Will to Power and Eternal Return

Nietzsche says, "supposing everything is becoming, then knowledge is possible only on the basis of belief in being," (The Will to Power, #518) and thereby shows quite clearly the essential link between his two basic concepts called "the will to power" and "the eternal return." In fact, here he shows these two basic concepts are one. How?

Will to power (in German, der Wille zur Macht) is the fundamental assertion that whatever is, wills, or is only insofar as it possesses (or rather inhabits) some intention towards an object. Now, it is not only this. To will to power means that whatever is, wills itself: the will itself that is, is the object of that will. Thus will to power is the willing of a will. It is the will that the will will again. Now, this does not mean that whatever is--that is, whatever wills--merely wills its own self-preservation. No. It wills enhancement. When we say that will to power is a will that wills itself again, we mean by this "again" not a mere endurance. What wills to power does not seek to merely endure or suffer through the moment and thereby preserve itself--Nietzsche calls this type of will the height of "slavish" morality, and would scoff at our even being able to confuse it with what is signified by "will." What wills to power seeks not to be again--this is what is implied by interpreting "willing again" as a will to endure. Rather, what wills to power seeks to become again, to have the chance to not exist as a will but instead will again--will being at bottom development, overcoming, becoming. If this will to will again means that a will will exist again, well, that is great. But it is essentially of no consequence to a will whether it exists or not--it merely seeks to impose itself on its object.

Eternal return (der Ewigen Wiederkunft) is a name for a fundamental reversal of metaphysics that Nietzsche conceived: all being is the becoming of being. Now, throughout metaphysics being (existing, is-ing) is conceived in opposition to becoming. What exists excludes what is-on-the-way-to-existing (this is what is essentially meant by "becoming"). As soon as something becomes, it strictly is not anymore. For example, say my opinion changes. Indeed we say this often enough--what do we mean by it? What is meant by this is that my opinion becomes: it temporarily does not exist while it changes from what it was to what it then, after becoming or changing, is. It is absurd to think of what my opinion is at the time that I am changing it. I only "have an opinion" before and after the becoming of the opinion. So too with being: this is how we can say that it is what does not exist.
Now, if all being is the becoming of being, what do we mean by that? Well, it implies two steps of our cognition. First, we have to see that Nietzsche does not strictly invert the proposition "all being is being" by saying that "all being is... becoming." If we omit "the being of," we see Nietzsche would be simply saying that all being is non-being, all existence is non-existence--in essence, nothing exists. Everything becomes. After contemplating what Nietzsche does not exactly say, we can then proceed to add "the being of" back in and see what he does say. But what he does indeed say has to be taken from the standpoint of this inversion: being is no longer primary, it no longer reigns over becoming. With this dethroning, becoming is more primary. Now, this established, we may assert that if all being is the being of becoming, this means all that is, is as a consequence of becoming (if becoming is primary). This is why this is a reversal of metaphysics: where becoming was subordinated to being, being becomes subordinate to becoming. Its existence is not eradicated, as it would be via the inversion we spoke of before--this would not allow it to be suboordinate. We see that a more complete and rigorous reversal than the mere inversion of being and becoming has occured in allowing being to exist under becoming, be determined by becoming.
And what would this being or existence determined by becoming look like? This is where the scenario signified by the phrase "eternal return" comes in. If all was becoming, and being was a mere consequence of becoming, then all that existed, all being, would have to be the result of a recurrance or return of becoming--that is, becoming that was repeated. Let us sketch out the scenario: if time not the span in which things existed, as it would be within traditional metaphysics, but the span in which they became, then time, if it ended, would have to begin again--this is prescribed by the nature of time remaining the span in which things become. In other words, if the process of becoming ended, it would have to just begin again. Now, what got repeated because of this beginning again, this repetition of time, would then no longer just be becoming, but would have some actual existence independent of the process of becoming. It would have being. Being, then, is what returns, or what is repeated, when becoming ends and begins becoming again. In other words, being is the becoming-again of events in time. This is how being is the being of becoming.
