Tuesday, August 7, 2007
Comments
Oops! I hadn't enabled comments--so that invitation in my first post about saying something if it struck you as interesting was kind of pointless. But it isn't now! Leave a comment about anything!
Monday, August 6, 2007
Slavoj Zizek on Heidegger
Zizek, self-proclaimed "Heideggerian" in his early years, raises some interesting questions about Lacan's tortured relationship to Heidegger in The Ticklish Subject, but his remarks on Heideggerian politics often seem to be inadequate, coming up short of the real issues. Indeed, he oversimplifies the Heideggerian position, but this isn't the real problem. In fact, the characteristic oversimplification of Zizek is a maneuver which I find often more productive than plodding along in the particular amongst "facts:" Zizek might agree most with Hegel that "thought moves in the universal" and gathers its power only by particularizing itself--that is, not by being constantly confronted by the particular as if the particular (facts, "accurate" information) inherently contradicted the universal (statements too wide in scope). Insofar as this is the case, he must oversimplify. Indeed his merit is that this oversimplification becomes integrated into his text: in other words, the excess of this oversimplification (oversimplification's "over-") is primarily the elucidatory element in any statement and further works to pushs his discourse along. This is because, like Hegel, Zizek's writing aims to hit constantly not only at the presuppositions that characterize a particular discursive position, but the perverse core of that presupposition that renders it so manifestly powerful: thus his continued uses of precisely's and Is it not the case that... ?'s, and, most of all, his paradoxes. Thus it relies on oversimplification, turning it into a force that is more powerful than any "fact-based" discourse that pretends to get at all objective truth (and thus equally moves within the realm of universality despite its own claim). Of course, this is all characteristic of thinking speculatively or dialectically about any problem (again, like Hegel), but it can go amiss when it overemphasizes the wrong nexus of perversion within a presupposition. That is what happens here.
In short, he emphasizes the perversity of the axis within Heidegger's thought that moves between "ontic" and "ontological," showing that Heidegger inevitably gets into trouble on the basis of this binary itself because it always priveliges the latter term. The ontological will always be "more primordial" for Heidegger. And since the ontological veils itself constantly in the ontic, Zizek, like Heidegger, asks how we are supposed to get to the ontological. Heidegger puts it this way in Being and Time: "Ontological Interpretation projects the entity presented to it upon the Being which is that entity's own, so as to conceptualize it with regard to its structure. Where are the signposts to direct the projection, so that Being will be reached at all?" (359). If the ontic is the "factual," the "whatness" of any particular being (an ontic interpretation of God might say that "God is the greatest," applying a predicate to something in order to characterize it) and the ontological is the "potentiality" of the thing, its Being (ontologically characterizing God would conceed that God would be merely a thing if we were to call it "greatest," and would look instead at how its existence makes possible a general possibility for its own existence, how it exists instead of not)--if all this is the case, and if we can only really bring to language the ontic, how can we get to the ontological? Heiegger says that we must "look at the phenomenon," look at the ontic in its ontological dimensions. But what is the relationship between the ontic and the ontological there such that we may derive one from the other? Do not all ontolgical phenomena have to be accessed ontically? And therefore, do not all ontological characterizations proceed by merely substituting an ontic phenomenon for an ontological one (Derrida says as much in a quote Zizek skillfully deploys--indeed, his most unappreciated genius might be his ability to bring to light key quotations most people miss)? In short, for Zizek, it comes down to this: "Those who come closest to the ontological truth are condemned to err at the ontic level... err about what? Precisely about the line of separation between ontic and ontological. The paradox not to be underestimated is that the very philosopher who focused his interest on the enigma of ontological difference--who warned again and again of conferring ontological dignity on some ontic content (God as the Highest Entity, for example)--fell into the trap of conferring on Nazism the ontological dignity of suiting the essence of modern man" (The Ticklish Subject, 12--witness the striking speculative logic and the precision in the oversimplification).
Thus, apropos the problem of how to choose a political system, Zizek shows that we really get into problems if this is the case. Citing his own experience in Yugoslavia as a young philosopher, he makes the claim that "Heideggerians are ... eternally in search for a positive ontic political system that would come closest to the epochal ontological truth, a strategy that inevitably ends in error" (13). Furthermore they engage in a political passivism, denying that any manifestation of a particular ontological truth in a definite political system will be flawed because it will be ontic: for example, they will condemn Soviet Communism while holding up Socialism as ontologically true--indeed, how many "postmodern" Heideggerians and Heideggerian Marxists did precisely this throughout the twentieth century, especially after the fall of the Soviets (cf. Specters of Marx and the various responses to it, which all do not really differ, regardless of the different views on Marxism expressed, in taking up this precise position).
