Showing posts with label de Man. Show all posts
Showing posts with label de Man. Show all posts

Friday, October 1, 2010

Empson

I've grown much more comfortable with Empson. I've always been amazed at his work (and his poetry, for that matter, of which I always want to read more), and liked it a lot, but have also been a little hedgy about his larger views of things mostly because I see him so pigeonholed in theoretical circles, and these views so distorted in relation to Richards especially:

[For Richards,] poetic language is purely affective and, therefore, can never lead to cognition, since it has no verifiable referential value in reference to an external object. [... (Nothing in this last statement is true, by the way--MJ) ...] The route may be different, but the starting point is the same as Roland Barthes. [...] By bringing down poetic language to the level of the language of communication, and in its steadfast refusal to grant aesthetic experience any difference from other human experiences, [Richards' view] is opposed to any attempt to confer upon poetry an excessively exalted function, while still preserving for it the freshness and originality of invention.

But what happens when one studies poetry a little closer following these instructions? A surprising answer is to be found in the work of William Empson, a brilliant student of Richards. [Empson says what] metaphor does is [...] instead of setting up an adequation between two experiences and thereby fixing the mind on the repose of an established equation, it deploys the initial experience into an infinity of associated experiences that spring from it. In the manner of a vibration spreading in infinitude from its center, metaphor is endowed with the capacity to situate the experience at the heart of a universe that it generates. [...] Far from referring to an object that would be its cause, the poetic sign sets in motion an imaging activity that refers to no object in particular. The "meaning" of the metaphor is that it does not "mean" in any definite manner.

[It is an "ambiguity," of course...]

In the seventh and last type of ambiguity [that Empson classifies in Seven Types], the form blows up under our very eyes. This occurs when the text implies not merely distinct significations but significations that, against the will of their author, are mutually exclusive. And here Empson's advance beyond the teachings of his master becomes apparent. For under the outward appearance of a simple list classifying randome examples, chapter seven develops a thought Richards never wanted to consider: true poetic ambiguity proceeds from the deep division of Being itself, and poetry does no more than state and repeat this division. Richards did recognize the existence of conflicts, but he invoked Coleridge, not without some simplification, to the appeal to the reassuring notion of art as the reconciliation of opposites. Empson's less serene mind is not content with this formula.

-Paul de Man, "The Dead-End of Formalist Criticism," 233-237 in Blindness and Insight.

I quote so much from de Man's bizarrely skewed introduction to the American formalist tradition for people on the Continent, not at all in order to imply that everyone (or even anyone) thinks about Empson along these lines. In fact, most people who appreciate him (like those who appreciate Barthes) really don't distort him at all, because Empson works so intuitively. But when it comes time to express themselves more abstractly about this appreciation, it usually is with some hesitation or at the expense of Richards that they do so. This is fine, actually, because they also understand Richards practically, and have a sense of the unwieldiness of his system (along with a sense that it's benefits are not chiefly in removing reference--which it does not do in Richards--or dethroning poetry, which could only really be the concerns of a de Man). And most of the time, this ends up only in a comment about the brilliance and general rightness of his larger views on his subject matter: Elizabethan drama, or Milton--or Pastoral, which de Man notably has to completely dismiss as unimportant or inessential, even "deceitful":

What is the pastoral convention, then, if not the eternal separation between the mind that distinguishes, negates, legislates, and the originary simplicity of the natural? [...]There is no doubt that the pastoral theme is, in fact, the only poetic theme, that it is poetry itself. Under the deceitful title of a genre study, Empson has actually written an ontology of the poetic, but wrapped it, as is his wont, in some extraneous matter that may well conceal the essential.
-"The Dead-End of Formalist Criticism," 239.

Someone, somewhere, is still thinking that this is a brilliant "reading" of Empson's Some Versions of Pastoral, precisely because it has such astounding antipathy towards what is actually meaningful for a real literary critic: if you can regard what Empson says about pastoral as a genre as "extraneous matter," you really have to have given up on "the poetic" (and poetry) a long time ago. Empson in that book actually articulates what his "versions" (something already more subtle than the caricature of "genre" into which de Man collapses them, the better to make his misreading convincing--it's the same move he makes everywhere) have to do with the possibility and future of poetry.

This is only to say that while the practical users of Empson know what he is up to, there is a theoretical context that takes advantage of this. So the (correct) championing of Empson gets slightly twisted into a ineffective attack of the formalist tradition (when Empson is actually a much more effective attacker than this), usually via a theoretical overemphasis on his types of "ambiguity." Empson is aligned with the close-readers, and then falls in slowly with the textualists, and then with the underminers of meaning. De Man here, as he always does, motivates all these unfortunate misapprehensions into a full-blown lie, and so I present it as a caricature, really, more than anything actually believed by anyone with any shred of practical knowledge about literary criticism and figures involved who is also interested in theory (no one except de Man really thinks Empson is a deconstructionist).

I also quote it because you can see some of the feelings that get used in this process: de Man (as John Guillory points out) was adept at collecting them and using them to cultivate resentment, so it's no surprise we find this work here. "Here Empson's advance beyond the teachings of his master becomes apparent," and Richard's apparent "appeal to the reassuring notion" are caricatures still, but unlike the actual theory they are a little closer to how we feel (they have to be, in order for them to shore up such a joke of a narrative), and are a little closer to what allows a theoretical pigeonholing of Empson and Richards to take place. The whole thing is not unlike Dryden and Pope, which is a notoriously one-sided comparison to begin with: the invocation of the master-student relationship ("master"! how overblown!) is serves this purpose most of the time.

But to the point: the key is "ambiguity," misunderstood by de Man as a non-referential play of language, stemming from a (de Man would put a "no doubt," or "necessarily" here) metonymic relationship between tenor and vehicle at the heart of metaphor. This is so off-the-wall that we just have to dismiss it to get anywhere: it patently ignores anything in the later work, and especially the doctrine of Mutual Metaphor, outlined in The Structure of Complex Words (a doctrine which actually makes allegory a species of metaphor, completely at cross-purposes with the anti-mimetic doctrine de Man is trying to push it towards). It also ignores anything hinting towards this doctrine in Seven Types itself (de Man calls everything but the seventh type of ambiguity "pseudo-types" of ambiguity, which should alert us that this claim itself is just an outright falsehood). But my point is that de Man is operating at the same sites that the theorizers of Empson's undermining of language do: the emphasis on ambiguity takes away from the bounds set to the ambiguity--not by the types themselves, but by the work of words, of language. This does not proceed in a Richards-like way, but--and here's my point--with an eye to what we do when we use language and begin to analyze it:

Much of our thinking has to be done in a summary practical way, trusting to a general sense of the whole situation in the background; we get a feeling that the rest of the situation is within call, so that we can concentrate our attention on one aspect, and this feeling is often trustworthy.

-The Structure of Complex Words, 1

This is an argument for the deeper consideration of the feelings themselves Complex Words will accomplish, and so the "often" is not meant to qualify the trustworthiness of the whole practical procedure. It is meant to stake out an area where we need closer attention to what we're doing beyond the practical, with a knowledge that "much of our thinking has to be done in a summary practical way." This general opinion of Empson is what the practical people appreciate in him, but which is hard itself to understand theoretically in an environment that likes to think generalization is impossible (and that also is willing to let such generalizations pass as "[for Richards] poetic language is purely affective," which is again a gross simplification and distortion of everything interesting and, wrong, yes, but also complex in Richards' understanding of poetry as "pseudo-statement"--I'll speak more of this next time, but now the name with its emphasis on "statement" should be enough to show you how stupid it is to equate Richards remarks with the "purely affective": indeed Empson in Complex Words shows how stupid it is himself, and how it ignores the real problems!). In the absence of this, we say the level at which Empson outlines the workings of language has to be undermining any generalization it could possibly make, and here we go wrong. I'll comment more on exactly what Empson is doing in another post. For now, I'll just leave this as an outline of where the problems in understanding him and his relation to Richards actually are.

Thursday, September 2, 2010

Simile

Just ran across one of my favorite similes from Virgil, at the beginning of Book VIII of the Aeneid. But I should say something about similes in general first, because they are very strange things. This is especially true when they take the extended "epic" form, which I actually think is the purest. Now, there are a lot of reasons to think otherwise: the epic simile provides a comparison which does not so much compare as narrate another story in miniature, and when they are not annoying for taking us away from the action, they vex our attempts to make sense of them, as they force even best interpretations to turn towards the awkwardness of allegory.

But many of these reasons come from a sense of the rhetorical canon (it doesn't have to be even an explicit rhetoric) that subordinates the simile to metaphor. Never mind the fact that this tendency often comes from the modern sense of metaphor as a function rather than a--for lack of a better word (the traditional "trope" having been coopted by de Man et. al.) I'll just say an artifice--which tends to justify itself with references the psyche empirically understood. Whether these take place in studies that present the empirical psyche straightforwardly as such (in a marriage of psychology and poetics that begins with I.A. Richards), or studies that veil it in a pseudo-phenomenological garb of anxiety and trauma (in a deconstructivism or late-Lacanianism), such view is problematic--not because empiricism provides its foundation, or because the reference is too psychological, but because such it sees the place where the psyche meets rhetoric as language, which is thereby both kept obscure and granted too much power (it becomes Language). This, by the way, is why this sense of metaphor as a function is really only helpful in structuralist poetics, which interprets the psyche psychoanalytically (as in Barthes) or with a genuine phenomenological intent (Ricoeur often, or the more un-de-Manian aspects of Derrida). Situating the link in a linguistic system which, made up as it is of signs, is able to be studied (that is, neither undifferentiated or wrapped in the mystery of infinite differentiation), these stay true to the real aim of the functional sense of metaphor, best outlined by Jakobson: to recover rhetoric by recovering its explanatory power, which means making it more economical (two tropes, which are brought into closer relationship to schemes) so as to restore some sense of the urgency of debates over typology (it will matter again whether the instance in question is an instance of metaphor or not).