Before we move on, we might ask why does becoming have to repeat--that is, become in the same way that it became before? Well, there are disputed answers to this within Nietzsche scholarship. The easiest way to explain it is that becoming must be a finite process. If what becomes is finite, then there are only a determinate number of possibilities for what becomes to become. Once these are expended completely, then the whole process would have to start over, and, though the order in which they became could be different, each possibility would be expended by the becoming again and thus would exist again.
Now, whether this recurring-time-structure of the world is the case is irrelevant. Nietzsche in fact never claims that it is. But it is not a mere fanciful thought. Why? Because, as we shall see, it is essentially not the structure of the world itself, but the structure of the will to power. In other words, what is designated by the eternal return is not the nature of reality, but the nature of the will to power that produces reality. The will to power operates in such a way that it takes being as the being of becoming, and insofar as this is true--which Nietzsche does claim and assert with vehemence--then reality, whatever it is--Nietzsche in fact thinks we cannot ultimately determine it--will be structured according to the idea of eternal return through the will to power.

How do these two basic ideas relate and become one? We see already that if will wills itself again when it is will to power, it must will itself to repeat. Thus it must will the eternal return to be true of reality, must will the eternal return into reality. In other words, in willing itself again it must will the eternal recurrance of itself, must will its return (i.e. must will itself) again and again, eternally.
But while this explanation is sufficient to link these concepts together, it still preserves a distinction between the two terms. The real key to understanding Nietzsche is getting at why they are one, why they are both aspects of the same phenomenon. And to do this, we must turn to the quote from Nietzsche (it should be noted that this quote isn't the only one where this connection can be made: Nietzsche is in fact quite frequently saying something of the sort that can be construed this way).
But what Nietzsche means by "knowledge" in this quote must be specified first. "Knowledge works as a tool of power," he said once, putting it quite succinctly (The Will to Power, #480). How is this so? Because knowledge is knowledge not of reality, but of what is real for the will that wills power. Thus, knowledge can be a "tool," an effect of the will's intention; it can be a facet or aspect of the intention that intends or strives for its object; it can be a reflection of this intention representing what the intention needs out of reality in order for it to get its object (which, we remember, is itself). If we conceive of knowledge as this, the (to use a not unrelated Freudian term) wish-fulfillment or fantasy of the will to power, and not as the representation of the reality as it is outside of the will (for there is no way the will can get outside the will), then we can begin to turn to the phrase and make sense of it.

"Supposing everything is becoming, then knowledge is possible only on the basis of belief in being." What Nietzsche means is this: if we can only act in such a way that we will to power, and if the will to power supposes everything is becoming or, expressed differently, supposes that the eternal return is true, then knowledge or the will to power's fantasies are possible only if the will to power believes or wills being and not the being of becoming to return eternally. In other words, knowledge is only possible if the will to power goes against itself and, as the will to the eternal return or recurrence of will, wills that the eternal return not be true. Let us be clear: it wills the eternal return not to be the true object of the will to power because in willing being to exist instead of the being of becoming, it wills that the exact reversal of the eternal return (being) be more primary than the product of the eternal return (the being of becoming).
Now, a lot is happening here, but it is already clear that knowledge is a product of the most savage and primordial masochistic act of the will: its will not to return. Knowledge is the reflection of this will to undo will. Now we begin to have a sense of how the will to power and the eternal return are really products of the same immense phenomenon that Nietzsche spent his life fighting: the fall of the will to power into a slavish will to nothingness, the fall of the will of the master into the will of the slave and the advent of nihilism—all this brings about a change in the will to power such that it does not will the eternal return anymore. Only when we figure out that this is the phenomenon that Nietzsche's concepts are forged in order to combat do we see how both the will to power and the eternal return are ideas that are interconnected, for we see they originate from and explain the same thing.
