Heidegger on information

Language, which speaks by saying, is concerned that our speech, heeding the unspoken, corresponds to what language says. Hence silence too, which one would dearly like to subtend to speech as its origin [as was suggested in Being and Time], is already a corresponding. Silence [indeed] corresponds to the noiseless ringing of a stillness, the stillness of the saying that enowns and shows. The saying that rests on enowning is, as showing, the ownmost mode of enowning. Enowning is telling [sagend]. Accordingly, language speaks after the manner of the given mode in which enowning reveals itself as such or withdraws. A thinking that thinks back to enowning can just barely surmise it, and yet can already experience it in the essence of modern technics, an essence given in the still odd-sounding name en-framing [Ge-Stell]. The enframing, because it sets upon human beings--that is, challenges them--to order everything that comes to presence into a technical inventory, unfolds essentially after the mode of enowning; at the same time, it distorts enowning, inasmuch as all ordering sees itself committed to calculative thinking and so speaks the language of enframing. Speech [thus] is challenged to correspond to the ubiquitous orderability of what is present.

Speech, when posed in this fashion, becomes information. It informs itself concerning itself, in order to establish securely, by means of information theories, its own procedure.
-"The Way to Language," in Basic Writings, 420-21, translated by David Farrell Krell (modified).