But never mind all that: the point is that everything that makes us subordinate simile to a metaphoric function doesn't help us when it comes time to actually get a sense of the purpose of the simile. Here, it is more helpful to turn things around and say as Pope once did that a metaphor is really just a little simile: this junks all the deeper things we have learned about metaphor, and reduces them to the comparative purpose of the simile, but it gives us a perspective that doesn't take this comparative purpose for granted. More significantly, it changes the relationship between metaphor and simile from one of explicitness (when we think of simile subordinated, we often say that it is just a more explicit metaphor: we are apt to explain it as a metaphor that just "has" like or as) to one of size: we thereby understand the comparison accomplished by the "littler" simile as something more like a short illustration, and the comparison of the actual simile as something elaboration. There is something disgusting to modern ears in this, because it comes close to the late-19th century finishing-school sense of such tropes as ornaments that make everyday speech more noble, decorated, and serve to puff it up. But comparison as elaboration is something different than comparison as ornamentation, and it gives us some sense of the essential role that earlier generations felt such tropes played. For they did not have such a disgusting sense that proper speech should be utterly unornamented, devoid of anything but the most rudimentary grammatical connections and the plainest, most dumbed-down meaning: they did not have the sense that meaning was utterly opposed to the means that expressed it (a sense which is only exacerbated by weak attempts to dissolve this opposition and make everything "linguistic," like those of the empirical/postmodern theories I mentioned above--which is why I complain about them).

If we view the simile then in this light, we understand more its relationship to narrative. Perhaps we even see it see it as a modification of the storytelling impulse itself, a modification which seeks to put the fictional aspect of stories to good use: it seeks to find what in fiction compares or elaborates reality, and uses it to work up a fiction already being elaborated. Such a role might actually bring it more in line with a different, lyric impulse, which does not oppose fiction and reality but sets them side by side: the simile might be lyric trying to tell a story, in other words, or narrative trying to return to its similar lyric-like--sorry for the similes--lack of opposition to reality (considered as something different from history, which is mimetically duplicated--more on this in a moment). This view of similes can perhaps most be opposed to view that has to make sense of them as allegory, relating the components together into a hard lump which, in its self-consistency, opposes itself holistically, at one go, to whatever is being compared: maybe it is even the trope that is the very antidote to allegory itself, being always closer (even in its more condensed, illustrative moments) to something like a parable.

Of course, what challenges such a view is the mimetic function that is most explicit in a simile. But what if we rethought mimesis in our rethinking of this very explicitness above, though we did so in a (supposedly--I'd say seemingly but that's what is precisely in question) different connection? Elaboration, like fiction itself, surely involves mimesis, but is not therefore an elaboration of anything that would bring it into opposition to reality, or, as was often said in the height of a celebration of postmodernity, undermine reality (for similar--sorry again--perspectives on check out the writings of Paul Fry and Michael Wood: Fry has been advancing this "realist" view since the 80's). Once we admit the fact that fiction, with mimesis at its center driving it on, is not as opposed to reality as it is to history (the weird internal timeframe of literature, which you can sit down and slip back into at any time, is an index of this--which does not, for all that, make literature itself something ahistorical), we begin to see how tropes that involve it, that mobilize it, might actually be the stuff of literature that is most in connection with the real.

This probably requires a bit more thought (how does literature's non-opposition to the real differ from its elements? how does a novelistic fiction's elaboration of reality differ from lyric's, which is obviously more direct? and how much is rhetoric fictional, especially when it is used in "non-fictional" [a pejorative term, that brings fiction back into opposition with reality qua history] discourses?). But in the meantime, it certainly shows you why I grant the epic simile primacy, as something like the "model" of all similes, and explains as well perhaps the most fascinating thing about epic similes (and perhaps all similes, then): their amazing translatability. Because from a practical perspective they serve to elaborate first and foremost (or tend to open up into something more than illustration), they gain a certain freedom from the selection of words that tends to modify illustrations (metaphors) more. They differ, of course, from translation to translation, but are wonderfully portable.

Perhaps I'll give you an example with the following simile, to which I finally come:

quae Laomedontius heros
cuncta uidens magno curarum fluctuat aestu,
atque animum nunc huc celerem nunc diuidit illuc
in partisque rapit uarias perque omnia uersat,
sicut aquae tremulum labris ubi lumen aenis
sole repercussum aut radiantis imagine lunae
omnia peruolitat late loca, iamque sub auras
erigitur summique ferit laquearia tecti.

-Book VIII.18-25

Meanwhile the heir
of great Laomedon, who knew full well
the whole wide land astir, was vexed and tossed
in troubled seas of care. This way and that
his swift thoughts flew, and scanned with like dismay
each partial peril or the general storm.
Thus the vexed waters at a fountain's brim,
smitten by sunshine or the silver sphere
of a reflected moon, send forth a beam
of flickering light that leaps from wall to wall,
or, skyward lifted in ethereal flight,
glances along some rich-wrought, vaulted dome.

-Theodore Williams' (pretty literal) translation.

While Turnus and th' allies thus urge the war,
The Trojan, floating in a flood of care,
Beholds the tempest which his foes prepare.
This way and that he turns his anxious mind;
Thinks, and rejects the counsels he design'd;
Explores himself in vain, in ev'ry part,
And gives no rest to his distracted heart.
So, when the sun by day, or moon by night,
Strike on the polish'd brass their trembling light,
The glitt'ring species here and there divide,
And cast their dubious beams from side to side;
Now on the walls, now on the pavement play,
And to the ceiling flash the glaring day.
'T was night; and weary nature lull'd asleep
The birds of air, and fishes of the deep,
And beasts, and mortal men.

-Dryden's translation (I include three more lines because I think Dryden is doing a balancing act of some sort between night and day which nicely takes off from Virgil.)

I'll add other translations as I hunt them down.

Wednesday, May 12, 2010

Language

I am rereading Frances Ferguson's excellent early work, Wordsworth: Language as Counter-Spirit (1977). I remember the following statement well, though, not only because it is the first, most concise articulation of a position that will run through the rest of Ferguson's work, but also because I have always thought it the most sensible and most demanding of any possible position. In other words, I have--when push comes to shove--always come back and stuck to the approach it outlines:

The recent re-examination of literary language which has flourished increasingly in criticism is an attempt to articulate the implication of the statement that all literature is necessary linguistic. Yet this very preoccupation with language, which heuristically substitutes an interest in linguistic process for an interest in literary content (mythic, thematic, psychological), can itself become a rehearsal of pat answers and artificially persistent mysteries when "language" is taken as an absolute. The paradox that language is both the most familiar and the ultimately unknown element in any individual's experience seems overwhelming until we recognize once again that literary texts not only postpone but also mock whatever éblouissement the paradox inspires. Thus, this study anchors itself in texts--not because the text has iconic absoluteness but because the text is there to be read, and the reading itself can alone demonstrate the legitimacy of speaking as though any literary work reveals a consciousness of language and a simultaneous consciousness of its erosion of a mythically exalted status for language.
-Wordsworth: Language as Counter-Spirit, 2-3.

Remember this was said in 1977, at the height of what would be called, outside literature departments, "the linguistic turn." In other words it underscores what some people outside the discipline--as Tim Morton nicely puts it in a nice recent interview (and indeed Ferguson is talking about structuralism)--don't seem to understand in their (justified) backlash against postmodern excess (which it is misleading to heap on literature departments): language in some absolute sense was and is never, seriously, that big of a deal for most literary critics. Dealing mostly with words, sentences, meters, styles, plots, forms, genres, and other concrete things (over which we have an unparalleled, yet teachable mastery), what we know of languge is something abstract--not absolute. Absolutized, literary critics would never know what to do with it! How could we? The only people who did do this--those around de Man and some of the other star figures of yesteryear--were and are (and they merit this, though the suspicion is not always for the right reason) suspect throughout the discipline precisely for being so vague, and often treating the texts we read as props for something larger--and, let's just be frank, much less interesting. But Ferguson's suspicion towards the exaltation or absolutization of "language" is not the only thing or the main thing that I have found so useful here: the last sentence is in fact perhaps the most important, and is what makes the position both more positive and indeed most demanding, as I said above. What characterizes reading critically is this speaking "as though," which requires engagement with or a test of the text to be read--and not in any way that would (Wimsatt-like) absolutize this latter beyond the bounds of the test. What's more, to think of reading in this way is actually (like Ferguson does: the author of Solitude and the Sublime and Pornography, the Theory is certainly not anti-theory at all) to believe in and promote theorizing--not to reject it--for this is one way the "as though" can be refined (the "something larger" can be helpful and, depending on how it is developed, further concretize the often ambiguous operations involved in reading, though it is not really related to reading in the sense developed here--and indeed de Man can be extremely helpful). I might recall also a comment of one of my professors with which Ferguson's seems to resonate (and which I more and more agree with), even though he is looking backward at precisely the time she is writing this: as readers of literature, we never really were theorists but readers who hoped, who believed in, the possibility of theory--who were (and still are) in favor of having some theory.

