Showing posts with label Williams. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Williams. Show all posts

Friday, June 27, 2014

Some thoughts on watching sports and sportswriting

From over at my sports blog, Rip City Reviews:

Just spent some time watching 120 Sports, if "watching" is the right word for it.  The MLB's Mark Newman had a nice little piece/advertisement describing what it is like to see it and just how it signals the arrival of a different world of sports viewing:

Picture a world of two-minute segments (hence the name) and ever-changing topical data cards, a world integrated with social media and a constant conversation that powers through everything in sports that fans are talking about everywhere. Imagine a fast-paced look at LeBron James' future and Mike Trout highlights and World Cup analysis and NHL mock drafts and Wimbledon previews and Bob Stoops' contract at Oklahoma and Tiger Woods back in action and NASCAR's Kentucky Speedway and college basketball recruiting and ...

There is no end, there is never an end. The videocentric show goes on, and 120 Sports will learn what you want the more you watch it. You are about to have access to unauthenticated video programming through a new platform built to intuitively integrate video and data in ways you haven't experienced. 

There were some good things about it, some bad things too.  Overall, it probably represents progress in sports viewing, simply because of the hurdles it overcame trying to license so much stuff from various leagues, and the sheer disruption that produces for the model of distribution whereby the leagues each have their own special devoted cable channel.  In other words, it is remarkable for the amount of "content" that it has made available out of mere "broadcasting."

The result though, isn't as entirely surprising as this makes it sound.  The end result is something like a Facebook news feed that is nicely selected for you.  Meaning, really--because the newsfeed isn't really anything new in itself either--that it's just channel changing done for you.  The British cultural critic Raymond Williams coined a nice name for the resulting effect in the 1970s: 120 Sports produces a constant content "flow."

As such, it may be the future, or simply the retrofitting of an outmoded gesture/haptics that now (like the Facebook news feed) restores a little bit more control to the provider side of things and siphons it slightly away from the consumer, by shifting the consumer-producer relationship to one centralized media hub or output point.  Basically, its the internet's version of a cable sports package.

The one thing that may be the wave of the future involves the way the channel changing (as it were) changes for you: it does so according to the development of stories along social media.  After live-tweeting some basketball games like the press guys do at the games, I can tell you, it's REALLY fun, and much more fun than following stories as they are ultimately processed by sports highlight shows.  The more that it is raw twittering that determines narratives, the less those narratives get processed, and the more interesting are the possible ways that the story develops.

This is just like enlarging the stadium so that people who don't sit next to each other can sit next to each other.  The strange result, in other words, is that we no longer become spectators interested in a representation but participants in a media event.

Pessimists thought this most likely would produce worse writing, but the exact opposite has happened.  It makes for a whole new mini-genre of writing: the sports zinger genre.  This is something that has purchase at the moment and will have it later when its outmodedness (anticipated and in a way built in to the form) is taken into account, but never quite fully captures the instant, never quite fully commentates upon it authoritatively, just shapes and solidifies and concretizes and memorializes.

Together with other types of writing that pop up around media-integration like this, it is productive of content that centers around the fundamentally great fact about sports writing as a whole: namely, that there's no need to craft a full narrative, not only because the narrative is ongoing continually, but because the words may have an effect, and at any time--like a cheer of support or of derision--affect the nature of the game it comments upon.  Any time there is a sign of narrative closure, events rupture it--I've never seen a field of storytelling that spends so much time pushing anti-narrative as sportswriters.  Contact with the immediate event, shaping that event and giving it significance or linking it to various networks, and then letting the thing go before anything more than a network of association, facts, statistics, what have you crystallize into anything too definite... that is sports writing, and it is glorious, and there is no other form of writing that comes close to it.

But for that, all you need is a Twitter app and a TV, really, not a whole sports platform, as it were. And that means that Twitter's auto-emojiing of the hashtags for the World Cup may be actually, in the end, a bit more relevant than 120 Sports.  In a way, while it moves towards mediatizing sports, it still conceives of its audience as a set of consumers still watching something like a channel and a flow.  And consumers have become users, fellow producers or mediators.  The ultimate irony for 120 Sports in general may be that, in the end, after working so hard to bring a good product to an audience, that audience depends not on the quality of their product, but just how much and in what ways it gets used.

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

David Harvey again

From Marxism 2009 last year. Though I'd heard of him and his excellent work before, I only really started to read some of Harvey when I was writing on Raymond Williams (Harvey has the single best piece on Williams--in Spaces of Capital--thinking through Williams' problematic "militant particularism"). I'm liking him a lot. Again, if you haven't seen the Reading Capital course, check that out. It's a good way to get through that book, which is one of those no one ever reads all the way through unless it's assigned (not unlike anything by Hegel). That's not always a bad thing, of course (certainly in Hegel, though only reading the master-slave passage in the Phenomenology or the beginnings of the greater Logic and thinking the dialectic is "therefore" necessary to "overcome" is pushing this way too far). I'm planning on going all the way through Capital 2 and 3 shortly (I've only really gotten through the beginning of 2 and the end of 3), so it's a great refresher and a good way to pick up those parts of the first book (especially part 7) I never made it through. I never touched anything really after the chapter on the working day (except some pieces of the machinery chapter and the amazing part on primitive accumulation), even when I reread it for exams last summer: in literary studies, due to Derrida and his specters, the focus is still on the first three chapters on use and exchange value (though not confusing the labor theory of value with the value theory of labor has enough attendant complications), often to the detriment of the theory of surplus value as a whole.

One more thing. Harvey above (and in a recent paper) talks about a transition from capitalism to socialism--revolution--taking just about as long (or at least involving as much complexity and work) as the transformation from feudalism to capitalism. This is a welcome comment (obviously drawn from Marx's sense of things itself) when revolution has always had the connotation of radical, instantaneous breaks on the one hand, and on the other has been conceptually discredited by the theoretical left itself in the US for about forty years in favor of micropolitical models of change (or a a dour sort of pragmatism, which turns quickly into a fatalism, rightly thrust to the fore for critical inspection at Planomenology--though one should also point out Zizek too often trades in this pessimism). To this, I would also just add a pragmatic remark about the relation of revolution to violence by by Fredric Jameson:

What is always at the bottom of the quarrel about the term [revolution--MJ] is the conception of revolution as violent, as a matter of armed struggle, forceful overthrow, the clash of weapons wielded by people willing to shed blood. This conception explains in turn of what may be called demotic Trotskyism, that is, the insistence on adding the requirement of "armed struggle" to whatever socialist proviso is at issue: something that would seem both to substitute effect for cause and unnecessarily to rase the ante on salvation. Rather, this proposition needs to be argued the other way around: namely that the other side will resort to force when the system is threatened in genuinely basic or fundamental ways...
 -"Actually Existing Marxism," in Valences of the Dialectic, 388

Then I would follow that up with how he shows, pointing rightly at Allande's Chile, just how plausible the beginnings of such a long revolution (Raymond Williams' term) actually are:

Left electoral victories are neither hollow social-democratic exercises nor occasions in which power passes hands definitively: rather, they are signals for the gradual unfolding of democratic demands, that is to say, increasingly radical claims on a sympathetic government which must now, in obedience to that development, be radicalized in its turn, unless it sells out to the appeal for order. The revolutionary process in this sense is a new legal dispensation in which repressed popular groups slowly emerge from the silence of their subalternity and dare to speak out--an act which can range, as in Allende's revolutionary Chile, from the proposal of new kinds of laws to the seizure of farm lands [which right now we find in Venezuela--MJ]; democracy necessarily means that kind of speaking out, which can also be identified as the truest form of the production of new needs (as opposed to consumerism).
-"Actually Existing Marxism," in Valences of the Dialectic, 391

