Benjamin, German Idealism, and dialectic

Benjamin often speaks of dialectic, the logical movement powerfully confronted by German Idealism, in favorable terms: calling someone a dialectician for Benjamin is a compliment. He says of the work of Karl Kraus that it deserves respect because of its dialectical character:

"...the fact that this man is one of the very few who have a vision of freedom and can further it only by assuming the role of chief prosecutor is a paradox that most purely reveals the dialectic at work."
-"Karl Kraus (Fragment)," Selected Writings, volume 2, part 1.

But if dialectic is to be sought after as an amazingly forceful way of thinking, why would Benjamin say of German Idealists that they have a view of the world like those of Jünger who longed for a return to the militarization of World War I?

...as far as anyone could see over the edge of the trench, the surroundings had become the terrain of German Idealism: every shell crater had become a problem, every wire entanglement an antinomy, every barb a definition, every explosion a thesis; by day the sky was the cosmic interior of the steel helmet, and at night the moral law above.
-"Theories of German Fascism," Selected Writings, volume 2, part 1.

Because dialectic is able to be lifted (cf. my post on Derrida, below, as well as the writings of Althusser on Marx's "overturning" of Hegel in For Marx) from the world of German Idealists.
Dialectic is an amazing force precisely because it holds things in indeterminate (immediate) contradiction through its effort to determine (mediate) them. This holding together, this arresting and immobilizing that takes place through the negative work of dialectic (the work of the dialectic to not arrest--that is, the work of the dialectic to mediate, to mobilize, or to bring forth total-mobilization) is the most forceful element of dialectic. Why? It (that is, this holding in indeterminate, immediate contradiction) does not lend itself without distortion (that is, without determination or mediation) to the objectification of capitalism, fascism, any of the organizing political-economic structures that reduce the world to what Heidegger rightly calls (also against Jünger) a "world picture:" a world of images fully determined by technology. Given this, one needs to think of how Heidegger in his critique of the objectified world-picture really thinks dialectic too much as a process that brings this picture about, and does not think enough that dialectic's suspension and overturning of objectification in its very process of objectifying is precisely the power of it--this would be Benjamin's contention if he were to confront many of Heidegger's texts dealing with Hegel (which includes Being and Time--in fact one could argue Being and Time is Heidegger's most expansive meditation on Hegel). In other words, dialectic, while it renders everything into a world of images fully determined by technology, can also bring forth a world of images that are indeterminate with respect to technology, that use technology to bring forth these indeterminate images or immobilizations--it is not necessary to retreat from the objectification and images wholly, as Heidegger seems to think.
The world of Geman Idealism is precisley not the world of dialectic, then, for Benjamin: however (dialectically, of course) it is that world in that it utilizes its power of determination and resolving (mediation) most. German Idealism's relationship to the dialectic therefore cannot be simply overcome and the dialectic extracted from it, just like its landscape (the First World War) cannot be merely passed by or simply improved by the view that blasted it apart. In being lifted (relever) from them, dialectic is always stolen--it belongs still in a sense to those who originally owned it.