Sunday, February 28, 2010

Themes and figures

On Touching--Jean-Luc Nancy is one of my favorite books by Derrida. I haven't seen it commented upon as much as I would have expected. I think that once they registered Derrida's death (which happened just when On Touching came out in English), people in America turned quite quickly to The Animal That Therefore I Am (which came out soon after, even though the text dates to 1997). Perhaps this was because the latter book represented something like a newer theme for Derrida--or the making-explicit of a theme that goes back all the way to Grammatology at least, where one can find some comments upon animals if I remember right. Or it was because animality was becoming the fashionable issue it is today--though I don't like to be so cynical about this, since theory works via fashion and styling (you'd have thought people would have come to accept this by now, annoying as it sometimes is, and really revived its utopian potential). Regardless of the reason, I mean to imply that there might have been something old-fashioned about this work for some people. Its main issues are phenomenological, even though we get forays into issues in religion (and even though this--as Martin Hägglund is right to point out--has become an almost too-popular way into Derrida in recent years), and certainly into the body. We're concerned here with Husserl and his issues, at the end of the day--and of course with Aristotle, who is never quite too far from a phenomenologist's mind. More than anything, it's this extended consideration of these thinkers which Derrida really focused upon early in his work that makes the long, interesting look at Merleau-Ponty here seem belated--even though he already produced a reading of The Visible and the Invisible in 1993.

I don't mean to imply that the work is only a return to origins, after a long career (though I don't quite have the problem others do of imputing to Derrida an action like this that would completely contradict his "philosophy"). Indeed, besides the fact that Derrida engages phenomenology continually, or basically brings the tradition of phenomenology to bear upon every problem he encounters, these thinkers are here because it is Nancy who engages with them and has them in his mind--and the book is above all else a fascinating meditation on and tribute to the latter's work (which I don't myself like much, but whatever). Nevertheless, it's this feeling of a return to explicit phenomenological figures--if not themes (and I'll come to the distinction in a moment)--that makes me really like this book.

That, and its general sloppiness. The book is all over the place--it rounds off thoughts in weird places, repeats itself without much difference all the time, and suffers from that frankness, that real drive to just get it out there that comes from a less crafted effort. I don't mean to say it isn't unbelievably wrought, or baroque in the ways characteristic of Derrida's other texts. Indeed it plays with certain phrases to a higher degree than usual (though it comes nowhere near Rogues), since it takes up an extremely dense semantic area, as we'll see. But it just isn't as minimalist as his other work (and Derrida's work in general can be thought of as something like philosophic minimalism, as much as people are fond of talking about it as jazz). This is probably because he didn't have enough time--but I like Derrida when he is sloppy or rushed, mostly because it is here that he is the most creative, and the least literary. The Gift of Death is another great example of this: we have something like a Derrida that can't go back and revise, a Derrida that is up-front and open, even frank--and despite how enigmatic and deep the constructions of that text in particular can be.

One passage in particular I enjoyed rereading today, because it was quite frank about something which was essential to Derrida's popularity in literature departments. Derrida is talking about a particular question of touch that he claims is put to Nancy (and by turns him, considering Nancy), and its inseparability from a question about Christianity--in short, whether the question of touch is a specifically Christian issue (keep in mind the becoming-flesh or de/en-spiritualizing of Christ), and what it would then mean that the question of touch is still an open question. He then says:

I knew, I thought I had known for a long time that if there is a work of thinking today that measures up to this, to this question, and actually measures itself against it as the incommensurable, in acts of language and reflection, then it is Nancy's work, even when it doesn't acknowledge all the references that I have just evoked, beginning with Aristotle and the Gospels. I thought I had known this for a long time (266).

This is perhaps less hyperbolic than it comes off, since we have that uncertain, unsure pause over knowing and thinking one knows. But even if it is I don't quite care too much--it is a tribute by a friend after all (and to a friend who had just had surgery on his heart). Regardless, Derrida then seems to qualify this unsure thought (that still was so sure Nancy referred to the question, even if he didn't acknowledge certain references) with a very sure or certain thought regarding how reference itself works:

To be sure, a search (which may have been too hasty) through a number of Nancy's early works--roughly until the middle of the 1980's, and strangely including, therefore, The Experience of Freedom--had shown us that neither the theme nor the figure of touch lays siege to his discourse, invests in it, or above all else invades it, as will be the case--we can establish it today--in all his recent publications (266).

We can be sure that even an acknowledgment of certain themes or figures would not necessarily establish that reference. But this in turn can only proceed if we know something about the distinction between a theme and the figure:

Let me insist that this is an issue of the theme and the figure--and this is more than just one difficulty among others. Because if there is "the" sense of touch [Nancy himself says "there is no 'the' sense of touch"], which is to say this motif of which Nancy speaks and that he now thematizes increasingly, while saying "there is no 'the' sense of touch" there are also--before or beyond this object of thought of discourse, beyond what is called touch, which is is henceforth dealing with--all these figural and apparently nonthematic operators with which he is continually playing (as I am doing here), through which and thanks to which Nancy has long since put touching into words, and said it and touched it (266).

What Derrida is essentially saying is that the thematizing of touch that Nancy is doing in his more recent work can be--or actually has to be--related to those moments even in his non-touch-centered work by way of Nancy's recourse to various operators, various used-up metaphors and tropes--figures. Figures like what? Derrida turns to a recent work, where we can see this working precisely in spite of the increasing thematization itself: Corpus. Nancy is talking about sacrifice--but I won't try and reconstitute or paraphrase all that, it's not important for my point--and Derrida quotes him:

There then follow, in the next sentence, two instances of the word "touch." They deserve an infinite analysis, on the scale of that upon which they touch, namely, precisely, a process of infinitization, the very same one that was questioned in the previous chapter: "To touch upon this denial, or, to put it succinctly, this manipulation, is to touch upon this simultaneity; it is to be obliged to wonder whether dialectical negativity washed away the blood, or whether the blood must, on the contrary, inevitably hemorrhage from it. In order to prevent the dialectical process from remaining a comedy, Bataille wants the blood to flow" (my emphases--J.D.) (268).

All well and good. Then Derrida gets frank:

In this case, one may easily say that it is a question of a manner of speaking, of some kind of trope. Just try and find someone who has ever literally "touched" a denial [which is what Nancy says, above]. At times Nancy seems to be drawing on the fund of an old rhetoric that says "to touch" for "to concern," "to aim," "to think," "to refer to," "to speak of," "to take as its object," "to thematize," precisely, in a precisely pertinent fashion, and so forth. But because, in the same sentence, one sees first the hands of "manipulation" (another figure but more strictly determinate), next the "blood" rise up or take shape, the literality of "touch" thereby becomes more sensitive, nearer, less conventional. One begins to ask oneself: whence comes and what comes as the authorizing instance of this figure of "touch?"? Why does one say "to touch" for "to speak of," "to concern," "to aim," "to refer to" in general, and so forth? Is it because touch, as Aristotle said, is not a "unique sense?" More and more, Nancy plays this game--the most serious game there is--which consists in using, as if there were not the slightest problem, this common and ancestral figure of tactile language in order to draw our attention to "'the' sense of touch" itself--which there is not. He invests this very invasion that, little by little, prevents us from distinguishing between thematic sense and operating function... (268).

The point is one that is familiar to readers of Derrida (maybe one that is old, tired). But you can also see the emergence of and collapsing of that distinction between theme and figure, and feel how it is essential to the point.

But what is that distinction? It was--as I hinted above--one that literary critics not only knew but also, in the 60s and 70s, were ready to appreciate. Literary criticism was getting bogged down with what we still call "thematic" readings: readings that trace a particular set of features through a text and supply some sort of organizing logic that would tie them all together. We don't have to go back to some previous "school" of vague psychoanalytic readings based on the presence or absence of various phallic symbols to get some sense of what this was like (and even these are less thematic--even much more allegorical--than some will claim), because indeed most readings of texts even in our age will still tend to be thematic in nature. It's not that thematic reading is bad or unskilled: though some would argue this, I would just say it's one of our our semi-natural attitudes towards making the text mean as a whole, on a somewhat more formal level (I notice several instances of "death," or "death-related imagery," and try to make sense of its "recurrence"). Indeed, amateurism wasn't even able to be the case as far as the literary critics who appreciated Derrida were concerned, since it was not the unskilled but the tendencies of the professional literary critic (psychoanalytic or not) that they were engaged with. No, the problem is that in these readings, one can't quite specify in what the themes inhere: they are just there, able to be organized, sometimes backed up with reference to style.

De Man in particular was ready to launch an attack on thematic readings as a whole by grounding this search for the logic of the text in the level of the figure. Figures (schemes and tropes) are actually parts of the text, though organizing them is somewhat more difficult. Regardless, they offer a viable alternative and moreover something like an even more traditional one. De Man would make much of this, grounding the professionalism of the literary critic in his ability to notice and handle such figures (which, again, I don't think is wholly legitimate), and distinguishing literary language itself from all other language (while claiming it to be superior) in terms of its essential figurality (which I think is even more suspect). Nevertheless, the original anti-thematic impetus is important (and being clear about it is really the best thing de Man did--and we should preserve that), and it is this that one can find, indeed, in Derrida. In fact, Derrida's use of the figure hit upon something even more crucial--which allowed all those power-grabs by de Man but which isn't necessarily bound up with them--which was that privileging the figural over the thematic actually requires that we reconceive our object of study itself. De Man interpreted this by asserting that as long as a thematic approach remains dominant, even references to figures will remain thematic in nature: it is the logic of the theme that will serve to make these figures significant. So what is needed is some sort of grounding of a reading in figures that is in turn unthematizable--and indeed this is what Derrida precisely offered.