Now, how much does this all hold up? The first thing to be noted is what Zizek is right about. He is precisely right in characterizing the difference betwen the ontological and the ontic, for starters, which makes his characterization of the "paradox" above all the more poignant: Zizek is not passing off some simplified version of the ontological as far as Heidegger's own political positions goes. That is, the usual way to engage with Heidegger's statement in his Introduction to Metaphysics about the "inner greatness" of the Nazi movement is either to characterize it as overtly Nazi--that is, as just giving into propoganda in calling it great--or (what is more common) to say that it merely gets at an ontological truth about the movement, while leaving that ontological truth indeterminate and thereby evacuating the phrase of any content. Zizek rightly sees that what the "inner truth" of Nazism was for Heidegger was precisely the no-holds-barred confrontation of man with technology, the attempt to seize it and integrate it into life, rather than through slowly (as in capitalist democracies) let it seep into our experiences such that technology ends up governing them totally (Zizek gets this from various remarks of Heidegger, but also sees that it is connected to his later interests in technology, which few are willing to do--that is why it is a good reading of this incident). The key to Heidegger is to realize that while the ontological veils itself, that does not mean it is indeterminate--this key Zizek applies with skill.
Yet it is precisely in this merit that he goes wrong, because he manipulates this key to his own advantage. That is, he is willing to problematize the ontological for Heidegger precisely when it is a matter of his Nazism, as well as for his Yugoslav Heideggerian acquaintences, but then not see that it is this very determinacy to the ontological he has used that allows a connection between the ontic and the ontological and "errors" (like choosing a horrible political system to embody an ontological truth) to be avoided. Of course, he does this in order to more radically correct the Heideggerian framework through integrating it with Lacan's remarks. But this only means the depth of the problem that he uncovers is not seen fully; that we have only arrived at a superficial version of the perversion constituted by Heidegger's paradox. In other words, Zizek's warning not to underestimate Heidegger's raising to ontological dignity a horrible ontic phenomenon only serves to cover up the real perverseness of this action that he passes by.
I'll specify this "real perverseness" more later.
In short, he emphasizes the perversity of the axis within Heidegger's thought that moves between "ontic" and "ontological," showing that Heidegger inevitably gets into trouble on the basis of this binary itself because it always priveliges the latter term. The ontological will always be "more primordial" for Heidegger. And since the ontological veils itself constantly in the ontic, Zizek, like Heidegger, asks how we are supposed to get to the ontological. Heidegger puts it this way in Being and Time: "Ontological Interpretation projects the entity presented to it upon the Being which is that entity's own, so as to conceptualize it with regard to its structure. Where are the signposts to direct the projection, so that Being will be reached at all?" (359). If the ontic is the "factual," the "whatness" of any particular being (an ontic interpretation of God might say that "God is the greatest," applying a predicate to something in order to characterize it) and the ontological is the "potentiality" of the thing, its Being (ontologically characterizing God would conceed that God would be merely a thing if we were to call it "greatest," and would look instead at how its existence makes possible a general possibility for its own existence, how it exists instead of not)--if all this is the case, and if we can only really bring to language the ontic, how can we get to the ontological? Heiegger says that we must "look at the phenomenon," look at the ontic in its ontological dimensions. But what is the relationship between the ontic and the ontological there such that we may derive one from the other? Do not all ontolgical phenomena have to be accessed ontically? And therefore, do not all ontological characterizations proceed by merely substituting an ontic phenomenon for an ontological one (Derrida says as much in a quote Zizek skillfully deploys--indeed, his most unappreciated genius might be his ability to bring to light key quotations most people miss)? In short, for Zizek, it comes down to this: "Those who come closest to the ontological truth are condemned to err at the ontic level... err about what? Precisely about the line of separation between ontic and ontological. The paradox not to be underestimated is that the very philosopher who focused his interest on the enigma of ontological difference--who warned again and again of conferring ontological dignity on some ontic content (God as the Highest Entity, for example)--fell into the trap of conferring on Nazism the ontological dignity of suiting the essence of modern man" (The Ticklish Subject, 12--witness the striking speculative logic and the precision in the oversimplification).
Thus, apropos the problem of how to choose a political system, Zizek shows that we really get into problems if this is the case. Citing his own experience in Yugoslavia as a young philosopher, he makes the claim that "Heideggerians are ... eternally in search for a positive ontic political system that would come closest to the epochal ontological truth, a strategy that inevitably ends in error" (13). Furthermore they engage in a political passivism, denying that any manifestation of a particular ontological truth in a definite political system will be flawed because it will be ontic: for example, they will condemn Soviet Communism while holding up Socialism as ontologically true--indeed, how many "postmodern" Heideggerians and Heideggerian Marxists did precisely this throughout the twentieth century, especially after the fall of the Soviets (cf. Specters of Marx and the various responses to it, which all do not really differ, regardless of the different views on Marxism expressed, in taking up this precise position).