So new laws, new freedoms, new regulations, alongside the building of new economic infrastructures under the emerging new state:

The legislature was passing the laws of eco-economics [...] They directed co-ops [...] to help the newly independent metanat local subsidiaries to transform themselves into similar cooperative organizations. This process, called horizontalization, had very wide support, especially from the young natives , and so it was proceeding fairly smoothly. Every martian business now had to be owned by its employees only. No co-op could exceed one thousand people; larger enterprises had to be made of co-op associations, working together. For their internal structures most of the firms chose variants of the Bogdanovist models, which themselves were based on the cooperative Basque community of Mondragon, Spain. In these firms all employees were co-owners, and they bought into their positions by paying the equivalent of about a year's wages into the firm's equity fund, wages earned in the apprentice programs of various kinds at the end of schooling This buy-in fee became the starter of their share in the firm, which grew every year they stayed, until it was given back to them as pension or departure payment. Councils elected from the workforce hired management, usually from outside, and this management then had the power to make executive decisions, but was subject to yearly review by the councils.
-Kim Stanley Robinson, Blue Mars, 296-7

And one more thing: this sort of conception of revolution concretely situates any cultural or discursive struggle--struggle on that level is only of finite use, and takes place at that level. Cultural politics is only politics (often just politicization, often just micropolitics) unless it also hits at or ties into economic levels--as Jameson (who some might call a mere cultural Marxist) never gets tired of saying.

But then again it is also necessary to register (with Harvey--see this lecture of his for an elaboration of his point about Ch. 15, footnote 4 in the short piece above--and Jameson) that there are many levels of struggle, and that no one who seriously is engaged in cultural Marxism believes they can turn the world around just at that level. No, it's often a micropolitical model that believes that--along with people who dismiss cultural Marxism as a safe or partial form of commitment. The dismissive sense of that last word shows that its positive sense--that indeed, as applied, it is a piece in a larger situation--isn't available from this perspective, one that also believes with the micropolitics of Foucault especially (and tendencies in critical theory in general) that institutions (the "academy") are what is big and bad, and moreover are what determine and compromise the situation of cultural anti-capitalist critique (rather than capitalism, which is precisely much larger--and smaller--than any institution).

My point is that "the production of new needs" is what cultural criticism is about (finite, because representational, demands and Utopian possibilities), but is about this alongside other--indeed partial--sorts of activities and commitments that are by no means incapable of this sort of production (Jameson's phrasing here is precisely calculated to emphasize the fact that these needs can be and are produced at these other levels--even especially at economic ones). Significantly, it is precisely the cultural level (or the level of everyday life) that is most engaged by the recent statements of Zizek, Jameson, Harvey, Badiou and others to think hard about what communism might be, to imagine Utopias, to speak up out of subalternity and present alternative experiences of the world, and, indeed, to think about revolution: "carving out autonomous spaces," as Paul Ennis recently calls it, in various ways (he talks about what Badiou thinks is necessary, against Zizek, but I think Zizek too thinks this Utopian--and I use this word in an approving, Harveyian, Jamesonian sense that too few share--enclave-production occurs or is at least pragmatically necessary). And it is this cultural level that is most misunderstood by people unfamiliar with that level and what it involves (including the sacrifices that I don't think we can just say are nonexistent--unless we keep thinking all cultural Marxists are just "humanists" in a disturbing new sense). That, however, means education is necessary (both of yourself and the misinformed, as Harvey insists upon above: part of the problem is that this stuff isn't taught, or only gotten through someone like Zizek), and repeated reconnection of this level to others (an act that cultural criticism and recent ideology critique has learned to do in perhaps the most adept and tactical way).

And indeed, cultural Marxism is great at this too: what is culture but a way to reconnect while recognizing that separation of levels, rather than try and construct a one-off sort of immanent metaphysical level at which every microelement just is or is not political? I don't even think you can say cultural Marxism has gone too far--which is what the reactionary consensus in the US (indeed increasingly in literary studies) seems to be. We need more cultural studies, not less. As these studies make their way into departments dealing with urbanism, architecture, media theory and design--where some of the most radical Marxist work is now being done--I think they become more concrete and produce more connections and reconnections, perhaps, than they did when this study was done primarily in literature and film (or philosophy). But that's a development and transformation, which is also probably a shift made in accordance with changes in the system studied and the new forms reconnection to other levels is imagined to take.

Wednesday, November 25, 2009

Coming up...

-A post on Marshall McLuhan vs. Raymond Williams.

-A post on why literary theory doesn't deal with aesthetics (often perplexing to those outside literature).

-A post on the dividual in Deleuze and notions of community, via a nice passage from Red Mars.

-A post on Jameson's deep notion that postmodern theory ends up thinking (only) the body.

-Another post on Addison, with special guest Addison.

And, of course, lots over a the Latour blog. We're reading a bunch of essays now, and revisiting the amazing Aramis.

I'm a bit all over the place lately, no? Oh well--it's post-examination time, and all I'm doing is trying to expand ideas before locking down that dissertation proposal.

Sunday, October 18, 2009

Tactical criticism: Leavis

I agree with Raymond Williams that F.R. Leavis makes close reading seem to positively require a very specific group of people: the small minority Leavis describes in Mass Civilization and Minority Culture, the most rudimentary community, that, merely by virtue of its small size and relative stability, would supposedly gain insight which remained closed to everyone else. Close reading becomes the practice of a seminar full of militants, thinking they are defenders of cultural tradition.

And, as Williams rightly says (in Culture & Society and elsewhere), this isn't elitism, at least in its usual form--despite what people still say about Leavis. For outside of the minority there is the entirety of civilization, on the one hand, and, on the other, individuals. Instead of the formation of a coterie, Leavis wants comrades. Criticism is criticism when something like intellectual guerrilla warfare takes place, not when a bunch of individuals decide they think others are inferior.

But where this warfare does indeed take place, and against whom, matters immensely for Williams and for me, and very little for Leavis. If such warfare only really makes sense at Cambridge (for it certainly can't take place in America: we barbarians have lost all hope of redeeming ourselves in such small communities with a tie to tradition) isn't this a little telling?

That is, in Leavis, I feel we have are the conditions of the struggle for Cambridge English universalized. And the very extent to which others recognized their struggles in this universalization testifies, not to the reality of the Cambridge situation, but to the appeal of an idea of a small community--which indeed, with Williams, I think is something to save. But if we save this idea, this does not in turn testify to the insistence that the small community of skilled readers is the only group capable of action, as Leavis would hold. In fact, the community itself becomes pointless if it is seen as the only community there could be. And, as Williams says, the position of the group against civilization leaves all sorts of questions about civilization unanswered, precisely in order to shore up the group.

On this point, it's probably good to get into the details of what Leavis calls "Judgment and Analysis" (and what others called "Practical Criticism"). For we have to see how Leavis's actual critical practice fits into his notions of this culturally informed minority, and allows this minority to sustain itself without any notion of a larger community into which it could eventually (after transforming this civilization) dissolve.

It might be helpful, then, to turn to America and the always illuminating W.K. Wimsatt. In "Explication as Criticism" (in The Verbal Icon) Wimsatt remarks that there are three forms of critical language. There is a sort of wide ranging positive and negative evaluation (good, bad). Then there is a sort of neutral technical language, where we label parts of the work in question (as well as label the "referential content," or "themes"--i.e. alongside "spondee" we also talk about "love" or "war" as what the poem interrogates, complicates, inflects). And finally there is a more complex, more subtle language that mixes the two others, a middle language where we get terms like "careful" "precise" "simple," "dreary"--terms that are used to evaluate while explicating. The third terms, Wimsatt says, are generally used because a positive or negative term has set off a train of evaluation that is being justified and expanded by the more neutral terms.