But you'll notice in the above that Derrida doesn't make this distinction to preserve it: he collapses it as well. This is why the distinction is a textual one for Derrida (occurring somewhere between thinking and the work) and a linguistic or rhetorical one for de Man: Derrida reads texts, de Man reads rhetoric. And I'll just end things here by noticing what Derrida says about rhetoric itself, as he expands upon his remark above on why we need to insist upon the figure/theme distinction:

Let me just insist that this is an issue of the theme and the figure. [...] But insisting is not nothing. Even if it did nothing but bring to the light of day what was sleeping in the shadow, even if it exhibited literally and as such (thus painfully baring its body) what had until then been a used-up metaphor, a familar trope we use without paying much attention to it--well, this intensification of insistence is no longer a simple rhetorical movement. It comes down to thinking and to the thinking body of thought (266).

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

Best of... Critiquing de Man

I've always been suspicious of de Man. That said, I've also always tried to give him a fair shake. You never should dismiss any thinker outright. Part of the problem, though, is that de Man takes a lot of your good will and puts it into his service. It's the common practice of a cynic, of course--not too hard to get around (though it takes John Guillory some time). But you have to be vigilant.

Part of the appeal of de Man is not so much his aphoristic language, but the modernism of his postmodernism--as Jameson has rightly put it. Everything is tightly worked out to fold back onto itself, in a perfect self-perpetuating form in which you are... now not in control. On another level, it's also the appeal of a system: with de Man, you can put away all the considerations that have to come from context, and just ram a text through the system. Oh yes, you have to pay very close attention, work through all sorts of problems--but that's made a part of the system too, insofar as it is what the system accounts for as an act of "reading" irreducible to the system.

Regardless, it's a significant and influential appropriation of Derrida--so influential that American philosophers confronting Derrida might still not have encountered the more (I hesitate to say original) French-Algerian article (one can often tell by their reference to Derrida's overintense focus on language... the latter being a primarily de Manian preoccupation).

I'm only realizing now that I'm a little outside that circuit--having never quite been in on the de Man sort of deconstruction, whenever I encounter it I just feel odd. But I think the important thing to stress is that it wasn't a "misappropriation" (something de Manians love to get all moralistic about) so much as a powerful coordination of all sorts of concerns, a lot of them political (and even the desire to be apolitical is quite political) and having to do with the state of the university and the English department (particularly Yale's department, which never was consolidated into an actual department like in other schools) at the time. It is also something we can sort of ignore or put by, while we try and cultivate some completely new sense of how to relate Derrida to the reading of literature. We can't let the dour de Manian, or for that matter the Derridian, stop that project, especially with his system.

That said, we have to learn to extract what we can from de Man, I think. And there is a lot that is useful here. Some of the following posts try and bring these elements out, while combatting what is the desperate sort of attempt of de Man to make literature both relevant and irrelevant at the same time:

Prior to a Hermeneutics and a History: I try to focus on what is good and anti-hermeneutic about this de Manian proposition--written for a class with Peter Brooks.

Theory, Pedagogy, de Man: A look at de Man's remark, "the resistance to theory is itself theoretical," and why this sort of aphoristic tendency of his produces a sketchy "pedagogical" situation--that is a situation sketchy insofar as we insist on its supposedly pedagogical nature.

Demystifying the Singular: Consolidating the critique, by looking at more dangerous lines in "Criticism and Crisis." There's a long exchange in the comments where I try to defend my views and distinguish de Man from Derrida (a task well-accomplished by Gasché, but I try and do it in a more holistic sort of way). One thing I didn't emphasize enough in this exchange is that de Man truly thinks the origin of the language of the sciences are "literary," and that this is insane. Now, it's not insane insofar as it engages an issue involved in literary studies all the way back to Richards and his rejoiners to C.P. Snow. It's insane insofar as it encroaches on articulating a sort of metaphysics of the letter--which many people still attribute to Derrida himself.

Giving Up Deconstruction: Not where I give up deconstruction, but where I reflect on many people being dissatisfied with just this sort of de Manian metaphysics of the letter (this is a sort of sequel to "Demystifying"). I use Frances Ferguson's excellent situation of this problem in terms of 18th century aesthetics and the role of Kant.

Blindness: I read "The Rhetoric of Blindness" and try and sum up the differences between Derrida and de Man that I've been articulating in "Demystifying" and "Giving Up." What's sort of amazing is how hard this is to do in literary terms, when philosophically it is extremely clear what these differences are... something that shows why new and more sophisticated interpretations of Derrida in America usually come from philosophy departments. This, however, isn't a sign that Derrida was really a philosopher all along--or that the new Derrida is actually more correct than the previous Derrida (the fact that many of these philosophers worked in Comp Lit. shows their knowledge of Derrida is impossible without the literary emphasis). Indeed I claim elsewhere that philosophy will never quite grasp Derrida without going back to the literary-critical concern. What this means though is that the de Manian approach pulls Derrida too quickly towards reading an individual literary object. Other literary approaches to Derrida--like that of Geoffrey Hartman--can often be deeper.

Blindness, part 2: One last word on the issue.

Predicaments: Looking a little closer at how people get de Man out of certain binds.

Reading and Society: Here I consider the de Manian drive to separate literature from any significant social context by way of a simplistic reduction of these contexts to the Barthesian "codes." The apolitical tendency of de Manian deconstruction is quite apparent here: society and politics has to somehow come only out of the literariness of the literary--nowhere else. All one has to do to oppose this is say that a social context is not the same thing as a Barthesian code. Insofar as the code is inadequate, however, de Man's critique is actually quite welcome.

Derrida, de Man, Materialism: In the last post I'll collect here I critique de Manian materialism and Derrida's weird insistence that he is asserting something similar to de Man on this issue. Indeed, I critique Derrida's buddying-up with de Man in general--I simply think they're on completely different pages, except in their shared high-modernist temperament. More specifically, I make the case for considering Derrida as more of an idealist than a materialist--with one important caveat: this is only really valid insofar as it is just a sort of heuristic. Nevertheless, I think it is helpful to combat the increasingly meaningless postmodern insistence on the "materiality" of the letter (and which Derrida himself critiqued extensively in his writings on Lacan). The trace, it is true, isn't ideal. But conceiving it as the effect of idealization--well, that's what Derrida's very first books lay out. It's important to retain that connection, and understand that it therefore forces a rethinking of materiality--one that makes the latter something completely different from anything de Man is insisting upon.

Tuesday, January 5, 2010

Bad theory

Almost forty years now of theory widely practiced in the US--and we only have a general sense of what theory is. It's a notorious problem that is actually its own solution: theory is one of the only fields where knowledge doesn't know what it has to be. So perhaps we shouldn't ever have to lock down what it is. Neverthless, it has assumed certain shapes. These too should not be avoided or combated in the name of preserving continual micro-self-differentiation etc., etc. Rather, bad elements (that is, bad procedures, bad ways of writing into which we slip--bad theorizing rather than bad theoretical positions or theories) should be identified, isolated, and clipped off or left alone to wither. Here then is what might constitute the "bad theory" (and it should be clear that by "bad" I mean something like "defunct" or "spoiled") that we might just hesitate before putting into service yet again, in another empty denunciation of... what have you:

Theory gone bad is theory that tries to assure the unqualified prolongation of theory. Theory should be finite--more than that, it should continually, with each use, project the point at which it might not be of use. Thus even if you want to say theory is immanent to thought itself, and therefore finite in that respect (when thought dies out theory will die out too), it would still be avoiding the issue: the issue is that the production of something different than theory cannot just be problematized from the outside.

Ethical theory is theory gone bad. There is too much talk of ethics and responsibility now, and this produces a lot of bad theory. This is because the use of ethical terms is the quickest way to build a bridge between politics and theory, or rather the politicization that takes place as theory (as I've outlined before) and the realm of society in all its diffuseness. Perhaps it is an attempt to thicken the overquick linkages to the political realm which early theory indeed made. But there's no reason this has to take the form of ethics--except possibly because this allows theory to sound more relevant, to issue more injunctions. At it's limit, this involves the dissolution of everything political about theory into philosophy, which has always been too comfortable with staying out of politics as it is: why ethics and responsibiliy are semi-proper philosophical subjects is because politics often comes to interrupt and situate philosophical speculation, embarrassing it. Theory that strives to be philosophical (or pseudo-philosophical) shouldn't go down the same road. In this respect I agree even with the extreme assertion of Zizek that, within the period under consideration (1933 and a little after), Heidegger's politicization of his philosophy is more valuable than his outlines of the structures of proper philosophizing (in his courses especially) that borders on an ethics--which is what in general I take away from his recent consideration of Heidegger's joining the Nazis (in In Defense of Lost Causes). That doesn't at all make what Heidegger did right--as Zizek would crudely hold, himself couching things in an overblown ethical language which supposes that the value of this could have been disclosed to him personally and guided his action at the same time as that action could represent a value attributed after the fact, which we perceive as the imposition of politics on the situation (this language--increasingly Badiouian--confuses things almost completely, as I've said before regarding Zizek on this fraught issue). But to attribute such value means (however crudely or confusedly) to recognize that politics imposes itself continually and is actively contained and bracketed by philosophies as well as other forms of knowledge. Theory normally attempts to trace what is thereby left out--but with an ethical turn (which was foreshadowed in the "deconstructivism" practiced at Yale by de Man, where people preached to no end about responsibility in reading), it loses its vocation and becomes increasingly irrelevant. At the same time, and insofar as this irrelevance suffuses theory, "the political" comes up more and more, leading us to the next form of bad theory:

Reifying concepts in order to protect them from reification. Such, at least, is the strategy I see behind such ugly invocations of "the political" or "the social." This form of parody only lends itself to a high seriousness that undoes the reason for adopting the parodic gesture in the first place.

