Nazism, Heidegger and Derrida

Isn't the upshot of all of Derrida's comments on Heidegger's Nazism the imperative "Be careful!"? Indeed, as an elaboration of Heidegger's projected "destruction" of metaphysics (cf. Being and Time ¶5) isn't Derrida's entire project of "deconstruction" merely "careful" (that is, productive) destruction of metaphysics--whence the cautious "-con-" that merely makes explicit the sense Heidegger gave to "destruction" in saying "this destruction is ... far from having the negative sense of shaking off the ontological tradition" or "a vicious relativizing of ontological standpoints"? The objection I am making is not really to the content of those comments on Heidegger or to deconstruction, but one to its particularly annoying style: that of the imperative. If one (correctly) understands deconstruction as the carrying out of the destruction of metaphysics that Heidegger describes or as the leading of philosophy into an era where metaphysics is something other than what it was, why put the "-con-" into "destruct" other than to force imperatively the productive character of destruction that Heidegger outlines upon us?
Indeed, what Heidegger says is an imperative. Metaphysics, in 1927 (the year in which he first uttered the imperative to destroy) was in need of this destruction. Wittegenstein too (and with him, analytic philosophy as well as math) realized that metaphysics, as philosophy that takes truth to be correspondence between a representation and an object or Being to be something that is present, had to go (in his Tractatus we see an almost Heideggerian elucidation of how the truth or elucidatory power of a proposition is to be ascertained--that is, in terms not of correspondence but of "surmounting:" "My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climed out through them, on them, over them. ... He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly."). And he too gave an imperative: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 7). In other words, "that truth which philosophy cannot grasp by way of correspondence must be replaced by a truth that is grasped philosophically by logic" or, quite simply, "metaphysics must be destroyed."
Why, then, this imperative again on the part of Derrida in the "-con-"? And why does it have to take the character of caution? That is my objection. Put differently it is this: It seems that if we understand Heidegger's sense of "destruction" correctly, we would recognize the imperative. Derrida then appends an imperative to recognize the imperative on top of that imperative itself. Isn't this superfluous?
The answer is no, and that my original position is wrong. The whole point of deconstruction is to recognize that the imperative to destroy metaphysics will never be superfluous because it will able to be recognized. This is the essential "ethic" of deconstruction, and why its labor must always appear superfluous. Because truth is not correspondence, its own nature can never even be grasped by a philosophy that would "recognize" it. That is, non-correspondent truth cannot even be theorized by philosophy. Why? Precisely because correspondent truth is a truth constituted by presence, the presence of what will be correspondent to a representation--that is, precisely because truth as correspondence is what is recognized. If truth is not what is able to be recognized (presence), philosophy will never recognize the imperative to move towards another concept of truth.
Is this thesis true, however? Was this really not recognized? At the time Derrida first wrote, this was the case. This is one reason why he attacked the structuralists so fiercely: they completely seemed to ignore this imperative and, like many "natural language" analytic philosophers (including the late Wittegenstein) had avoided the issues Wittegenstein brought up in 1921, returned to a philosophy of presence (while, indeed, including many of the amazing other breakthroughs Heidegger made). The early book on Husserl and the articles that originally made up Of Grammatology are really the first articulations of this superfluous imperative.
But where does that lead us regarding Heidegger's Nazism? In "Comment donner raison" (Diacritcs, 19:3-4, 4-9) Derrida said the following regarding the proclaimations of various members of the French philosophical community in the late 1980's and the press that Heidegger should not be read because he was (briefly--though the meaning of "brief" here was precisely what was in question) a Nazi:

That in the name of which we immediately--or nearly so--condemn Nazism can no longer, must no longer, I believe, be formulated so simply in the language of a philosophy that, for essential reasons has never been sufficient for this and that Heidegger has alsotaught us to question. ...More than ever, the vigilant but open reading of Heidegger remains in my eyes one of the indespensible conditions, one of them but not the least, of trying to comprehend and to tell better why, with so many others, I have always condemned Nazism, in the horror of what, in Heidegger precisely, and so many others, in Germany or elsewhere, has ever been able to give in to it.