This surely has changed since Wimsatt wrote (1948): now we have new and more complex neutral terms to set off the process of justification by other, more technical neutral terms. But in saying this I should also mention that with the decline in outright evaluation there is a corresponding change in the function of criticism itself, such that it no longer explicates but organizes or describes a text--something overlooked by people who lament the loss of the evaluative function of criticism. It isn't as if criticism grew afraid of the positive and negative and only now substitutes an other, more neutral language for them--such that now, we're always only judging positively or negatively by other means (as Sianne Ngai and might claim). Rather, as I have said before and with reference to Leavis, literary criticism called into question the entire structure that Wimsatt outlines and which produces this first language (good, bad). If there is any error here, it is in seeing this first language as a mere symptom of the explicative structure, and not the integral moment that Wimsatt makes it.

Thus, perhaps more significant than the change in the ability of Wimsatt's structure to describe a state of criticism is the transformation that occurs in the use of structures like his in general. That is, while we also don't judge positively or negatively anymore, we also don't have any real faith in Aristotelian structures like Wimsatt's (my colleague Evan is fascinated with this). For, to bring us back to the actual three languages and how they bears on Leavis, Wimsatt wants to cultivate, not the neutral terms, but (and here's Aristotle) the middle terms. Why? What we do with middle terms is point, while explicating, to the larger "concrete universal" aspect of poetry at which the general evaluative terms can only sort of grunt.

And this sort of grunting "authoritarian bent" in criticism, caused by a lack in the cultivation of middle terms, characterizes Leavis from Wimsatt's perspective. Here, without middle terms, criticism becomes only provocation, only the exhortation that we ought to admire these passages. Or only somewhat more subtly, it becomes the insistence that we ought to plainly perceive how a poem is good, or part of the great tradition, if a particular poem's thought or viewpoint is something generally right or not--which is what Leavis's criticism does. For Wimsatt, all this is trying to get us to the concrete universal too quickly, and ultimately in a way that, even with its meticulous justifications (or rather because they are there only to painstakingly justify something so crass), ends up destroying our ability to apprehend that universal.

But there is also something to be said for Leavis's lack of cultivation of middle terms, as opposed to this authoritarian prodding in general. Because Leavis is always trying to show us how an author can be right or wrong in a general intellectual sense (and that his or her rightness or wrongness is what is valuable about his or her work), he never gets stuck judging merely the intricacies and complexity (tonal, structural, whatever) of a work. He always integrates this complexity into a sort of world view that becomes relevant for the possibilities of connections to other works that it produce, unlike a poem for Empson, which seems somehow to exhaust the world it comes from; to not offer anything to us by virtue of its coming from a history. But one also wonders whether considering a thought valuable to us if we ourselves were to take it up now is somewhat preparatory to the work of criticism--as preparatory as I would claim (perhaps somewhat scandalously) Empson's work is.

Only Leavis, then, could see the potential in reprinting something like John Stuart Mill's writings on Bentham and Coleridge--generally ignored at the time or, if read, seen only as "great essays." Leavis's introduction to the two essays makes the case for reissuing the little book (almost a pamphlet--a form with a history of subversion) quite well: one will get in Mill's writings a portrait of two intellectual tendencies that will dominate the 19th century, as well as a third tendency that would first recognize and isolate, and then try and reconcile them--and this is infinitely more valuable than the Carlyle that people read for the English Tripos. There is, in short, something to be said for such an effort, which makes possible alternate traditions, and actively opposes them to the established histories (like the tradition of the novel--the serious study of which he, along with Queenie Leavis, made possible). But as an effort, one also has to wonder, with Williams, whether it belongs to literary criticism and not to the sphere of Kulturkritik. Obviously, its aim is reversed, and it is not bourgeois, but it is a local effort that has no possibility of going further abroad except through a wide process of generalization, like those remarks on taste that such a bourgeois criticism constantly uses (allowing mass audiences to be better consumers).

Criticism, Leavis says in The Living Principle, is tactical. And I do think there's something to be said for that notion--if only because it make clear that practical criticism is undertheorized as tactical criticism. But a tactic is a limited effort, not a general one: it can gain its force through its ideal (tradition, living principle), but actually becomes cut off from its goals when it (without transforming itself) becomes generalized.

Tuesday, October 13, 2009

Almost entirely free

I'm not really the habit of reading the blurbs on the back of books. So I just now picked up the Country and the City there on my bookshelf--a book I've read at least twice now--and happened to notice this remark from the Times Literary Supplement:

A sustained and thoroughgoing attempt to relate English literature to its social background... It is fair to add that Dr. Williams's work is almost entirely free from the partisan unfairness and unimaginative literalism to be found in some other critics who share his general outlook; and he has given us a right and timely admonition against sentimental falsifications of rural life and of nature.

What can this mean but "Raymond Williams isn't a real Marxist?" I'm searching for the original review--there it might have made much more sense. But on the back of a book like this, one suspects that the line blurs between something like "He isn't your typical Marxist" and "You can pick it up, kiddies, it's safe."

In other words we can see how a typical Kulturkritik rhetoric of originality, when opposed to "partisan unfairness" especially, and then bolstered by "unimaginative literalism," easily turns around into its opposite: Williams is no different than all those others... Indeed, those people he pals around with, those who "share his general outlook," they're the dangerous ones--but who would read such boring trash? They're too sentimental, too naive about country life. Too "back to nature." But fundamentally, they're just so "unfair." To those poor country folk... or to us. In short, you can read this blurb a different way if more context is given (it could be a Marxist defense of Williams, even). But as a blurb, the old "vulgar Marxist" argument is turned into a "right and timely" quote that will sell the book. Of course, then, it is no accident "free" is used in one of its more hygienic senses... And even if we wonder what made the reviewer, and the people who designed the jacket, stick with that "almost," we've already perversely limited what in Williams' approach would be truly tough to swallow...

I bring this up because I wonder whether there is indeed something palatable to Williams from the bourgeois standpoint. While it ultimately might be in the bare content (nature, experience, etc. etc.), I think it has to come from the subtlety of his method, from his isolation of structures of feeling and his very Lukácsian insistence on the need to interrogate what is lived (though he only read Lukács after he wrote The Long Revolution), the real activity of men and women, that would make him take up particular figures wholly opposed to his viewpoint (Arnold, Leavis), and allow him to claim they are vital for our thought in a certain respect (to the extent they shape and express those lived structures).

This was for him a more radical gesture than investigating the unconscious of society--which he considered a basically bourgeois concept (since it had been quickly mythicized and reified: one imagines Williams being more open to more powerful Lacanian reformulations). But, from a certain angle, such subtlety can also make him seem "almost entirely free" from Marxism for such a reviewer. One then has to ask--what sort of environment would take subtlety in such a way? Of course, with the question put this way I open the door to cynicism. But I do imagine there could be other answers. One might, for example, insist upon how hard it is to actually conceive a neutral criticism, despite the long history of the view that criticism is without prejudice.

Monday, October 12, 2009

Coming up...

Better posts coming up, everyone, along with a better blog more generally. In the near future expect:

1) Posts on GA 29/30 (Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik)
2) Posts on The Pasteurization of France and Science in Action
3) Posts on The Country and the City
4) Posts on The Difference Engine
5) Posts on Locke's Essay

I'm also reading John Protevi's Political Physics. I'll say a little about some of the excellent ideas there soon. Prepare yourselves...

Saturday, October 3, 2009

One night in Miami...