Now, how much does this all hold up? The first thing to be noted is what Zizek is right about. He is precisely right in characterizing the difference betwen the ontological and the ontic, for starters, which makes his characterization of the "paradox" above all the more poignant: Zizek is not passing off some simplified version of the ontological as far as Heidegger's own political positions goes. That is, the usual way to engage with Heidegger's statement in his Introduction to Metaphysics about the "inner greatness" of the Nazi movement is either to characterize it as overtly Nazi--that is, as just giving into propoganda in calling it great--or (what is more common) to say that it merely gets at an ontological truth about the movement, while leaving that ontological truth indeterminate and thereby evacuating the phrase of any content. Zizek rightly sees that what the "inner truth" of Nazism was for Heidegger was precisely the no-holds-barred confrontation of man with technology, the attempt to seize it and integrate it into life, rather than through slowly (as in capitalist democracies) let it seep into our experiences such that technology ends up governing them totally (Zizek gets this from various remarks of Heidegger, but also sees that it is connected to his later interests in technology, which few are willing to do--that is why it is a good reading of this incident). The key to Heidegger is to realize that while the ontological veils itself, that does not mean it is indeterminate--this key Zizek applies with skill.
Yet it is precisely in this merit that he goes wrong, because he manipulates this key to his own advantage. That is, he is willing to problematize the ontological for Heidegger precisely when it is a matter of his Nazism, as well as for his Yugoslav Heideggerian acquaintences, but then not see that it is this very determinacy to the ontological he has used that allows a connection between the ontic and the ontological and "errors" (like choosing a horrible political system to embody an ontological truth) to be avoided. Of course, he does this in order to more radically correct the Heideggerian framework through integrating it with Lacan's remarks. But this only means the depth of the problem that he uncovers is not seen fully; that we have only arrived at a superficial version of the perversion constituted by Heidegger's paradox. In other words, Zizek's warning not to underestimate Heidegger's raising to ontological dignity a horrible ontic phenomenon only serves to cover up the real perverseness of this action that he passes by.
I'll specify this "real perverseness" more later.
Sunday, August 5, 2007
Resoluteness and Being-towards-death
The connection between the two involves the comprehension of three steps.
1. For Heidegger understanding is the projection of Dasein onto a possibility. When Dasein understands itself, it has thrusted itself forward into a possibility of some sort. It has done this either authentically or inauthentically--i.e. in such a way that it has projected itself towards a possibility as something like a Self (authentic) or as something like a worldly thing (inauthentic) that goes about its projection like a business affair (existence is just mere business to an inauthentic projection; its possibilities are just mere "options" to be calculated about as to whether they will bring "success" or not).
2. If Dasein is projecting itself authentically, it understands (or projects) itself as guilty--that is, as thrown-projection, as care--and this type of projection is therefore "resolute". By "thrown," we mean that authentic Dasein projects itself upon its possibilities as something that has already had possibilities open to it such that its current possibilities grow out of those previous possibilities. In other words, Dasein's possibilities are determined or determinate--not in the sense that they are necessitated, but in the sense that they follow from Dasein's structure as a thing that has already decided upon previous possibilities and approaches this new possibility as one that is connected to those through itself (this is the structure of "care"). Understanding yourself as determinate in this way is to be guilty for Heidegger: you are guilty of previously deciding in some way such that you brought this new possibility before yourself, such that you inhabit some mode of care with regard to it. Resoluteness as the understanding of "thrown-projection" then means you project or thrust forward out of this guilt. Inauthentic Dasein never encounters itself, therefore, as thrown-projection (i.e. even if it encounters itself as projection, as having possibilities that are not mere "options," it still does not project itself as if it is thrown--and vice versa).
3. As an understanding, resoluteness can only be resolute authentically if it maintains itself in anticipation, i.e. in such a way that it understands itself or projects itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-being: only if projection projects itself towards possibilities that are possible for Dasein in its most individualized or ownmost mode (i.e. only if it anticipates) can they be possible, and this (i.e. this anticipation) is Being-towards-death. Only projection in such a way that Dasein is individualized or its owmnost (i.e. its essence) is it authentic. Thus authenticity needs both maintenence towards yourself as care and ownmost-ness--i.e. maintenence towards yourself as individualized care, care that is yours alone--in order to be. And only anticipation is the way that this projection can occur. Anticipation is merely the type of projection that does not comport itself towards Dasein in its structure--this is resoluteness, which maintains itself towards Dasein as guilty care--but rather comports itself towards the possibilties of Dasein as of Dasein. In other words, authentic projection does two things. First, it is resolute, and therefore is a comportment of Dasein towards its true essence as that essence. Second, it is anticipation, which is a comportment of itself towards its possibilities not as issuing out of itself (this is resoluteness) but as coming from beyond oneself and from a place to which Dasein will go. To use Heideggerian terms, resoluteness is Dasein's authentic facticity, and anticipation is Dasein's authentic existentiality. Now, Dasein is anticipatory only in Being-towards-death, that is, Being-towards or projecting itself upon that instance when it could possibly be no more--where it could have no more possibilities. If Dasein understands itself as or projects itself towards its death, and Dasein will see its possibilities for what they are: namely, possibilities that are for a being that is Dasein and Dasein only, since when they are taken away from Dasein if he were to die they would be taken away from nothing else than it.