Similarly, bad theory trades in commonplaces. These include the use of phrases like "identity politics," which are most of the time just codes for a reactive movement against queer or feminist impacts upon the humanities. But "western metaphysics" is also a commonplace. Eventually, this trade in commonplaces (a dissolution of the commons?) results in a prohibition on experience itself, as each of these are traded in for something supposedly known (and never described in detail)--or turned back into their reified pseudo-philosophical counterpart by the move we just mentioned.

This is related to the bad-theoretical overuse of alterity as a concept. The dynamics in which alterity engages us are ultimately reductive and need to be reopened back up into the contexts (experiential) from which they emerge. Even if the concept is used to precisely fight reduction, to insist on irreducibility, it has become an uncreative way to reorganize a wide array of phenomena along too-familiar lines.

This is also the way that bad theory ends up relying too much on "language," and makes it into a homogenous field through which everything has to pass. Language isn't that important to good theory. Or, rather, when it becomes a crutch, it isn't language.

Next, bad theory quickly displaces social dynamics too quickly into theoretical terms. An example would be the oft cited "subordination of feminism by Marxism." What and who are we actually talking about here? It is here where Foucault's "discourse" comes in to save the day: when in doubt, say discourse does it. Theories of ideology, in comparison, have infinitely more subtlety--and that's saying something. In Foucault himself, the notion is structured (in the Archaeology of Knowledge) to get him out of precisely the dilemma this question (what? who?) produces, as it is posed to him by people who rightly were wondering just how he was able to coordinate so much information concerning the rise of the human sciences. While it's right to insist that the stratifications of discourse, as well as its effectivity (and by means of such insistence, discourse thereby becomes a richer concept in Judith Butler and Edward Said), this might not be enough to rescue the concept from its reduction to an empty field producing too many of those effects. Discourse has to be used more carefully, with more structuralist concepts brought in to thicken the mix.

Bad theory thinks of itself as avant-garde. It has an easy relationship to its own history that sadly ends up mirroring the simplistic histories of ideas which it was supposed to displace. In general, it proceeds as an arrogant new humanism by thinking of itself as a progressive adventure.

Bad theory thinks it only includes by opening itself to multiplicities. While the focus on alterity is reductive, it'd be wrong to see multiplicity as an alternative, or something that does the job better--even if one conceives of it "rightly" (that is, itself fraught with difference or composed only of differences and dimensions, as in Deleuze rather than in Laclau and Mouffe). Multiplicity might not always be the right thing to which a situation must be opened up or in terms of which it should be conceived. Something like totalization can be mobilized against universality and even unity and oneness, as in Sartre or Adorno.

This touches on another aspect of bad theory: it's unwillingness to use more than one or two theories. Bad theory is usually only one or two theories, which gets stuck to or followed to the letter. It's not yet dogma, because it has so much functionality and can in general also be illuminating. But it seeks to eliminate other theories or foreclose their imposition--which occurs often, and as an annoying conceptual muddle--precisely by extending the one position (and flattening or restricting itself so they can be assimilated without reducing them--which would require changing the current stance). Good theory is polyglot and patchwork: it knows when to shut up in one system and shift to another (in other words, it shouldn't proceed by increasing the number of prohibitions upon itself--something nearly all bad theory does--and then get angry at those who misunderstand the minimalist language). Just because the concept itself--here multiplicity--is actually structured (rigorously) in order not to foreclose something, doesn't mean everyone should see how it doesn't exclude something. Everyone shouldn't have to get on your page (or be immanent to whatever) to be on the same page. Moreover, theory should actually open itself up to other things at the edge of theory, which theory isn't--thus I insisted at the beginning on the finitude of theory, which now is rethought spatially--indeed like literary theory and literary analysis. This leads into my last characterization:

Bad theory thinks it itself is politics: while theory represents the politicization (if only by oblique suggestion) of various other fields and their materials and procedures, it has to be interrupted by something from outside itself--or, as theory, has to go someplace other than the lecture hall--in order to actually become something like activism. Along these lines, one shouldn't think that because one's theory says it does not separate a particular conception and politics (like in theoretical Spinozism), introducing the concept into an arena is not political, nor does it link the politicization that might (and only might) thereby occur to actual politics. It's not that there is a gap which we can never bridge--it is simply that politicization and politics itself requires this lack of certainty as to whether it is, in any instance, traversed, as I think Judith Butler (for one) outlines quite well.

Saturday, January 2, 2010

Style

I think style is extremely useful as a way into a text, and I often take it up instead of form if I want to attune myself to what is going on in a poem or even in critical/expository writing (I don't use it really while reading a novel, and I'd be hard pressed to put it into service even in a modernist text: issues of plot and character are simply more important there). As soon as it becomes the sole thing specified by one's interpretation, though, or the only upshot of the analysis, two problems emerge. Style becomes autonomous, replacing the issue of form, and thereby bolstering the hardness of the text rather than opening it up into language--in short style becomes something of the artifact. Style also can then become a mere informing presence, and remain at the level of the artist/genius who has a particular style, carries himself with a particular style, etc.

In Anglo-American criticism, all this is really confused by the introduction of the issue of form, which tries--despite what those in stylistics will tell you--to be more specific about precisely what is involved in style. It offers this as an alternative to the specification that comes in stylistics proper through linguistics, and I think (insofar as the retreat from linguistic analysis opens the text to practical criticism, as it does) represents an advance. At the same time, this formalist approach seems to suppose that stylistics itself from the beginning is quite crude, proceeding without its own particular act of specification.

This, however, is a minor problem brought up by the intrusion of form. The more significant one is when rhetoric comes back to supplement this formalism. Combined with the formalistic approach, what hasn't been approached in terms of form can be got with rhetoric. This is bad for both stylistics and formalism, since formalism has now merely become the former with its terms reversed: now one starts from minor units of argumentation and moves back only to the level of an informing presence more general and causal than any sort of actual tension in the object (which a stricter formalism would actually provide).

What seems to ameliorate this situation is 1) a general sense that the function of literary language is still communication and experience, however formally intricate it becomes (thus form always has to be subordinated to the task of shoring up language: in other words, one must have a sense that this increasing intricacy actually adds to the communicative ability of literature), and more precisely 2) the introduction of a distinction within style itself on the basis of this communicational thesis about literature--one which William Wimsatt once made in an essay entitled "Verbal Style" (collected in The Verbal Icon). The latter will then have effects on the formal level which will curb the slipshod use of rhetoric we just outlined.

Wimsatt's distinction is between logical and counterlogical stylistic virtues. What he means is basically that there are pieces of language that have a logical structure and pieces that are basically without logic. One just can't explain the latter except in something like associative terms--and in fact one does a disservice to them by reducing them to a logical framework. The greatest example of the logical he has is the parallelism--which he analyzed at length in his amazing early book The Prose Style of Samuel Johnson--and the greatest example he has of the counterlogical is rhyme itself. I quote from another one of Wimsatt's essays because there you see how the counterlogical is rightly described:

The music of the rhyme is mental; it consists in an odd, almost magic, relation of phonetic likeness which encourages us to perceive and believe in a meaning otherwise asserted by the words... The principle is well illustrated in a few of Pope's proper-name rhymes, where we may note an affinity for a certain old-fashioned and childish form of riddle to be found in the pages of The Farmer's Almanac. Why is A like B? Because the name of A or of something connected with A means B or something connected with B. Why is a dog dressed warmer in summer than in winter? Because he wears a fur coat, and in summer he wears a fur coat and pants. Why is a certain poet a dangerous influence upon married women? Because his name sounds like something.

Poor Cornus sees his frantic wife elope,
And curses Wit, and Poetry, and Pope.

Why is a certain scholar a graceless figure? Because his name shows it:

Yet n'er one sprig of laurel graced these ribalds,
From slashing Bentley down to pidling Tibbalds.
-"Rhetoric and Poems: Alexander Pope" in The Verbal Icon

If the sound is an echo to the sense, as Pope himself famously said (in a phrase tirelessly quoted in the 18th century), well the sense here must be nonsense--if we conceive of rhyme from a logical perspective. If we see it from a counterlogical perspective, the thing makes its own sense, because we have not narrowed sense down to simply logic (later de Man would describe all logic in terms of grammar, and this in turn skewed everything Wimsatt is trying to distinguish here--at the same time as making the act of analytic description much easier and indeed logical). Here is Wimsatt on a related phenomenon, the pun:

Puns have been assimilated into recent criticism so often with phrases like "fruitful ambiguity" or "paradoxical tension" that it is easy not to realize just what a curious thing a pun in poetry is.
-"Verbal Style: Logical and Counterlogical," 214

The literary critical tendency to reduce a piece of language to a form in which it is put back into service of the logic of the poem at the same time is a tendency to sever its connection with communication and experience. Or rather it is that formalist tendency (the phrase "fruitful ambiguity" is William Empson's, and the phrase "paradoxical tension" is Cleanth Brooks') to treat the piece of language as an artifact (or indeed a matter of fact). By no longer using "tension" as a heuristic tool (as I think it is often used by the formalists in practice, as I implied above) but as a substitute for rhetorical classification (a slackening formalism that after I.A. Richards--in fact as soon as Empson himself, and perhaps there most egregiously until we come to his later work--we can see growing), it becomes precisely a heuristic tool for producing logic out of the counterlogical, and a sense out of a more lived and experienced (and not artifactual) verbal affinity like a pun (it is experienced as wit, as a tapping of the contingent).