We are normally given some twenty or twenty-five minutes of the film, to get us interested in it; then four minutes of commercials, then about fifteen more minutes of the film; some commercials again; and so on to steadily decreasing lengths of the film, with commercials between them, or them between the commercials, since by this time it is assumed that we are interested and will watch the film to the end. Yet even this had not prepared me for the characteristic American sequence. One night in Miami, still dazed from a week on an Atlantic liner, I began watching a film and at first had some difficulty in adjusting to a much greater frequency of commercial "breaks." Yet this was a minor problem compared to what eventually happened. Two other films, which were due to be shown on the same channel on other nights, began to be inserted as trailers. A crime in San Francisco (the subject of the original film) began to operate in an extraordinary counterpoint not only with the deoderant and cereal commercials but with a romance in Paris and the eruption of a prehistoric monster who laid waste New York. [...] I can still not be sure what I took from that whole flow. I believe I registered some incidents as happening in the wrong film, and some characters in the commercials as involved in the film episodes, in what came to seem -- for all the occasional and bizarre disparities -- a single irresponsible flow of images and feelings.
-Raymond Williams, Television: Technology and Cultural Form, 91-2

What is interesting here is the tendency of the Marxist move, which we see I think most concretely in Williams (that is, it is registered most thoroughly in experience, not theory, or rather in the collapse of the thought-work distinction--a factwhich Adorno talks about), though it's present in Marx to a huge degree already (mostly as blistering theoretical irony--something I feel many readers don't fully understand). This is to rely not on clearer insight into the phenomenon in question, but to a fleeting glimpse captured while in an irrational state, which does not disclose that the totality is irrational, but transforms what, in any other state, you would call rational into an irrational moment (which presupposes an irrational totality indeed, but also determination, in the Hegelian sense). I think this has to be distinguished somewhat from (though no doubt it is related to) a hermeneutics of suspicion. I should give, in conclusion, Williams' general theory of "flow" or rather (since it is determined, through institutions) "planned flow," which tries to make sense of this experience:

What is being offered is not, in older terms, a programme of discrete units with particular insertions, but a planned flow, in which the true series is not the published sequence of programme items but this sequence transformed by the inclusion of another kind of sequence, to that these sequences together compose the real flow, the real "broadcasting." Increasingly, in both commercial and public-service television, a further sequence was added: trailers of programmes to be shown at some later time or on some later day.
-Television, 91

Sunday, August 30, 2009

Best of... Marxism

Nothing truly interesting is possible without negativity; error or ideology, false appearance, are also objective facts that have to be reckoned back into truth.
-Fredric Jameson, "On 'Cultural Studies'" in The Ideologies of Theory, 633

I know I said a phenomenology collection would be next, but returning to Marx and Hegel recently in my reading has given me a fondness for my (somewhat more sketchy) writings on Marxism:

Marx, Hegel, Feuerbach: A very, very lengthy attempt (it extended into six posts, and still remained incomplete) to piece together some basic characteristics "Theses on Feuerbach" and comprehend the level at which Marx's "overturning" of Hegel proceeds. I'm not as technical here as I should be, especially in explaining Hegel, but I hope my simplifications (especially the use of Foucault, who I toyed around with as an explanatory mechanism, and, quickly after this, threw away) are generally helpful in making the problem Marx encountered clear. I should add that in short, I am generally trying to outline something like what Fredric Jameson says (as usual, excellently) here, or find out why and how exactly it is the case:

...it is a mistake to think that Marxism is simply a type of interpretation that takes the economic "sequence" as that ultimately privileged code into which the other sequences are to be translated. Rather, for Marxism the emergence of the economic, the coming into view of the infrastructure itself, is simply the sign of the approach of the concrete.
-"Towards Dialectical Criticism" in Marxism and Form, 322

...and Here are the other posts in the series: post 2, post 3, post 4, post 5, post 6, and some rough notes on where I am going after the sixth post.

On Hoarding and Specters of Marx: a detailed analysis of the "hoarding" chapters in Capital and the Grundrisse, and a general perspective on the usefulness of Marx, via a somewhat unorthodox (or at least less Marxist) take on Derrida's Specters of Marx.

Marx, Economics and Law
: explaining the "Critique of the Gotha Programme."

Spivak v. Derrida on Value: A look at "Scattered Speculations on the Question of Value" and a localization of differences between Spivak and Derrida when it comes to Marx. I should say that Spivak seems closer to what Marx says, which refuses analogies between capital and subject, and insists on analogies (in order to demystify them) between capital and society (the demystification proceeds by then seeing society in terms of the means of production), if I can speak loosely.

Gramsci on Hegemony
: my presentation for a class with Spivak on Gramsci (and, in a shockingly productive pairing or contrast, W.E.B. Du Bois--whose Black Reconstruction I can't recommend enough), which tries to explain in detail how the concept of hegemony emerges in Gramsci's analysis of history.

Structuralism and finitude: I touch on structuralism mainly, but I have a nice part on the famous "effective causality" passages in Althusser and Balibar's Reading Capital.

You can also expect in the future more detailed treatments of Raymond Williams than the ones I have written so far, as well as considerations of Althusser and Fredric Jameson.

Friday, April 10, 2009

Raymond Williams on "Sesame Street"

Certain forms have evolved within the conventions of current television programming. In American television, with its extraordinarily short units and as it were involuntary sequences, mainly determined by commercials, there have been such interesting innovations as Laugh In, Sesame Street and The Electric Company. The comic effects of fast-moving disconnection, using many of the local techniques of commercials and trailers, made Laugh In in its early years a fascinating example of an effective form created out of a deformation. In Britain, in a different way, Monty Python's Flying Circus developed new kinds of visual joke out of standard television conventions, by simply altering the tone and perspective. Sesame Street is perhaps a different case. It has been said that it uses the techniques of commercials for education. Yet this is a doubtful description. Many of the technical possibilities for mobility of every kind were were first exploited, at a popular level, for commercials, and have no necessary connection with that kind of simplified selling. Some of the best mobility of Sesame Street and The Electric Company is a way not only of responding to a highly mobile society but of responding in some depth, since the central continuities, within the fast-moving sequences, relate not only to planned teaching but to a kind of eager openness, a sympathetic curiosity, which is perhaps a truer social use of some of the intrinsic properties of television than any of the more fixed and confirming social forms.
-Television, 74-5.

All I can say is that this is the most proper viewpoint from which to analyze this show. Despite its age (1974) the analysis still seems more relevant now than the recent discussions we have seen in the news of the show (since its first couple of years recently got released on DVD)... and I am generally one to think that more familiarity with a medium or emerging form produces better consciousness of it...

Friday, February 20, 2009

Practical criticism and the sociologist

I just love Raymond Williams. Here's his description of Lucian Goldmann confronting literary scholars at Cambridge, and then his short history of the problems of practical criticism--with Leavis as (and I think he's right about this) the villain:

...I would give it about fifteen minutes, as Goldmann began to describe his own methodology, for that crushing quotation to be brought out from Lawrence:‘We judge a work of art by its effect on our sincere and vital emotion, and nothing else. All the critical twiddle-twaddle about style and form, all this pseudo-scientific classifying and analysing of books in an imitation-botanical fashion, is mere impertinence and mostly dull jargon.’ So no methodology here, thank you; only sincere and vital emotion. But who decides the sincerity and vitality? If you need to ask that you couldn’t begin to understand the answer. People decide it, in themselves and in an active and collaborative critical process.
But which people, in what social relationships, with each other and with others? That, at whatever risk of damnation, is the necessary question of the sociologist. Practical criticism is vulnerable at several points: in its hardening into an apparently objective method which is based, even defiantly, on subjective principles; in its isolation of texts from contexts; in its contemplative aspects, which have often made it hostile to new literary work. But all these weaknesses are most apparent, we say, when it is badly done: well or badly being again an internal criterion. In fact, however, all these weaknesses, or potential weaknesses, follow from the specific social situation of its practitioners. The real answer to that question—which people, in what social relationships?—was, as we all know, precise and even principled: the informed critical minority. What began as the most general kind of claim, a visibly human process centred on the apparently absolute qualities of sincerity and vitality, ended, under real pressures, as a self-defining group. But then, because the critical activity was real, very different social relations—a sense of isolation from the main currents of a civilisation in which sincerity and vitality were being limited or destroyed, an implacable opposition to all the agents of this limitation or destruction—emerged and forced a generalization of the original position.