Two things are apparent here. First, that a philosopher's Nazism does not entirely implicate all of what a philosopher does, because all these doings in light of this (brief) Nazism prompt us to contemplate what was wrong this Nazism. Second, that philosophy must change the way it conceives itself and its mission if it continues to force these implications upon not only Heidegger but--since Heidegger is a philosopher--itself. Both these points are superfluous, in the sense we outlined above: they call imperatively to a move beyond metaphysics. But it is the second that accomplishes this superfluity most thoroughly: philosophy cannot "recognize" what is wrong about itself and then cut that part out. To do so one would have to be able to recognize nothing less than truth. In short, the demand that we condemn all of Heidegger and his work is unreasonable not because of the scope of what Heidegger himself did, but because to do so is to remain in a philosophy of metaphysics, to remain convinced that what Heidegger did might suddenly present itself to be recognized as evil. As if we did not ourselves determine precisely through reading (not recognizing) Heidegger what is evil in it! Derrida is not trying to show that the amount of Heidegger's complicity philosophically with Nazism is small compared to the majority of his work. He rejects this approach outright, and rather calls imperatively for a transformation of philosophy into a state in which we might be able to more richly entertain the question as to Heidegger's Nazism.
And yet, my objection I think was not entirely wrong, in the end. For why does this point have to be made imperatively--in the form of an imperative precisely to go and re-read Heidegger? Doesn't this make us want to re-read Heidegger precisely in order to find a "genuine" reading of him (or "true" by way of correspondence to what Heidegger actually meant) that will allow us to adequately pose the question of Nazism? I guess the real objective of Derrida is to bring up this precise question. In other words, this is the real issue necessitating the form of the superfluous imperative. In a philosophy beyond metaphysics, one will not re-read Heidegger to try and find a Heidegger that will correspond with the reality of his Nazism. In a philosophy beyond metaphysics, we re-read Heidegger for another reason, a reason that does not entail us recognizing anything. Imperatively, the question comes before us: What would this reason be?
In other words, to those who will say to Derrida that this form of the imperative could never itself be enough to bring about that new philosophy beyond metaphysics, he would concede that they are wrong. The form of the imperative itself will never be enough, but in saying that it is insufficient it has already done its work. That is, in already asking "what would be the reason to re-read Heidegger beyond metaphysics?" that was prompted by the imperative to re-read Heidegger, to revisit the destruction of metaphysics, to reclaim what seemed (in its presence, in being "recognized") superfluous as essential, we merely rephrased the same imperative: "Be careful!" or, more fundamentally, "Respect the non-present!" What seems to lead us back to a place where we need to supply an answer to yet another imperative really is a step forward towards conceiving a philosophy beyond metaphysics: we have conceived its necessity from yet another level, a necessity that leads us forward back to its imperative. Eventually we will hit upon this philosophy, though it will never be something we can recognize.
In fact, we might have already hit upon it in the form of the imperative itself. If an imperative can possess an answer that is non-present, as we are asking it to do here in our question, "What would this reason be? Yet be careful! Respect the non-present!" we have something completely other than a Kantian imperative. The Kantian imperative respected only presence, in wanting a definite answer in the form of an action that made morality itself present. If there is a way of generally being able to respect the non-present in an answer to an imperative, we have produced a new basis for a new philosophy beyond metaphysics. This is the fundamental move of the work of Emmanuel Levinas as Derrida sees him: thus Derrida's turn towards him in his later work (we should note that it is also the move of Lacan, precisely through Kant himself, although Derrida does not use him). The imperative that began the work of Derrida's deconstruction of philosophy therefore itself engenders a philosophy that Derrida can work out such that he can move even beyond Heidegger.