But let us elaborate, starting with the term "slave:" why is knowledge slavish exactly? Because, as we have already established, as knowledge, knowledge represents a reality that the will wills to be true--and in this case this reality is essentially a reality where willing does not occur. If the will wills itself not to return, it wills its own death. And if, looking through Nietzsche's writings, we see that he often says the essence of (biological) life is the will to power, it becomes clear why Nietzsche links this will of the death of willing to the slave, who essentially is characterized as nihilistic: the will against life is a will to nothingness, and therefore nihilistic. Nihilism is the will of the slave for Nietzsche. The term opposed to the slave—master—we see characterizes those who are worthy of life, those who do not seek to be free of it but want to will correctly (that is, will to power).
Master and slave basically characterized, then, we can see that the advent of knowledge was also for Nietzsche the advent of both nihilism and slavishness—in other words, the fall of the will to power to a will to nothingness. According to Nietzsche in this short remark, knowledge of reality only comes on the scene once life, the will to power, ceases to will itself to power again and again. Why? It is clear that if this is true, this fact makes all knowledge slavish knowledge, even if it is held by a master, simply because it has an essence that wills the end of the will to power. It is also clear that a true master would only diverge from willing his power again and again, eternally, by acquiring knowledge (or, descending into the muck of the slave) only to will himself to power better, more easily, more deftly, with more skill. But for anyone who takes reality to be something that can be known, they cease willing to power: they apparently engage with reality in such a way that they are slaves, that they will their own destruction.
But is this true? Does knowledge come on the scene when life ceases to will itself to recur eternally? Why should Nietzsche indeed affirm this? Everything revolves around seeing how knowledge does not seek the eternal recurrence of the will to power. But before we can grasp this, it is handy to picture life before the advent of knowledge. If the essence of life is to will itself (which is, we remember, will to power) to power, then there is no need for knowledge (in the sense we already described) at all. Knowledge can only be a deviation from the primary task, can only be secondary (readers of Freud now see that these primary and secondary tasks are a lot like the primary and secondary processes of the unconscious and the conscious). Adhering to this primary task, then, will in this time before knowledge knows nothing. Put differently, prior to the advent of knowledge, there was only a masterly willing of will such that reality was only the reflection of the will to power. In fact, it was not even a reflection of this will to power: reality simply was—no representation of the will to itself needed to juxtapose itself between the object and the will, as there is with knowledge. Reality was not fantasy or the wish-fulfillment of the will, for the will did not need anything more out of it in order to get at its object than what it already was. As hard or impossible as this is to picture, the key to grasping the fall of the will to power into nihilism is to see that this reality of the master is necessary to keep in view, a reality where knowledge is superfluous and in which life can get along fine without it. For once we know this and grasp it at least as somewhat plausible (looking at animals for examples), the concepts of the will to power and the eternal recurrence seem clearer, and the phenomenon of knowledge more sinister.
As we said, the key to knowing how knowledge arises when life seeks to will itself is to see that any deviation from this primary process must hinder the will to power, and hinder it in a way that resembles knowledge. Since the will to power seeks to will itself again and again eternally, that is, seeks to will the eternal recurrence of the becoming that is itself, all knowledge can only be a will for something else to recur eternally. And while this "something other" does not directly have to be the reverse of the will to power, the force that will undo it, to some degree this reverse is always the ultimate effect of any will that does not will itself to power. Why? Well, because along with any other object willed, there will also be a will against the will to power, a will to nothingness, because it wills something other than becoming to exist. That is, if it does not will becoming, it must will some form of being. And since being can only be a consequence of becoming for the will, this will must will against will. It is that simple.