-"Literature and Sociology," Culture and Materialism, 17-18 (and here at the New Left Review).

It is on the basis of this history that he proceeds to, very clearly, put the problem to the sociologist: in Britain--but I wonder whether this has some similar significance here in America now--one has to confront the fact that "it is from this," this practical criticism, "paradoxically, that much of the English work in literary sociology has come" (18). In other words, literary sociology must also transform the academic society (which is not the same, for Williams, as the discipline or institution) in order to be able to do its work. This does not mean revolution--which the theorists here in the 80's tried to bring about--but first and foremost a change in vocabulary that will allow method and theory to enter into critical practice (as I tried to bring out of Williams in the last post). First and foremost, there is the change in what actually gets described: not the actual but the possible. Using Goldmann, he outlines this view:

Most sociology of literature, Goldmann then argues, is concerned with the relatively apparent relations between ordinary literature and actual consciousness: relations which show themselves at the level of content, or in conventional elaboration of its common illusions. The new sociology of literature—that of genetic structuralism—will be concerned with the more fundamental relations of possible consciousness, for it is at the centre of his case that the greatest literary works are precisely those which realize a world-view at its most coherent and most adequate, its highest possible level. We should not then mainly study peripheral relations: correspondences of content and background; overt social relations between writers and readers. We should study, in the greatest literature, the organizing categories, the essential structures, which give such works their unity, their specific aesthetic character, their strictly literary quality; and which at the same time reveal to us the maximum possible consciousness of the social group—in real terms, the social class—which finally created them, in and through their individual authors.
-"Literature and Sociology," 23-24.

Ultimately, however (and a bit against Goldmann), Williams says that we cannot even think of what gets realized and revealed to the sociologist as a consciousness: first and foremost, "we need to reconsider the idea of consciousness itself" (24). Rather, what is more important is the ability of the structure, the organizing categories, to then actualize themselves. Where are the points in this structure that are more capable of producing the work than others? This is why he introduces his notion of "structures of feeling:" by making the structure one of feeling (which, as I always stress, should almost be taken in the tactile sense of "feeling:" what we are talking about here is bodily, material), what one does is then think more in terms of the structure and sees its productive possibilities not at all in terms of the actual. One thinks the ideality of the structure in a more differentiated way (one thinks its productive capacity more purely) by attributing to it this odd (and not necessarily conscious) aspect of "feeling." One adds to it a certain width, a breadth, not unlike Bourdieu.

Raymond Williams on Britain and America

An amazing characterization of Raymond Williams of the American intellectual space, which is too often just summed up under the vague term "democratic." If Williams too succumbs to the cliché of American intellectual space as democratic, he at least gives us a few new adjectives in his comparison of America to Cambridge that have the potential to make people more precise about what this entails:

I think many people have now noticed the long-term effects of the specific social situation of British intellectuals: a situation which is changing but with certain continuing effects. In humane studies, at least, and with mixed results, British thinkers and writers are continually pulled back towards ordinary language: not only in certain rhythms and in choices of words, but also in a manner of exposition which can be called unsystematic but which also represents an unusual consciousness of an immediate audience: a sharing and equalstanding community, to which it is equally possible to defer or to reach out. I believe that there are many positive aspects of this habitual manner, but I am just as sure that the negative aspects are serious: a willingness to share, or at least not too explicitly to challenge, the consciousness of the group of which the thinker and writer—his description as intellectual raises the precise point—is willingly or unwillingly but still practically a member. And while this group, for so long, and of course especially in places like Cambridge, was in effect and detail a privileged and at times a ruling class, this pull towards ordinary language was often, is often, a pull towards current consciousness: a framing of ideas within certain polite but definite limits...
[And then] there was American work: in what appeared the same language but outside this particular English consensus. Theory, or at least system, seemed attractively available. And most American intellectuals, for good or ill, seemed not to have shared this particular integration with a non-intellectual class. Complaints that a man explaining his life’s work, in as precise a way as he could, was not instantly comprehensible, in a clubbable way, to someone who had just happened to drop in from his labour or leisure elsewhere, seemed less often to arise.

-"Literature and Sociology," in Culture and Materialism (also available here).

In other words, what Williams sees here is a disjunction between the ordinary or "common" vocabulary of British intellectuals and the commoners themselves. British intellectuals, he is saying, maintain the fiction that their work is pragmatic because it is put in a certain language. What this does is only highlight how specialized and intellectual they are. So the ordinary language is 1) not the plain speak of common people in the first place, and 2) actually coopts whatever is connected to the commoners (or non-intellectuals) to produce intellectual cliques. In other words, people pretend to be relevant but they aren't: all that is produced is a "consensus," which, like consensus in politics, is most of the time merely an agreement that doesn't really get anything done, being just for show. So it isn't surprising that the non-intellectual comes into a lecture and says what he does: the actual language of the people (whether good or not) confronts the fiction of the British intellectual's "ordinary language," which, in the meantime, merely serves to hinder or hold back thoughts that only a more technical vocabulary could get at. The word "integration" here is used both satirically and as a genuine criticism of America though: it is the name for this fiction of the British intellectuals, but it is also a name for the more genuine disparity between intellectuals and the American people.

