Dreyfus on sources in Heidegger

Here is an amazing article by Hubert Dreyfus that confirms what I was sketching out in my post on the sources in Heidegger, and brings out how to take these sources and their combination. I might comment on this more later.

Hegel and Kant on time in Heidegger, corroborated...

Here is a short sentence in Being and Time that confirms what I was sketching out in the last post:

...Hegel has made an explicit attempt to set forth the way in which time as ordinarily understood is connected with spirit. In Kant, on the other hand, while time is indeed "subjective," it stands "beside" the "I think" and is not bound up with it.
-Being and Time, II.6 &82, 480.

In standing beside the "I think," time (as it is ordinarily understood, as a series of "nows") is not "bound up" with subjectivity but rather passes along with it. For Hegel, however, because he connects time (as it is ordinarily understood) with the development of the spirit, which is the development of the subjectivity or the "I think," time becomes even more of an expression of subjectivity than with Kant. That is, time in Hegel determines the Being of the subject less as time, because it becomes the vehicle for subjectivity. In Kant, however, because time passes along beside subjectivity and determines it while being outside it, time can determine the Being of subjectivity without emptying itself out into subjectivity, or losing its character as time. In Hegel, time becomes the mediating power of the negative that develops subjectivity and its Being. However, in Kant, time remains the determining factor that constitutes but does not remain the developing agent for subjectivity: it thus retains its power of determination over subjectivity without emptying itself out into a power of subjectivity itself. In short, then, it resists being something present-at-hand, even though Kant still holds that time is a series of "nows" that are present-at-hand, because it does not become something that is as graspable as the "I" in the "I think" of subjectivity (as it does in Hegel) while still remaining determining for subjectivity and its Being.

Hegel and Kant on time in Heidegger

There is a wierd footnote in the back of Being and Time that I'd like to speculate on:

Division Two, Chapter Six, xvi... The extent to which an even more radical understanding of time than Hegel's makes itself evident in Kant, will be shown in the first division of the second part of this treatise.

The reference to the first division of the second part of course doesn't mean anything, because this portion was never published. I haven't read Heidegger's book on Kant yet, which is supposed to answer some of the issues that first division of the second part would have posed, but I'm just thinking now that, given Heidegger's interpretation of the historizing potential of Dasein, Kant would have a more radical understanding of time than Hegel. Hegel reduces time down to history. And while Heidegger's view of time is probably closest to Hegel's with respect to the the degree to which he accords it importance and determining power over Being, Heidegger we know is farthest from Hegel in interpreting things as present-at-hand or as realized potentials, and thus might have more affinity with the indeterminate and yet primordial phenomenon of time in Kant. That is, Hegel reduces time right down to the now, and then extends this now out to encompass history. Kant leaves time intederminate--it has no relation to history other than as the factor which makes it possible. Because it is a possibility or a categorical determinant of existence for Kant, then, it might be closer to the act of stretching-itself-along or temporalizing itself historically that Heidegger has in mind when he says Dasein historizes. And because this potential is so determinate yet not present-at-hand at all in Kant, it might then be said to be more "radical:" it hits more at the nature of temporality as it determines Being. While Hegel gives time such an important place in its ability to detemine Being, he ultimately undoes this importance in making it something present-at-hand. Kant of course leaves time mostly unelaborated as a concept--that is, when compared to Hegel--but it remains less present-at-hand than in Hegel and thus more powerful.