Scholarly experience

Bourdieu is making the following case for "the indispensable creativity of empirical research," which (and I couldn't have put it better) is the fact that "when we act without entirely knowing what we are doing, we make it possible to discover in what we have done something of which we were previously unaware" (Homo Academicus, 7--in this he might agree with Deleuze). He then says this, which I think is just so excellent:

Far from being, as certain "initiatory" representatives of the "epistemological break" would have us believe, a sort of simultaneously inaugural and terminal act [my italics, mj], the renunciation of first-hand intuition is the end product of a long dialectical process [again mine, mj] in which intuition, formulated in an empirical operation, analyzes and verifies or falsifies itself, engendering new hypotheses, gradually more firmly based, which will be transcended in their turn, thanks to the problems, failures, and expectations which they bring to light.
-Homo Academicus, 7

But then, in a footnote to this sentence, he talks of the activity of managing of this process introducing a difference between scholarly and ordinary experience--which just takes the cake:

I cannot regret strongly enough not having kept a research diary which would have shown, better than any declaration, the role of empirical work in the progressive accomplishment of the break with first-hand experience. But a reading of the list of sources used (see appendix 1 [which is not just extensive, but also highly organized]) should at least give an idea of the work of controlled recollection which is the motivating difference between ordinary experience and scholarly experience.
-Homo Academicus, 280

This work is also what precisely makes scholarly experience necessary to analyze qua different.

Theory, pedagogy, de Man

Why do we keep returning to Paul de Man for definitions of theory? "The Resistance to Theory," is, no doubt, an excellent essay, and contains many concise formulations--the resistance to theory is itself theoretical, etc. etc. But where precisely does the concise statement pass over into an imperative to revisit what is concisely said? And can such a statement, if it has the power to convert itself in this way, ever really be about what is concisely said--that is, the referent of the statement--as opposed to the fact that it is de Man who is saying it? From what I can see in the writings on de Man, people hesitate over precisely this issue: the answer is no, insofar as the statement is really about de Man himself, and his ability to pronounce upon theory; the answer is yes, insofar as the implications of how de Man puts the statement are immense and indeed, in themselves, provocative. It is evident though that each of these answers presupposes the other. Nevertheless, the distinction is handy for people, because it allows them to take up the first answer and analyze it somewhat critically under the title of pedagogy: in other words, viewing de Man's statements on theory as never quite about the subject under consideration gives theory itself a new subject to consider, theoretical pedagogy or the teaching of theory. This particular strain in de Man, then, is seen as precisely his pedagogical aspect (John Guillory, for example, despite what his mode of analysis entails, sees it as precisely this). It is de Man's teaching that we see in such formulations, and therefore (to bring it all back to our initial question) we return to such concise statements because they are products of the problems involved in the transmission of theory or theory's continuity over time--the survival of theory being precisely that which is involved in any consideration of theory's role. If I am wondering what theory is, I am also considering what it has been, and de Man's formulations are (in this view) precisely what theory has been, since they are made not only to sum up what theory is but send it as such into the future, my present. In such statements we feel we are not only looking at what theory was, but at how it was transmitted.

But the question then is, why is pedagogy here being reduced to a form of speaking--the concise formulation that demands revisiting (in other words, something like, but not necessarily the same thing as, the aporism)? In considering how de Man speaks, we have precisely made pedagogy and transmission account wholly for the form of the statement that de Man is uttering--when it could just as well be the case that such a statement has nothing to do with transmission, or at least would only be one element in everything pedagogy involves. The teaching of theory has nothing to do, perhaps, with this sort of concision, this sort of way of talking. This is still a bit unclear in my mind, and will become clearer as I read de Man in the coming weeks, but I might summarize (and not teach) my thoughts in the following way: because a statement also involves the conditions of its utterance does not mean it transfers along anything--anything more, that is, than we are willing to read into it, and which (disturbingly) in this case is the entire discourse of theory.

Reading for exams

As you read this, my cohort in the English department prepares for general field examinations! A few of us are discussing what we are reading here on our blog. Stop by and enjoy. (I, by the way, am specializing in 18th Century Literature, as well as in Literary Theory and the traditions of Literary Criticism.)