Monday, January 5, 2009

Against the New Aestheticism

Perhaps one of the biggest things we're suffering from now in Anglo-American literary criticism is how little we know how to handle a post-hermeneutic mode of interpretation. That is, as we gather more and more of an idea of what post-hermeneutical criticism would actually look like, we are, at the same time, losing a sense of how older critical devices can be turned towards this new form of criticism (or how we can invent new devices out of old ones). In other words, it doesn't take as much effort as some people might think to use a device in a post-hermeneutical way. So what is betrayed is not a lack of knowledge about what interpretation would be like without hermeneutics, but a lack of knowledge about how this new interpretation really is already at work in many ways in what we do already.
We generally know now, I think, that there are several forms this post-hermeneutic interpretation would look. The clearest example--that is, the one that is easiest for us to wrap our head around as far as how its post-hermeneutic operations look--is a sociology of literature: here what is at issue is nothing about the meaning of a text, but how that text fits into a system that produces that meaning as an effect of its (the system's) operation. It does this little switcharoo, however, without trying to say that the system is any more viable a source of meaning than the text: this is what makes it less hermeneutically invested--it doesn't try to find a real sphere where meaning originates. The post-hermeneutic act of interpretation, then, is in the laying out of the system. Franco Moretti gives us some very clear examples of what this work of elaboration can involve: making graphs or maps of data (how many copies sold, where, how, etc.) or just simply the explanation of the paths between these pieces of data.
What Moretti doesn't tell you, though, is that we do this already, sometimes, in hermeneutic interpretation. We just don't emphasize it, or really work on it for its own sake. When I write an essay about a book, I organize whatever I find out about it. A lot of the work of my hermeneutic effort depends on this organization. But I eventually use it for hermeneutic ends. And because I do so--and here is why my hermeneutic effort will look a lot different than Moretti's--I confine myself to the work that exposes sites of meaning. And these tend to be internal to the text (or intrinsic, to use the old term). And even when they are extrinsic (sales figures, etc.), they tend not to extend themselves out into networks that aren't subordinated to the intrinsic work of the book. They therefore don't give us a wide ranging study of the networks themselves--studies like Pascal Casanova's.
But this presence of the post-hermeneutic in the hermeneutic should be kept in mind, I think. For what happens when this isn't recognized is you get post-hermeneutic critics trying to just pick up the hermeneutic devices without caring about how they have to modify them to be post-hermeneutic. In other words, they just use all the old devices and say they are not unlocking meaning with them--and in a lot of cases, we just have to take them on their word that they are doing this. This is how that odd phenomenon that I will call the New Aestheticism--a phenomenon that is catching on--works. New Aestheticist critics (I have Michael D. Hurley in mind, but also bits of Stanley Fish and even Eve Sedgwick) use certain ambiguous but old and commonsense categories like "feeling" or "pleasure" (as in, how does that poem make you feel?) to try and 1) integrate these maligned phenomena back into the work of interpretation (which is laudable) and 2) make these phenomena into a sort of unmeaning excess that is the only point of the text. Not only does the second aim completely undo what would have been the laudable aspects of first (it effectively maligns affect yet again--and I think this is pretty unforgivable, because at the same time these people act as if their crusade in the name of affect makes them a morally justified), the second point really misunderstands what post-hermeneutic interpretation is about. That is, the second point proceeds as if post-hermeneutic interpretation is only the act of pointing out that the only meaning of a text is a non-meaning. In other words, the Aestheticists think that if you come up with a sort of moment where what is at work is something vague (unelaborated) like a pleasure (individual or collective), and then say that all the text does is produce this, you've canceled out any particular hermeneutical work you've done along the way--and that this cancelling out is the goal of post-hermeneutic discourse. But it's evident that this isn't really talking about pleasure (it's talking about meaning) and it isn't really post-hermeneutic, because it doesn't--like the graphs do--use any devices as post-hermeneutic devices. It uses them as hermeneutic devices and then tries to subtract their work.
The real problem would be precisely finding out how these old hermeneutic devices look when they operate in a post-hermeneutic way--and how they have to maintain themselves to keep working, i.e. what demands they make or compromises they have to bring about on the part of the critic. This is what I find in the work of some (and only some) deconstruction: in this area, we have close reading without its hermeneutic goal--close reading that doesn't bring out any meanings but instead organizes a text differently than before. To think about the micro-elements that make up this work of reorganization, and how they must work if they themselves do not produce meaning--this is what deconstruction is, and what makes it a neat site of (still pretty intrinsic, unfortunately) criticism that tries to negotiate these problems, not run away from them.
Or rather, act like it is too in the right to deal with them. For the real bad thing is these New Aestheticists have the gall to attack other post-hermeneutic modes of criticism: they yell at the New Formalism, which has these post-hermeneutic tendencies (especially when it becomes Derridian), and against the sociology of literature people. This is partially because the New Aestheticism becomes merely intrinsic again, shutting itself off from a lot of "statements about society," as it might call the result of these other forms of interpretation--while modestly claiming that it wouldn't presume that it was able to say anything with that weight (when it is in reality presuming twice as much and is half as moral). Most often, though, they yell at "theory." Theory--and what to them is its sidekick, cultural criticism--was nothing other than the subordination of post-hermeneutical efforts (the work of Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, etc.) to hermeneutic ends. Theory is the mistake that the New Aestheticst's approach will reverse by focusing on more traditional, but more overlooked (in the recent years of theory's wildness, particularly due to its fascination with politics) elements of the text.
I'd contest the idea that theory worked this way, however. This seems only to describe bad theory--which is just bad literary criticism in general. Theory might have worked precisely as a way for people to organize their ideas in a post-hermeneutic way. It did this not by actually carrying out what the post-hermeneutic authors that were its progenitors (Derrida, etc.) were saying, but it sort of met them half way by deploying something similar of its own.
For when we talk theory, we are usually describing something we could talk about in a different way. Theory is a sort of shorthand, in most cases, for concepts of interpretation that are often different than those of old (those of the New Criticism). I might say that the particular moment in this text reminds us of Lacan's mirror stage, which I would then outline... and this would be a theoretical remark. I can even use one theorist and then another: the mirror stage can be imbued, here, in this textual instance, with a sort of Foucauldian power... This is the way theorists often talked, and often confused ideas--as the New Aestheticists would say. I'd say instead that while this was a confusion, it was doing something more as well. This sort of shorthand allowed one to proceed more and more without reference to meaning insofar as it originated in the text itself. One could be led, then, from theorist to theorist--submitting the text to the play of this sort of parallel interpretation that was going on. For what happened was the theorists would be elucidated with respect to each other, fit together in new and interesting ways. Or at least one theorists ideas, reified by this process, would be made to work in odd ways that perhaps, if they were submitted to some ideal of systamaticity (or even to the rules of organic, philosophical thought, which theory does not follow), or even to the rest of the system from which they originated, would not have occurred to anyone. In other words, what happened was that the text got related and referred to a discourse that was developing alongside it. And what this did was pry away the interpretive effort from the hermeneutical effort in the first place. This is what theory did, I think, and it is the only way that a more rigorously post-hermeneutical discourse can now (in the Anglophone world) be taken up. Theory, then, was a post-hermeneutical modification of one of the basic tools in the hermeneutical toolkit: the reference to an authority, usually philosophical. This work of reference was made to work in and of itself, and forgo its capability for elucidating the text. The authority would then merely cohabit the interpretive essay with the text, and at this point--though it also was sustained by a huge academic regime, and this I would say was a very bad step--would be working out what interpretation was like without opening up a meaning in the text.
So far from being a mistake, theory was what makes the discourse of the New Aestheticists possible, and may have even operated in a similar way to other forms of post-heremeneutic criticism. What it didn't do, though, was make the post-hermeneutic use of interpretive devices seem easy, which is practically the only thing the New Aestheticism does (although I'd say this only of some theory, in the end: theory also did this, and thus actually made possible the New Aestheticist fascination with canceling out its hermeneutical work--just look at Spivak and her fascination with writing under-erasure and you will see this is the real goal of that erasure). The focus on pleasure, the focus on the excessive feeling that a text gives you, when this is considered as non-meaning, does not give us anything in itself. As I said, it even erases what is left of any conception of pleasure that we have--and it is dependent upon preserving the ambiguousness and thus the maligned and ostracized status of pleasure. (So to the idea of pleasure or feeling that this criticism employs must be opposed, precisely, Raymond Williams' idea of structures of feeling--an idea that has affinities with a sociology of literature.)
Allowing a mere descriptive work of interpretation, a phenomenology without a point (phenomenology's strength is that it invokes the ideal, the invisible), this New Aestheticism should be avoided. Above all, it forgoes the need to explain more what is theoretically advantageous about its conception of pleasure, or even to look into its origins (Hurley, for one, is completely anti-scientific and would resist this project). Without a more elaborated notion of what pleasure is, about what will be cancelled out by the work of the New Aestheticist criticism--and, for that matter, the work of cancellation itself, which is merely effected by the reference to a vague notion of pleasure now--all we have in the end is one of those old vague analyses of style, or, even worse, something like a book club. It is not that literary criticism has to be submitted to the rigors of scientificity--and this is really what the New Aestheticism rejects, not hermeneutics (but passes its opposition for the former off for opposition to the latter). It is just that what this idea of scientificity allows is rational discourse, discourse that is sustained by discussion and by the articulation of points. And this is not in opposition to a post-hermeneutic project. The idea that it is, that we can only have a discussion that operates post-hermeneutically if it is not submitted to the rigors of articulated discourse--this is what is at the heart of this turn back to the excess of (this made-up and unstructured conception of) pleasure, of feeling.