But we have not shown how it wills against will in a form that resembles knowledge. Well, let us remember what Nietzsche here says knowledge is: knowledge is that which is possible only on the basis of a will that being should exist. Knowledge assumes things simply are. In fact, insofar as it exerts itself, it wills that they are this way. It does not assume that they become—how could it get a handle on them? Indeed, if you know my changing opinion in the process of it being changed, you know nothing: it is not an opinion anymore or yet. Thus Nietzsche shows, quite profoundly, that all those conceptions about reality that go so far as to presuppose that what is real is no longer the old solipsistic Cartesian cogito, but the structure of a world, of a reality that merely happens to fall in line in a particular way with our mode of perceiving—all these Kantian and Hegelian and Comteian notions of reality as a thing that is structured to suit knowledge overlook something. They do this even if they affirm idealistically (like Berkeley) that only knowledge is reality (i.e. that all that is real are pure subjective perceptions--there is no "external reality" at all). They are overlooking how reality is not structured at a deeper level, at the level that makes possible their assertion that reality is structured for knowledge. At this level, being and becoming war with each other, and all that exists is will. Their philosophies thus will being as opposed to becoming, since what is remains the sole object of knowledge (knowledge is not of becoming). And with this will they fail to see that their being can just as well be an effect of becoming.
Now, it is this hastiness, this lack of resolve to make sure being permeates all that is willed that makes their will lack something. What it lacks is a will to impose itself upon all things such that it can expend all its possibilities and recur again: this will lacks a will to power. As such, it has made something be in opposition to becoming, so that it can grasp and comprehend not what it is but what it should be. Reality thus is representation as opposed to reality—fantasy or mere wish fulfillment. As such, it is knowledge. Thus knowledge is the effect of a denigrated will to power.
We have moved quickly, because the central issue here will bring us back to what has just happened. The central issue is this: regardless of whether will to power is what is real, regardless of whether the recurring-time-structure is the structure of reality itself, all knowledge stops short at a point where its essence could be one of two things, being or being of becoming. Since they are identical in their appearance (both appear to be being), but different in their genealogy or origin (one has its origin in being, the other in becoming), the decision to pick one over the other will inevitably be fatal, regardless of which is chosen. For all knowledge can see here is being: it has stopped short of genealogy. It thus affirms being and ceases to have contact with reality other than through fantasy. Now, what made this knowledge stop short? A lack of will. It is not knowledge itself, but the will of knowledge that is its downfall. This will, because it wills only being at this juncture and does not will itself—i.e. because it is not at this juncture true to its nature, which, as a will, is will to power, will to recur again and be again the being of becoming—because it wills being over its own nature it stops short of itself, does not will itself again, again at this final juncture where of all places it should will itself again, assert itself again. It is suddenly truer to the object of the will than the will itself. This, then, regardless of what reality is, makes the will to power what is not willed by knowledge.
And this is why Nietzsche repeats again and again that "knowledge is dangerous." It is not dangerous because it is a "tool of power," in the sense that, as knowledge, it can influence us to will domination over things that we should not dominate, like the poor, etc: knowledge here is not dangerous primarily because it is "ideology," because it has something wrong with its content. It is dangerous first and foremost for the will and its ability to will itself because of its form--that is, because it is merely a tool that seeks to substitute itself for will (one sees parallels with Heidegger's assertion that Being has fallen from its essence to become something merely ready-to-hand, something approximating techne, what gets used in the world). Indeed, Nietzsche thinks that we probably no longer have the capacity to will something without knowledge (in the conventional slavish sense) anymore: he believes that many generations must pass before humanity can live up to such a will again (and a knowledge that is suboordinate to will--we must keep in mind that Nietzsche is not advocating fanaticism or the end of knowledge, but only its being in the proper place, underneath will). Thus knowledge comes on the scene when life ceases to will itself to recur eternally. And thus the phenomenon is unitary: it occurs when being and being of becoming are put before a will, and the will does not make a choice and impose itself but accepts them both as equivalent, as being. In essence, this is the same choice we make everyday when we see a shoe or something made in a foreign land using slave labor and do not see its origin but see it only as a finished product—that is, see it only as a shoe, something that is regardless of where it came from, not as something that is only because it is the result of becoming what it is (that is, being-made-by-slaves). Now, as soon as this type of will becomes the predominant one, all that can result is nihilism, because the choice has already been made inside the slavish will itself against the true nature of life, against a will towards the eternal return of will. As soon as this will to power resurges, however (and it will have to overcome knowledge as slavish knowledge in order to do so) the proper nature of will might be restored to itself and life will again masterfully affirm life (and know masterfully--know not instead of willing but know in order to will).