So if we rightly hesitate before thinking that a rhyme will support the meaning of a phrase--something that even now (and indeed perhaps especially now) is not done enough--it is because we are trying to open up analysis again to this more communicative level of language (full of the counterlogical alongside the logical) and in turn something about style: the fact that it remains chained to the twofold problem that I talked about above while also leading one into a poem by pointing to something beyond the form and rhetoric.

Tuesday, December 29, 2009

Whole pie

One special notion entertained by the Chicago critics is that the only alternative to a genre criticism is an escape into the psychology of the author or reader. Thus they execute what I shall call a double or slant antithesis, one which is not a true or exclusive opposition. They say that, if criticism leaves the species or kinds of poetry to search for the general definition of poetry itself, then criticism leaves behind also the cognitive object and passes into the realm of general psychology. They seem to assume that there cannot be a general objective discussion of any topic. You have to divide it into its parts or species in order to remain objective. If you try to pick up a pie whole, it will melt into a plan for a pie or the taste of a pie. If you cut it into slices, it will remain pie and whole pie. The argument might gain something of plausibility if we were able to entertain that literal equation of poem with physical artifact which has been criticized above. In the realm of artifacts, if we were somehow constrained to talk only about "artifacts" and never or little about "houses" or "hammers," the objects of our discourse might conceivably tend (at least if we were not on guard) to lose tangibility and become just qualities or, by a further slip, just human aims and methods. But poems, as we have said, are not physical artifacts; they are, to start with, verbal acts. Their definition and defense have to be drawn along a different line.
-William Wimsatt, "The Chicago Critics: The Fallacy of the Neoclassic Species" in The Verbal Icon

This is what Wimsatt calls the "fallacy of the neoclassic species"--perhaps the least memorable fallacy featured in The Verbal Icon because it hovers between the two others: the famous "intentional fallacy" and the other (and equally important) "affective fallacy." Perhaps the fallacy here is actually closest to the latter. This fallacy is where something like generic convention is taken to be the ultimate determiner of the form, and thus the form gets hardened (in a way that it wouldn't if it were seen to produce concretion or complexity says Wimsatt--obviously anticipating his important essay "The Concrete Universal") into something identical with the shape of the poem on the page. Thus, it should be clear that when Wimsatt opposes taking a poem as a physical artifact, and affirms the verbal act, he actually means that we shouldn't think of the poem as a materialization of some ("doughy" he says--Wimsatt likes confection-metaphors) abstraction called language (this position would be resolutely against the linguistic determinism--and indeed sham materiality--we find in Paul de Man). Such a view (combining what he rightly says is an Aristotelian view and, when pressed hard as to what makes the artifact, a Crocean view of poetry) encourages considerations of the "whole object"--that is, considerations that relate any minor point back to the rest of the poem, producing a sort of "tension" that defines the work or requires that any local change (in a novel, the reinterpretation of one character's action) be registered throughout the work (by a reinterpretation of the whole plot, say)--where this whole is defined only as the poem on the page. In short, this makes form too static, or "tension" too defining, at the same time as it makes local "ambiguity" too important. Two indicted critics here would be Cleanth Brooks on the one hand (dear to most New Critics) and William Empson (dear not only to deconstructionists like de Man but indeed to most current critics and theorists) on the other--though it is their tendencies as combined and put to work by the Chicago critics (R.S. Crane included) that are under consideration here. As you can see from the quote above, this all is involved in the general movement of over-avoiding the affective fallacy at the same time as one commits the intentional fallacy (and covers up the deed).

Well, almost everything: Avatar

Let's just say (and without any spoilers), Avatar does a lot right that I said Star Trek does wrong. I was a little off in saying the movie does everything right, as I did in an overexcited tweet a couple days ago after seeing the movie. Star Trek might be the most lengthy popular meditation on what it means to stay within a world created by an SF series--and for that it deserves some serious credit, even if, by the cheap postmodern device of trauma (cheap, that is, when made formalistic--not when it appears as content) it often reduces this world to what is called a "franchise." Avatar instead is a mashup of all sorts of (properly) SF and fantasy devices (I mean to imply that trauma is not a generic-specific device, but one that typically disrupts things all across the board), from "unobtainum" to the concept of the avatar itself.

This doesn't mean at all that the movie is a ripoff--SF and fantasy, like any genre, work in this self-reflexive way (a way I don't think many commentators on the movie so far have really recognized, which is odd). I hesitate to call this way "intertextual," because that horribly vague concept precisely overlooks everything specific about genre (and more specifically form, but that's another post) which needs to be brought to bear upon any consideration of such works. Indeed, condemnations of the film as racist have to proceed as if it did not occupy any particular generic space. Thus, "Avatar is just Dances With Wolves" is the equation through which this critique makes its first steps, while it is only in reflecting upon that generic space (making allowances of course for the fact that it is pop-SF, or "scifi"--perhaps even "syfy"--that we're considering here, though that also opens up a question of genre from the inside as it were) that a condemnation really would gain its force. Of course, there are simply discursive codes that are racist, and there isn't any need to be more specific about them (one of the ways to remove the problems of racism is to suggest the accusation is only superficial): but the point is that the concept of code (when it remains only at the level of a wide-ranging discourse, and nothing more specific, like a filmic or even SF/fantasy code) may dissolve the presence of different racist elements in the work--and especially emerging elements, ones that don't fall into codified pattern.

Thus, what seems racist about the film is not the general portrayal of the Na'vi as othered in typical ways, but, I'll contend, the particular logic at work in their bodies as they intersect with the device of the avatar. The most important line of the film, for me, was the throwaway one which made this explicit: "I had to trust my body," the protagonist says. And is the properly SF situation that makes such a statement really weird and interesting and problematic: what does "my" mean when that is actually the body of something or someone else (the thing/person status of the avatar itself--a body grown for another--is really quite uncanny and disturbing when, even with the use of a pronoun, one begins to restore to it something like the capacity for its own control of itself)? Once we see that the whole colonial problem that is the main focus of the film emerges here in this scene of education in appropriation, the problems provoked by the presence or absence of racist codes have to transform.

But it isn't just appropriation that is at issue here, and this is the first way that the transformation occurs. What is almost more important than the question of who controls this body, or who is proper to this body in any vague sense (the sense in which postmodern theory stretches Heideggerian themes to sometimes foreclose less seemly questions of who owns this body--a question I'll just leave on the table, or take up later), is the way the body works in the film. The new motion capture cameras invented to shoot the picture most definitely come into play here--as well as the fact that it really a film made for 3D (I really recommend you see the film in 3D: if I saw it in 2D I think it would just be somewhat ordinary). It'd be crude to read the whole avatar concept, as deployed, as an allegory for this new motion capture technology (de Manian allegory is always a reduction of content to form masquerading as an opening of form--which mysteriously turns into language itself via a mystification of rhetoric--to content), but if this can give you a sense of the connectedness between the film's use of this technology and the issues central to the story and its development, then it might be worth suggesting. The technology quite simply signals the death of Jar-Jar, allowing for the seamless transition between closeups and full-body CG rendering of action, and then from CG to non-CG shots of the actors. The CG characters thus lose their CG-ness, and I'm actually quite certain that reports of the uncanny-valley experience still being made by people who have seen the film are really just mistaken registrations of the uncertainty produced by the concept of the avatar itself--in other words registrations of the plot. With the introduction of this technology, the valley frankly has been crossed, though of course by a sort of cheating--you are, through the CG, watching actual faces after all--which actually betrays the fact this isn't a technological "advance" (as it is being characterized and marketed, in a typical determinist manner) so much as a proper displacement of the old problem into an area where it now opens up new avenues (think of what the rumored Ghostbusters 3 would be like if it used aspects of this technology for ghosts!). And what this all allows is first and foremost--and finally!--a subordination of your interest in the CG-ness of the characters to your genuine concern with their activity. No longer, that is, do we care about the fact that a character is more or less "realistic." This is important because the suspension of the question about reality lets in fiction itself (and which makes possible something so far only really attempted by Pixar and others with natural scenery --vraisemblance).

When this is combined with the fact that the film is made for 3D, the effect is to make the problem of the body distinguish itself from the problem of any sort of representation of that body. For in these elaborately built 3D spaces, full of palm fronds, vines, waterfalls and bugs  in the foreground that your eye avoids, and backgrounds of stars, planets, or huge mechanical spaces into which you are drawn--in a spatial sense, almost on the level of basic motility (these spaces are brought closer to you, one critic rightly said)--the avatar body can move and interact and refuse to sit there as a spectacle. In other words the 3D aspect of the film stratifies or complexifies the environment against which the body is moving as much as the new motion capture deals with the body's most important surface aspects, such that both become something you deal with rather than look at (as you would deal with a landscape as opposed to a landscape painting: there are multiple points of entry into the former, say, while the latter--even if painted in the picturesque tradition--only attempts to give you those). This differentiation achieved, the problems in the representation of the body can return as part of the problems raised by those bodies.

Thus, within your experience of these bodies on-screen, you begin to notice that the avatar body, and the alien species of which it is a modification, take on problematic shapes. Besides the fact--way, way underutilized--that the Na'vi are about twice as big as humans, they remain somewhat boringly humanoid, except for their little neural hook-ups that connect them to the planet eco-network (but I won't get too specific). This is different with the animals, which are simply the most amazing things in the film because they blend SF and fantasy so well: they remain sufficiently alien while they also behave almost like magical companions--and yet the balance always is tilted in favor of the alien (it can only be tamed through work, not through immaterial communion with it) but without the easy move of making the animal into a monster. One gets the sense--and it is the real achievement of this film--that the creatures work in many different and interesting ways. I think Cameron wanted the Na'vi to be something similar: thus their larger catlike ears, eyes, and, of course, nose (the most significant sign of differentiation), and their tails. But the film seems to founder here: a culture has to be built, and that seems to do the work of erasing the animal in them. Or, more probably, a vitalism and spiritualism--to which we'll return--comes in to take over the animal aspect, and dissolve whatever was interesting about it in the bodily realm.