This is all a bit muddled, but I hope the three step structure brings out what Heidegger's logic is in the confusing third chapter of the second division of Being and Time. Everything turns on combining authentic facticity (resoluteness) and authentic existentiality (anticipation). Because each of these two states also has corresponding aspects of facticity and existentiality, simply because they were distinguished seperately and in such a way that Dasein was both of them (and Dasein canot be anything other than factical and existent)--because of this things get complicated, and the two phenomena seem to break apart even more. But seeing them as merely these two aspects of facticity and existentiality hopefully shows that they are essentially different names for the same thing: authentic Dasein.
1. For Heidegger understanding is the projection of Dasein onto a possibility. When Dasein understands itself, it has thrusted itself forward into a possibility of some sort. It has done this either authentically or inauthentically--i.e. in such a way that it has projected itself towards a possibility as something like a Self (authentic) or as something like a worldly thing (inauthentic) that goes about its projection like a business affair (existence is just mere business to an inauthentic projection; its possibilities are just mere "options" to be calculated about as to whether they will bring "success" or not).
2. If Dasein is projecting itself authentically, it understands (or projects) itself as guilty--that is, as thrown-projection, as care--and this type of projection is therefore "resolute". By "thrown," we mean that authentic Dasein projects itself upon its possibilities as something that has already had possibilities open to it such that its current possibilities grow out of those previous possibilities. In other words, Dasein's possibilities are determined or determinate--not in the sense that they are necessitated, but in the sense that they follow from Dasein's structure as a thing that has already decided upon previous possibilities and approaches this new possibility as one that is connected to those through itself (this is the structure of "care"). Understanding yourself as determinate in this way is to be guilty for Heidegger: you are guilty of previously deciding in some way such that you brought this new possibility before yourself, such that you inhabit some mode of care with regard to it. Resoluteness as the understanding of "thrown-projection" then means you project or thrust forward out of this guilt. Inauthentic Dasein never encounters itself, therefore, as thrown-projection (i.e. even if it encounters itself as projection, as having possibilities that are not mere "options," it still does not project itself as if it is thrown--and vice versa).
3. As an understanding, resoluteness can only be resolute authentically if it maintains itself in anticipation, i.e. in such a way that it understands itself or projects itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-being: only if projection projects itself towards possibilities that are possible for Dasein in its most individualized or ownmost mode (i.e. only if it anticipates) can they be possible, and this (i.e. this anticipation) is Being-towards-death. Only projection in such a way that Dasein is individualized or its owmnost (i.e. its essence) is it authentic. Thus authenticity needs both maintenence towards yourself as care and ownmost-ness--i.e. maintenence towards yourself as individualized care, care that is yours alone--in order to be. And only anticipation is the way that this projection can occur. Anticipation is merely the type of projection that does not comport itself towards Dasein in its structure--this is resoluteness, which maintains itself towards Dasein as guilty care--but rather comports itself towards the possibilties of Dasein as of Dasein. In other words, authentic projection does two things. First, it is resolute, and therefore is a comportment of Dasein towards its true essence as that essence. Second, it is anticipation, which is a comportment of itself towards its possibilities not as issuing out of itself (this is resoluteness) but as coming from beyond oneself and from a place to which Dasein will go. To use Heideggerian terms, resoluteness is Dasein's authentic facticity, and anticipation is Dasein's authentic existentiality. Now, Dasein is anticipatory only in Being-towards-death, that is, Being-towards or projecting itself upon that instance when it could possibly be no more--where it could have no more possibilities. If Dasein understands itself as or projects itself towards its death, and Dasein will see its possibilities for what they are: namely, possibilities that are for a being that is Dasein and Dasein only, since when they are taken away from Dasein if he were to die they would be taken away from nothing else than it.
This is all a bit muddled, but I hope the three step structure brings out what Heidegger's logic is in the confusing third chapter of the second division of Being and Time. Everything turns on combining authentic facticity (resoluteness) and authentic existentiality (anticipation). Because each of these two states also has corresponding aspects of facticity and existentiality, simply because they were distinguished seperately and in such a way that Dasein was both of them (and Dasein canot be anything other than factical and existent)--because of this things get complicated, and the two phenomena seem to break apart even more. But seeing them as merely these two aspects of facticity and existentiality hopefully shows that they are essentially different names for the same thing: authentic Dasein.
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