I'm thinking the distinction between literary theory and critical theory is growing more and more useful. Despite the fact that it probably originated because Barnes & Noble had some weird shelf-space issues, I feel like we also know this difference intuitively.This is not just because critical theory is something more like "theory for theory's sake" and literary theory "has literature as its object." In fact, I'd like to insist (and I think it needs to be insisted upon more and more in the years to come) that it matters less what object each has. What matters more is the difference in method, in the way each works, and what concerns are generally proper to its working.
Literary theory pulls the act of determining a text's meaning apart from the act of saying something about a text, or interpretation. Critical theory, on the other hand, invents useful concepts that saturate the concerns of the human sciences (philosophy, sociology, history, political theory) with politics. It is because of this that you see literary theory more in literature departments, and critical theory in architecture. It is also because of this that you see literary theory in architecture, and critical theory in literary theory.
Indeed, literary theory's political power is usually found in troubling this distinction, spilling into critical theory. Whether this happens when its concepts lose or gain their power is a real question. As literary theorists try to answer it more and more, or, to put it another way (to use the titular phrase of Jonathan Culler's excellent book), become concerned with the literary in theory, one of two things must happen: either the distinction between critical and literary theory will have to base itself more and more on the objects involved, or literary theory will have to assert its political power in other ways.
I hope things move in the latter direction, not because I think literary theory should become less political (that should be clear from what I've said), but because I think it should define itself less in terms of its object--that is, because I think it should become more methodical, or aware of itself as method.
Whether this means that the critical in theory will have to come into its own more, I don't know. It has, I think, had no problem in doing this over the years. But I think critical theorists should be more aware, at least, of the distinction, so that they aren't made aware of it in the way literary theorists have been.
Then again, maybe critical theorists have been made aware of it from the get go...
3 comments:
"literary theory's political power is usually found in troubling this distinction, spilling into critical theory."
Why view this contamination of identity a threat?
Especially with your concern from moving yonder from a referent object, is it not a case of knocking CT of its privileged perch?
Will.
I'm not trying to view it as a threat--I'm first and foremost trying to describe it. That's why I vacillate so much in the end, so as not to come down on either side. More importantly, that's also why I don't describe these things as identities to begin with, trying to see them instead as methods--as practices with aims and no objects. Fundamentally, I would question the notion that removing the referent (the object) produces a coherence that we can safely call an identity. At most it is a tendency... no? This is why, finally, I actually come down on your side: I'm trying to disturb the distinction, yes, but not in the way you would propose. I'm trying to say that literary theory and critical theory need to disturb the distinction or difference otherwise than as identities engaged in some sort of battle--which presupposes some front, some face, some aspect, some object, some phenomenon.
Performative identity is still an identity, but in original post I thought I detected an angst at crossing boundaries – I stand corrected!
Will.
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