And now is when we begin to notice that the aliens all remain exceedingly fit, slim, and trim--there's not a pudgy one in sight. And it is here that I think a critique can be levied--now that we have also hit a terrain also familiar to feminism: fitness is allied with race here in a weird way, to do the work of making this alien body alien. In the place of something like a completely different anatomy (always a possibility, though it is perhaps the easiest--and indeed it is explored with the animals themselves), or any other qualitative difference, we have some implication that the aliens experience their bodies more. And this sheer quantitative differentiation does not produce any significantly different "trust" of the body--which is what, I think, would be required here for a genuine experience of the alien as opposed to what it can always (and too easily) be dissolved into: race and sex. The film tries to balance this (along a technology/nature binary) by setting up the colonizers as fit and powerful (something like a different kind of fitness)--even to the extent that they make the protagonist's body get a little flabby the more time he spends as his (increasingly fit) avatar--but it's not really convincing when we gawk at sweaty seething flesh moving rhythmically in ritual (like in Riefenstahl's weird and obsessive late photos). Everything gets leveled to some sort of bodily experience aligned with a re-discovered naturalness (that is, artificiality--or rather the artificial flow between them which can magically partake of both) and then to sexuality, which--besides lacking any gender differentiation or play (women are either reduced to Amazons [i.e. men] or lusty nubile objects)--offers less bodily possibilities precisely as we're meant to think it offers more (and in a way that seems similar to how many theorists talk about "the bodily," taken as a site of pure, uninterrupted or uncitational production).

But, these problems now have to be routed through plot, insofar as the real subordination made possible by the new technology's subordination of spectacle to action is that of all the visuals to the story. What I thought was really lamentable in Star Trek was that this relationship to plot was never set up. Characters were there only, surrounded by a really interesting visual experience. And while characters can generate plot (the best example being Arrested Development), Star Trek decided to turn in circles with the most minimal story--that of trauma. In fact, it even subordinated the most interesting character to this story, as if the character himself wasn't interesting enough: we become familiar with Spock through his trauma, as if the only real relationship with a character that we could have is that of a shared and ultimately minimal void... While this perhaps cleanly avoids issues of race that the alien brings up by draining all of those problems--remember, Spock is an alien--into a trauma that is apparently pan-species (an old, and typical, postmodern displacement of humanism: the "everybody's trauma" or formalistic/constitutive trauma of Cathy Caruth) I'd frankly rather risk an encounter with that (and isn't the possibility of that encounter precisely constitutive of SF itself as a genre?) to see a genuine story--or something, at least, that will make issues out of all these minimal markers. While the plot of Avatar might be a bit too old and oversimple (Cameron himself admits as much), this is what the movie achieves. The real feeling of an "advance" in the technology I think stems from this: that now the CG people and the actors can be on the same team for once, and try to tell a story together through the technical setup. It's in this sense that Jar-Jar is really dead (along with, perhaps, Shrek and Nemo: animation itself can now go down a really interesting route that rotoscoping perhaps only really traveled on seriously before).

So when it comes to plot, the problematic racial relation to the body is solved by a disturbing ending, that affirms the pleasures of conversion into this avatar body rather than make it interesting. Here religion (into which fantasy elements easily slip, though--like in Harry Potter--they don't have to) come back to interrupt whatever was properly sci-fi about the whole situation (though religion and science fiction are also not opposites: see VALIS for the most amazing, if perhaps too soft-SF and self-reflexive, example). And, more than that, they make us question what was scifi to begin with about the various biological neural "networks" that connect the whole planet together: the scientific explanation only really becomes science-fictional when it loses its ties to empty spiritualism. And while the whole movie provides an immersive ecological experience that is sure to drive the importance of biodiversity home to anyone who sees it (and counter cynical religious anti-science drivel), unless it provides something more than an optional scientific explanation for relations between the Na'vi body and its environment--for that is how it is presented--we regress. Something like a real experience of this relation (which is what is required) is, indeed, brought home right before the ending--in the planet-wide rebellion against the colonizers (I try to remain vague so as not to spoil), on a scale that is large enough to render nature itself alien (again). But then the ending kills that off and makes these relations spiritual and familiar.

Wednesday, October 21, 2009

On tenor and vehicle

I wonder whether our discussions of metaphor have become a bit sloppy. When we find metaphor being treated merely like logic, as in the work of Paul de Man, something has gone wrong. We then take the metaphor as a unit, and, if we don't completely overlook its internal complexities (treating it as rhetoric in the abstract), open the door for all sorts of mistakes in actually determining how the figure is working (accepting any grammatical work at all as metaphoric). This probably extends to how de Man treats all figures, but I'd like to stick to metaphor, because so many others tend to treat it in his fashion.

Of course, I can say that things have become sloppy because we literary critics once (in our readings) had a very precise way of talking about the internal aspects of metaphor: through the distinction between tenor and vehicle. And while this famous formulation of I.A. Richards presented in The Philosophy of Rhetoric ends up being put to ends much too formalist and too psychological, one has to recognize that it seems sophisticated in comparison to how de Man talks about the figure (for example, in his analysis of passages of Proust in Allegories of Reading, or even his strained reading of the word "translucent" in the famous essay "The Rhetoric of Temporality").

So what are the tenor and vehicle? They are the elements of the metaphor, its two components. This is the first and most fundamental point which must be understood: the metaphor is the name for the copresence of the two elements in the form of the two sets of ideas being related, and never is reducible to either one. For it is still (still!) common to say that the figure itself is the second element, the vehicle.

Let me use an example: when I say that my love is a red red rose (to modify Burns a bit), taking the metaphor as the vehicle would mean saying that the red rose is the only thing in the sentence that is metaphoric. Richards' real innovation is to understand that this requires my love to be unmetaphoric, or the literal, plain meaning which the rose simply embellishes.

Now, this might seem exactly right with the use of a simile: what is the rose here doing except embellishing, coloring the woman, my love? But extend it to any more complicated (and normal) form of a metaphor and you immediately get confusion: when I talk about how the morning sun kisses the mountainside (as Shakespeare does in his 33rd sonnet), or even how my dessert is kissed with honey, we're not using using kiss to embellish some plain meaning.

Yes, we could explain what we mean otherwise--a small amount of honey is delicately added to my dessert--and thereby act as if the plain meaning is being added to by some fancy-schmancy language. But to do this, look at what is necessary: an expansion of the vehicle, not explaining the plain meaning which this vehicle supposedly embellishes, the tenor. In other words, we have moved over to what we're calling metaphor itself (and what is really the vehicle) in order to retain some notion that there is a sense (a tenor) which is unmetaphoric. We have made precisely what we called metaphoric (and is really the vehicle) into something other than a metaphor in order to explain how it (the vehicle) is metaphoric (as a mere embellishment)!

It makes sense, then, to change this situation and say that what we're calling metaphoric is only one part of the metaphor: the vehicle. For once we do this, in explaining the vehicle we can still say that we are explaining a metaphor--we don't have to literalize what is metaphoric in order to prove its metaphoricity. This is the brilliance of Richards' distinction: it recognizes the way we are looking at the problem in the process of our reading and, by giving us a clearer terminology, actually allows us to continue what we're doing, but much more precisely. He calls this a process of translating our skill into observation and theory, by which he means making our skill in reading and deciphering the problem explicit so as to refine it. And this is an alternative to what people still do when unable to articulate how their precise readerly observations come from more than just mere insight: fetishize the skill, turn it into the mysteious capacity that only a few distinguished individuals possess. Richards, yes, came up with the phrase "close reading," but he uses it in the exact opposite way of those who talk about Derrida, for example, as an "extremely close reader."

If we say that the metaphor involves the copresence of the tenor and the vehicle, then, we can begin to investigate the different ways this copresence takes place. We can talk about the different interactions of the tenor and vehicle, and see that embellishment is only one possible relation between the two. We can even begin to make sense of what at first appear like limit cases, because, with a recognition of the vehicle as vehicle, the tenor becomes much more expansive than "plain meaning." No longer identified with such meaning, it can become even something as generally unmeaningful as the excuse for merely using a vehicle.

In Shelley (I'm thinking of Epipsychidion especially) we have a lot of the this latter phenomenon, along with the layering of metaphors (the use of a vehicle as a tenor for another vehicle) which Richards' vocabulary also allows us to explain. However, Richards' example is John Denham's description of the Thames in what is usually called the first locodescriptive poem, "Cooper's Hill" (1642)--an example which Samuel Johnson, in his Life of the poet, praises:

O could I flow like thee, and make thy stream
My great exemplar as it is my theme!
Though deep, yet clear; though gentle, yet not dull;
Strong without rage; without o'erflowing, full.