Saturday, April 12, 2008

Appendix to Williams


I just realized I left out a part of my argument in the post below, though I ended up hinting at it in what's there.
It is the explicit connection of the repetition I find in the lines of Crabbe to the anxieties over memory in Goldsmith, and the connection is made thus: Williams thinks Goldsmith's observational discourse, beyond being just an experience of memory, is also an experience of anxieties about tropes in poetry. In a way, Goldsmith wonders whether with the disappearance of the village, the ability of poetry to say anything unique (i.e. without turning what it observes--in this case village life--into a trope) is also lost. I find the repetitions of Crabbe, far from being some sort of evocation of the state of mind of the villager-turned-laborer, are instead instances of this sort of anxiety about tropes: the repetitions function at the most basic level to push any line of the poem towards troping itself. The anxiety in Goldsmith that gets concretized in this folding back of the poem on itself (and, we should note, not because "all poems are troping themselves," or something like this) functions as the only way that Crabbe can describe the villagers--i.e. functions in its turn as the element of the poem that reflects or instantiates Crabbe's own anxiety. This anxiety is more total (for lack of a better word) than Goldsmith: it has to do with the ability of poetry to turn what it observes into inspiration for itself, even in its resisting of itself (i.e. being a counter-pastoral). It is a question about not the constitution or being (we'll find this in Cowper) but the role of the past that Goldsmith discovers.
Hopefully all this (which should probably go right after where I read the repetition in Crabbe closely) will make the transition between Goldsmith and Crabbe (as Williams generally sees it) clearer, and show more clearly how Williams' approach sees things at the specific level of poetic form connected to the movements of history within that form.

Raymond Williams on Crabbe, Goldsmith, and Cowper


Meanwhile the rural ditties were not mute…
-Milton

The Country and the City’s account of Crabbe and Goldsmith cuts through an immense network of problems surrounding the use of pastoral to eventually lodge itself deep within the difficulties of relating to history and historicity that Cowper encounters in front of his oak. This path of the account constituted by the book’s opening chapters (most notably, in “A Problem of Perspective,” “Pastoral and Counter-Pastoral,” and “Nature’s Threads”) begins to be concretely established when Williams considers two lines from the beginning of the second volume of Crabbe’s The Village: “No longer truth, though shown in verse, disdain, / But own the Village Life a life of pain” (II.1-2). Williams asks two questions regarding them: “Where did it come from, that tone of apology about verse? Who was it aimed at, that insistence on the truth?” He then gives us a task: “Crabbe’s poem … needs to be read between these questions.” (The Country and the City, Oxford: Oxford UP, 1973, p. 13. Cited parenthetically as CC.)
In other words, Williams seeks to constitute a field where the feeling in what Crabbe articulates—namely, that pastoral verse has failed and will continue to fail to account for the pain of country-village life—plays itself out. But Williams does not see this field as merely reactionary, even though he brings Crabbe’s articulations under the heading of “counter-pastoral.” Counter-pastoral is not so much an interruption and overturning of a particular poetic genre by the creation of another as it is the embodied indistinctness of Crabbe’s articulations with respect to this genre—an indistinctness that actually may work to prevent any discernible break with pastoral. Counter-pastoral, for Williams, is thus a change in poetic form—in the most all-inclusive, indeterminate (and yet still determining) sense of this word “form:” whether considered as the governing principle(s) of the artwork or the structure of the elements that make it up, counter-pastoral is operative only within this particular range covered by the word “form” since it is more specific than a social attitude (though it expresses one) and less specific than the content of the work itself (though it can overlap with this and also, perhaps, be “in” content). I leave “content” unspecified, for this term of course varies with any definition of “form.” (For a discussion of the resonances of “form,” one should look at Williams’ entry “Formalist” in Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1983. 137-140.)
I dwell on this point because correctly conceiving of this formal shift in Crabbe is key in showing how we can link him (or rather, the particular significance of his articulations) with Goldsmith via Cowper—which, I will maintain, is the audacious thesis of these chapters in The Country and the City. In short, I dwell on this point because it is our reason for considering Williams on these poets rather than the poets themselves: the field opened up by articulations like those in The Village, when conceived in Williams’ manner, allows us to consider some 18th century poetry in such a way that the developments of the thought around it (whether these be aesthetic theories or social chatter) and the roles it plays (whether these be within the sphere of material production and consumption or in debates on social values) inject themselves, as it were, into form. The upshot is that these thoughts and these roles thereby become immediately visible as form within the various poems as they develop through time one after the other (allowing us to track them within a period such as the 18th century in their various instantiations), and yet remain the function of apparently—when one looks at a poem to specify this thought or role there—non-chronological concerns (the “sense of place,” notions of “culture,” etc.). (I am of course (without pretending to know exactly what Williams’ verbiage means) referring to what governs the “structures of feeling” within the “keywords” of 1) “culture” as it gets analyzed in Culture and Society, and 2) also “place” in John Barrell’s amazing The Idea of Landscape and the Sense of Place—another work that has affinities with Williams’ approach. It should be obvious that all this is not directly a recommendation of Williams’ approach but an attempt to show how it (or those approaches like it—Bourdieu’s or some aspects of Foucault’s come to mind, though this requires substantiation) might impact the concerns of our class. Indirectly, however, it might seek to point towards the (somewhat recent) hint of John Barrell that some of the basics of Williams’ approach need to be revisited differently if (and perhaps only if) one finds that the current interpretations authorize an expansive “recovering” of historical documents to index the plurality of the representations of subjects involved in historical struggles at the expense of the representations of the subjects themselves. According to Barrell, this would be a recovery that does not recover, but merely works to “replace… the question of who won and who lost.” See his “Afterword: Moving Stories, Still Lives.” In The Country and the City Revisited: England and the Politics of Culture, 1550-1850. Ed. Gerald Maclean, Donna Landry, Joseph P. Ward. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999. 231-250. One might (only?) then see if Williams can be recommended.)
From this perspective, Williams can define counter-pastoral positively, then, as poetry that continually insists upon its inability to idealize village or country life. I say positively, because this poetic insistence is the very form of a poem like The Village—the “reaction” to pastoral in the movement counter to it is not negative, so we can clearly specify it (there need be no hermeneutics of suspicion). This, then, is how Williams reads between these two questions in Crabbe: the particular logic (I hesitate to call it “logic,” for this sounds like it requires a rational structure. Even though it may be rigorously specified (even perhaps mapped, graphed and put in trees), Williams is far from claiming this logic is rational. On this point, I might emphasize that I am only considering Williams here with respect to poetic language, even though he also reads “between” prose. The level at which he analyzes in that field might not be the same. Williams, as far as I can tell, thus is not claiming that rationality or irrationality inheres in the logic of this poetic language)—the particular logic behind and yet within the lines “No longer truth, though shown in verse, disdain, But own the Village Life a life of pain,” gathers itself together at the level of the form that they both rely on, resist, and share in their inhabiting of it.
We can specify this formal charge (to borrow a formulation of Susan Wolfson's) or logic at both its more specific or general levels (as Williams does in his analysis). Here we will do so only at the specific level merely to illustrate (so while we use Williams’ analysis of the poem’s specificities, we are expanding it beyond him). In the lines from Crabbe, already Williams is able to pick up on a more specific aspect of the form which regularly appears throughout the poem: the quick repetition of either an entire word like “life” or, via the deployment of a combination of alliteration, assonance, the spondee, parallelism and the more specific figure of chiasmus, a series of repetitions of similar words within a line of two lines. Here, we see “Village Life a life;” but earlier in the poem we also find “They boast their peasants’ pipes, but peasants now, / Resign their pipes and plod behind the plough” (I.23-4); and “Here too the sick their final doom receive, / Here brought amid the scenes of grief, to grieve,” (I.242-3); and perhaps the most complex of these concrete instances (echoing the specific peculiarity of certain tightly formed chiasmic structures one finds in Pope),
There, where the putrid vapours, flagging, play,
And the dull wheel hums doleful through the day;
There children dwell, who know no parents’ care,
Parents, who know no children’s love, dwell there (I.232-5).


