Yet one cannot...

What's often disturbing about Derrida is that, even within all the play, he still remains so very intuitive, simple, basic in his concerns. The following is a good example, in that the task is not abstract, but almost commonsense:

How can one assume a responsibility [...]? One can vary or deconstruct all the predicates of responsibility in general, yet one cannot completely reduce the delay: an event, a law, a call, an other are already there; others are there--for whom and before whom one must answer. However "free" it is supposed to be, the response inaugurates nothing if it does not come after.
-"Désistance" in Psyche II.

Where do this "yet one cannot," and this "supposed to be" come from? What is disturbing is that it is left so cryptic, so undertheorized, while at the same time it appears so obvious, so commonsense, like it comes from experience. In fact, it appears essentially commonsensical, commonsensical for a vital reason--this is what makes it disturbing, because it provokes one to think that any effort to further specify will actually require making explicit what is most obvious (which is most commonsense, most widely-experienced, most prejudicial) and thereby undo the effort to specify (to make clearer, bring into the light) as such.

And unless one understands that this, too, is what Derrida intends, one begins to misread him. Intends--and yet one cannot say that this intention is not supposed to be anything other than something that plays.