No doubt Johnson had other reasons for liking this (its intense reliance on parallelism, that great mechanism of Johnsonian thinking), but he says that it is good because "the particulars of the resemblance are so perspicaciously collected." We'll come back to this in a moment, but for now, let us see how Richards explains what is really the tenuousness of the relationship between the tenor ("I," or, as Richards says, the poet's mind) and the vehicle (the river) in the last lines and its development of what at first appears to be "a limit case" of metaphor:

The more carefully and attentively we go over the senses and implications of deep, clear, gentle, strong and full as they apply to a stream and to a mind [...] the more will the vehicle, the river, come to seem an excuse for saying about the mind something which could not be said about the river. Take deep. Its main implications as regards a river are, "not easily crossed, dangerous, navigable, and suitable for swimming, perhaps." As applied to a mind, it suggests "mysterious, a lot going on, rich in knowledge and power, not easily accounted for, acting from serious and important reasons." What the lines say of the mind is something that does not come from the river. But the river is not a mere excuse, or a decoration only, a gilding of the moral pill. The vehicle is still controlling the mode in which the tenor forms. That appears at once if we try replacing the river with, say, a cup of tea!
-The Philosophy of Rhetoric, 122-23

Richards then quotes again the last two lines just to show you:

Though deep, yet clear; though gentle, yet not dull;
Strong without rage; without o'erflowing, full.

If the vehicle used here was tea, and not a river, the lines obviously become ridiculous: while a tea can be strong, and while a cup of tea can deep and full (without overflowing, or rather spilling!), no one would say it is "strong without rage" unless they were using the vehicle to give us a better sense of how a mind works. Thus, we can see that a river is a better vehicle than a cup of tea. That is, the vehicle is still related to the tenor, developing it, even if it has come so far away from the tenor that "what the lines say of the mind is something that does not come from the river." The tenor, then, is no longer a sort of pure meaning which the vehicle modifies, but something which, precisely "forms" as the vehicle "controls" it.

Thus the relationship between the tenor and vehicle can modulate to accommodate, on the one hand, a situation where the vehicle merely develops what is already pretty apparent in the tenor, and, at the other, a situation (this one here) where the vehicle takes up senses that do not resemble the tenor at all but which still lend it a more powerful meaning.

And with this we can turn back to Johnson. The vehicle we see, doesn't have to have any "perspicaciously" achieved "resemblance" to the tenor at all: Richards takes up this example to show that what Johnson praises about the relationship between tenor and vehicle ultimately would have to make the vehicle still embellish the tenor, and restrict the tenor only to something like the plain meaning underlying the vehicle. Rather, resemblance is only one way in which the tenor and vehicle can be achieved, just as embellishment is only one way in which the tenor and vehicle can relate. More often, there will be a process where the vehicle simply modifies or qualifies the tenor in the way that the vehicle of the river does here.

To describe this relation more adequately, Richards begins to supplement his original schema.  At present, we have simply the following:

metaphor:

tenor + vehicle

Now, Richards introduces another concept, the "ground" of the metaphor. Most accounts of Richards' distinction leave this out, though it only describes more clearly what we have been talking about concerning the resemblance of the vehicle to the tenor. The ground of the metaphor is merely the presence of a tenor-vehicle relation, which is most "solid" (or the least "recondite," as Richards will say, 117) in the form of resemblance. Thus, where we have a vehicle that relates to the tenor in the form of resemblance, the metaphor has a ground. And where we have a metaphor where the vehicle is controlling the mode in which the tenor forms, but not by bringing out something that resembles the tenor, the metaphor has less ground (i.e. the metaphor is more ungrounded). A particularly common form of metaphor where there is less ground is found in instances where we call someone a "pig," for example, if we are disgusted by them. There is no relationship of resemblance, but there is a sort of commonality between the tenor and vehicle here which ultimately is the function of the ground: it is the common characteristic that sets up a relation between tenor and vehicle. However, this commonality is not in directly mimetic terms, so there seems to be less ground. Instead, there is only a commonality in terms of how we feel about the person and how we feel about pigs.

So, to reiterate, where the relation of the tenor to the vehicle is one of resemblance, there is ground. Where there is less of this type of relation, there is less ground--though the ground still hasn't disappeared. However, we see now that in neither case are we talking about the relation of the tenor and vehicle solely in terms of each other, so we can easily admit what we previously had to talk about as "limit cases" as what they really are: basically normal metaphors. The "limit cases" are normalized, not in order to disturb our assumption that we talk in plain language most of the time (though this view of metaphor will allow us to see "most sentences in free or fluid discourse turn out to be metaphoric," and that "literal language is rare," 120), but to be truer to the way metaphor is used, which is often not at all like a simile--that is, as an embellishment. So, let's modify the schema, incorporating Richards' changes:

metaphor:

tenor ↔ vehicle
------ground------

With this fully developed model, Richards is in fact able to tackle the famous table leg. Leg of a table is generally recognized to be not really a good, pure metaphor, but a catachresis. However, as the catachresis is usually defined as a failed metaphor, we have to actually explain on what basis we would call the leg of a table a leg. No one, however, ever explains this, except by saying that the metaphor is a dead one (which doesn't tell us much)... no doubt because it is simply easier to say why the leg fails as a metaphor (tables aren't human!). Richards, however, with his more developed schema, is able to explain why it is a metaphor quite clearly:

Let me begin now with the simplest, most familiar case of verbal metaphor--the leg of a table for example. We call it dead but it comes to life very readily. Now how does it differ from a plain or literal use of the word, in the leg of a horse, say? The obvious difference is that the leg of a table has only some of the characteristics of the leg of the horse. A table does not walk with its legs; they only hold it up and so on. In such a case we call the common characteristics the ground of the metaphor. Here we can easily find the ground, but very often we cannot. A metaphor may work admirably without oru being able with any confidence to say how it works...
-The Philosophy of Rhetoric, 117

Thus while the leg of the table has less ground than, say, the example of the river, there is still a commonality, still some form of ground between a tenor and vehicle, and so it is indeed metaphoric. For--as we said above concerning the normalization of "limit cases"--what Richards is trying to admit through this notion of ground is the case where,

the peculiar modification of the tenor which the vehicle brings about is even more the work of [the tenor and vehicle's] unlikenesses than of their likenesses.
-The Philosophy of Rhetoric, 127.

So while a leg only shares one real commonality as a vehicle (in the action of holding up), it is still part of a metaphor and should be recognized as such, precisely because there could be cases where the lack of resemblance will (unlike here) make a better metaphor. These instances aren't an instance of the paradoxical good catachresis, but simply metaphors.

This is also because is on this new basis of ground that Richards distinguishes between metaphoric language and non-metaphoric language: we can say that what goes beyond our "limit cases"--a metaphor completely without ground and a metaphor where there is too much ground such that the vehicle and tenor are identical--will not be a metaphor. Why? Because no relation will be there between a tenor and a vehicle, such that we can distinguish between them and relate them:

If we cannot distinguish tenor from vehicle then we may provisionally take the word to be literal; if we can distinguish at least two co-operating uses, then we have metaphor.
-The Philosophy of Rhetoric, 119

I put this in terms of ground because while Richards is emphasizing here how one idea described by the same idea is not metaphoric, we can also stress (perhaps against Richards' tendency to psychologize) how the opposite case also holds: when we relate two things without any commonality whatsoever, this is a literal relation.

One final point. I stressed the presence of ground, and the possibility of the metaphor that still works quite well when it is less grounded, because Richards introduces one more concept immediately after talking about the table leg--that of the shift between tenor and vehicle across the ground:

...A table does not walk with its legs; they only hold it up and so on. In such a case we call the common characteristics the ground of the metaphor. Here [in the case of the table leg] we can easily find the ground, but very often we cannot. A metaphor may work admirably without our being able with any confidence to say how it works or what is the ground of the shift.
-The Philosophy of Rhetoric, 117

Now I call the "shift" another concept, but what is really the case--and should be clear from the entire exposition here, and which, even more strikingly than the lack of talk about ground, I have also never seen elaborated--is that all of the terms which Richards introduces to explain metaphor are also metaphors: tenor, vehicle, ground, and now shift. I bring this up now because this metaphor of the shift allows us to describe metaphor completely metaphorically, but also more accurately, because all the other terms are able to give a fuller sense to as well as explain metaphor. For indeed, when we only use "tenor" and "vehicle," which is what happens when (rarely, as we noted) such terms are brought up, we do only the latter--and such explanation tends to make the terms into what they were meant to replace. We can complete our diagram, then, as follows:

metaphor:

tenor             

shift→
             |vehicle|
------ground------

Richards is comparing metaphor itself, in other words, to something like a car, such that we don't even have to talk abstractly about the relation of the tenor to the vehicle. Rather, the vehicle brings the tenor along, and shifts it across a ground. The tenor gets in the vehicle, and the vehicle shifts it. Thus we see why Richards chose "vehicle" and talked about how the vehicle modifies the process of the tenor's formation: the vehicle takes over the movement of the tenor. Furthermore, because we stressed the possibility of the attitudinal nature of the commonality or ground, we see also why Richards chose "tenor" for the name of the first element in the metaphor: the tenor is like tone--it isn't what the message means, but it is what sets the message in a particular direction (tone being the attitude of the speaker to the listener), allowing it to develop (here) by other means (the vehicle, with which it can share a common attitudinal relationship). In other words it is as much of a mistake to see the meaning of the metaphor within its first element (the tenor) as it is to see the meaning of a word solely in how it is delivered, in its tone: how the message is delivered isn't the same thing as its meaning, and by emphasizing how what we normally think of as the meaning could really only be attitudinal, our mode of trying to talk about the metaphor in terms of its literal beginnings is hindered. Nevertheless, while tone or how the message is delivered isn't the same thing as meaning, it certainly allows the message to develop: the metaphor is where such a message in a word is developing in a complex way through another word.

In short, all the metaphors explain and modify each other in this new structure, which the final diagram above can only somewhat adequately explain (to be more accurate, we would have to act more as if the tenor is moving over the ground by way of the vehicle and through the shift--thus the shift should also be represented more as the shift of the tenor and vehicle over the ground). Nevertheless, if you begin to use all these metaphors, you have a sense for how complicated and rich the internal complexities of metaphor become.