The irony of the playing of vapors among the children (it should be the other way around) is particularly evident here, though only after one revisits the whole sentence and, to a degree, grasps its form. We only meet the children after we get the intrusive repetition by assonance and alliteration in “the dull wheel hums doleful through the day,” and perhaps also the reversal in the last two lines, so that the poem calls us back to where the children are dwelling only after we have passed through the distracting intercession of the mechanical.
Now, one could generalize and say that the repetitive structures in the form of the poem here are an evocation of the type of psychic state of the villagers or of the type of the village’s social relationships when these villagers are treated merely as labor and given only rote tasks to perform: repetition mirrors or reproduces the feeling of the unfruitfulness and boredom that—we must say—according to Crabbe always hangs over the life the villager. But from Williams’ perspective, this would reduce the evident to evidence. For him, these repetitions at the formal level are, in (or rather as) their logic, “dimensions” of that field he specifies as counter-pastoral, “caught” by the poem (Williams uses these words with extreme care to set up many of his small but numerous quotations: cf. CC, 68-72). In other words, they are instances of a poetic insistence that pastoral has failed and will fail to account for the pain of rural life, as we said earlier.
It is at this level that we can ascribe what is articulated in these lines to Cowper—though it also is at this level we precisely cannot confine it to him alone. Indeed, this movement of counter-pastoral is a wider, and yet more delicate formation than any one author’s set of actions: according to Williams it finds its beginnings in Goldsmith and its most concrete or exemplary expression in Cowper. It thus moves at the level between material history and the history of ideas, folding itself at particular times and for determinate reasons back into one or another of these domains (which, Williams reminds us—though perhaps less often than someone like Bourdieu—are also our historiographical constructions).
We can only quickly indicate Williams’s treatment of Goldsmith as the poet at the beginnings of this counter-pastoral history. However, we can see how it immediately launches us into a consideration of Cowper as this history’s most thoroughly articulated (though perhaps also the most fragmented—two qualities that are not necessarily opposed by Williams) concretization.
Goldsmith’s endless comparisons between “now” and “then” (I put them in quotes because they are quite vague and act more as names than as things) form a stage in the transition from “reflection to retrospect” in the consideration of the country (CC, 82). Williams is quite clear how this transition is achieved (quoting The Deserted Village, ln. 397-8):
The poems to the happy tenant, the idealized and independent self of the reflective pastoral tradition, are succeeded by poems of loss, change, regret: that structure of feeling, at once moved and meditating, appalled and withdrawn, which is caught so exactly in Goldsmith’s couplet:

E’en now, methinks, as pondering here I stand
I see the rural virtues leave the land (CC, 68).


But, Williams contends, it is not achieved by Goldsmith himself. Notice how Williams instead points out at a more general level the precise point at which this transition is most active, that these lines (not merely, but concretely) mark: Goldsmith brings the entire scene back to his own vision as something taking place between now and then, as a concrete process glimpsed within the past that has just gone by, congealing into a memory like those the poet has of “then.” This “as pondering here I stand,” far from being merely a depiction of a scene of writing qua textual self-consciousness, is an instance at which the inscription gets taken up into a larger movement than any conscious “now,” yet more finely composed than that of “then.” This moment of composition, in its texture, is precisely that of a reflective movement turning into a sense of history or rather of historicity—of the flowing away and yet congealing of time into a recent memory. This is why the countryside in Goldsmith, according to Williams, becomes more of a spectacle, an “observation,” a “dissolving of the lives and work of others into an image of the past” (CC, 74-77): any possible violence of Goldsmith’s gaze upon the people and places he describes is due more to a basic and wide-reaching sense of the fleetingness of the old countryside itself than any sort of snobbery or privilege. The latter, while most definitely at play, obscure a more interesting phenomenon by reducing it to fit within a clean-cut framework.
We see now, perhaps, how problematic it is to stop at any reading of The Village as a mere attempt at a refutation of The Deserted Village: even though it does function as this, the dialogue (or possibility of a lack thereof—the two standpoints are indeed quite different) between the two poems is much more complex because, according to Williams, the formations or forms that they constitute are beyond themselves as much as present in their most elemental units (words, spaces, stresses), happening always “meanwhile,” though never remaining mute. Thus we must try and see their relationship in the following way: there is a moment in Goldsmith where the recent memory of the countryside pulls itself away from the “now” and the “then” as they function in his poem and proceeds to gather a thickness of its own—a thickness that, in Crabbe gets “pulled up,” as it were, and deployed in a form that both has a tone of apology and constitutes an insistence on its own truth. (I am using a term applied now more when someone is dealing with “windows,” “sites,” or “alerts” with computers—that is, in a space and time of the technical, of the hyper-mnemonic—and which, with this term’s combination of a verb-form and preposition, might fit somewhere between the Wiederbringen and Uberlieferung—that is, bringing-again and or handing-over—of Heidegger. See the section on historicity’s repetition in Being and Time: “Repeating is handing down [Uberlieferung] explicitly;” “The repeating of that which is possible does not bring again [Wiederbringen] something that is ‘past,’Being and Time. Tr. Macquarrie and Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell, 1962, p. 437 and passim. However, I am here only giving some consistency to the idea of the time and space of Williams’ history by stressing its unnatural or out-of-joint character—though one should be hasty in mapping a thoroughly technical time completely onto Williams.’) In other words, the degree of the disappointment in the poem of Goldsmith as it confronts and becomes memory turns into—but by no simple process, occurring by means of the complex and unnatural temporality “hacked-into” by Williams’ historiography and literary analysis—the bitterness, the sense of mission, the shame within the poetry of Crabbe.
We can also see how it might be possible for Cowper to insert himself within this apparently non-chronological (one might be more accurate in saying that its chronology is different, and perhaps also goes “backwards”) field of formations, between Goldsmith and Crabbe (though, at the most extreme level and beyond Williams, one might perhaps say that, if conceived rigorously, in this field there are only “betweens” or “meanwhiles,” so “insertion” would be difficult to conceive—see above note). The movement of memory is again “pulled up” and pressed into such exact articulations that it poses new problems beyond the sphere of changes in the distribution of land in the countryside. In other words, the articulation has, in Cowper, caught up with the changes of which it is a function and in which it is a player, and has thereby allowed it to connect with other changes (of which it is a function and in which it is a player, etc.). According to Williams, these changes (which again, are thoroughly specifiable) are the role of the country’s nature in its more general relation to humanity, and in its own relation to itself: anxieties begin to grow as to whether humanity as a whole is alienated from any and every country:
What is at issue, really, is a dialectic of change. A much later poem [than Thompson’s The Seasons, under consideration in the chapter “Nature’s Threads”], Cowper’s Yardley Oak (1791), is in the main a traditional and melancholy reflection on history and the mutability of fortune, in the sight of the centuries-old oak that has become hollow and rotten. But there is an intermediate reflection, which seems to catch the dialectic of just the change that was being widely experienced:

Natures threads,
Fine, passing thought, e’en in her coarsest works,
Delight in agitation, yet sustain
The force that agitates, not unimpar’d,
But, worn by frequent impulse, to the cause
Of their best tone their dissolution owe.

This sense, of a dissolution within a lively and productive exercise, is exact (CC, 71-2).


Perhaps now we can see by what other criterions than his particular analysis in The Country and the City Williams judges this phrase “exact,”—and how they inform his extremely influential study of 18th century poetry.