Zizek on Heidegger, continued

Last time I suggested that Slavoj Zizek, in his profound and exhilirating work The Ticklish Subject does not run into problems in his interpretation of Heidegger because he oversimplifies Heidegger's position, but because he does not go deep enough into the problem he uncovers. That is, often Zizek is characterized as careless in his writing, and because of this one might have expected him to critique only a slimmed-down Heidegger. I find this assertion extremely stupid, however, and I hoped to bring out why last time with some remarks on Zizek's penetrating mode of thought, as well as his correctness in interpreting Heidegger. I suggested Zizek is a dialectical thinker in that, like Hegel, in his criticism he not only unveils the presuppositions of whatever his subject is, but shows these presuppositions to be perverse. By bringing this perversity to language, Zizek (and Hegel likewise--"contradiction" for Hegel is nothing other than a sort of perversity) seems like he "overlooks" particular elements within an author's discourse. Really, though, he is merely penetrating through what Hegel aptly calls "instinctive thinking:" that is, thinking that does not submit its perversities to thought but rather lets them constitute it wholly, lets them "enmesh" it within its "bonds." Thinking as determined by perversity is essentially a language of desire that constantly bars itself from accessing its drive, its perverse "knots or nodes" that only make it reconsitute its perversity as an unthought presupposition. Essentially, Zizek agrees with Hegel in the necessity of bringing these knots and nodes to light:

The broad distinction between the instinctive act and the intelligent and free act is tha the latter is performed with an awareness of what is being done; when the content of the interest in which one is absorbed is drawn out of its immediate unity with oneself and becomes an independent object of one's thinking, then it is that spirit begins to be free, whereas when thinking is an instinctive activity, spirit is enmeshed in the bonds of its categories and is broken up into an infinitely varied material. Here and there in this mesh there are firm knots which give stability and direction to the life and consciousness of spirit; these knots or nodes owe their fixity and power to the simple fact that having been brought before consciousness, they are independent, self-existent Notions of its essential nature.
-Hegel's Science of Logic Preface to the Second Edition, 37.

What Hegel is getting at here is that bringing these knots or nodes before a particular discourse makes them show this discourse's essential nature to be stable only because of the knot: this knot is not merely a presupposition, but is perverse. Thus, the particular statement of a discourse is shown to only be a function of this universal perversity particularizing itself, and thus, to any discourse trapped within the bonds of the particular, this universal discourse of Zizek will appear like an oversimplification, a reduction of the particularity to a single particular--an appearance that is grossly mistaken as to the truth of the matter, and essentially constitutes a repression of the perversity that has been brought to light.
Anyway, I thus asserted that Zizek emphasizes the perversity of the axis within Heidegger's thought that moves between "ontic" and "ontological," showing that Heidegger inevitably gets into trouble on the basis of this binary itself because it always priveliges the latter term. The ontic is always subordinate to the ontological: as Heidegger himself puts it, using a term from Husserl, the ontic is "founded" on the ontological--if the ontological were to disappear or be removed, the ontic would not remain, but not vice versa. But I showed that Zizek, despite his own knowledge of what Heidegger is getting at with the ontological, essentially makes this "priveliging" into a straightforward preference for one over the other, such that the ontological seems, for Zizek, something like the "noumenal" of Kant, that indeterminate basis of any phenomenal--or, in the case of Heidegger, ontic--circumstance. The ontic "veils" the ontological, Heidegger agrees, but it does not veil it in the sense of Kant, in the sense that the ontological remains indeterminately a priori, beyond all of our ontic experience. This is how Zizek makes it sound.
But this is not oversimplification: it is merely an attempt to get at the perversity of the distinction between the ontic and the ontological. Essentially, Zizek is not "reducing" Heidegger's ontic and ontological distinction into something Kantian, but this is merely an unfortunate side effect of his primary aim, to show that the ontic/ontological distinction in itself is perverse. That is, he shows that the ontological difference (a Heideggerian term for the ontic/ontological distinction) allows thinking about particular phenomena, like politics, to be plagued by an inadequate framework that forces false choices on these Heideggerian thinkers.
In doing so, where he goes wrong is in specifying the general locus of the perversity to be merely at this level of the distinction, and not anywhere deeper. In essence, Zizek is right, but not as right as he could be! It is this that makes something like an "oversimplification" of Heidegger's ontological difference into a Kantian distinction appear. This "ovrsimplification," in other words, does not attest to the untruth of what Zizek is getting at, but rather attests to its essential correctness. Can we still call it an "oversimplification" then? I think not. It is merely a marker that something truly perverse is being hit at by Zizek here: he just didn't pursue it far enough.
With all that said, we can get down to what Zizek forgets such that he stops short of the real perverseness his discourse accesses. I'll specify this in the next post, which I'll begin right now.