Spivak on Derrida

If I argued below, like other Heideggerians of late, for looking at Heidegger as a philosopher of truth rather than a philosopher of Being, the same argument applies to who I also argued to be the best reader and developer of Heidegger in the last century, Derrida. Recently I found a remark of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, written on the occasion of Derrida's death, that concisely puts forth this view:

His concern was not the exposure of error but an investigation into how we produce truth.
-From a letter to the New York Times

The locution "how we produce truth" seems to step into the place of what we might expect to be present, given the rhythm of the rest of the line--namely, just "truth," (so the line would run, "was not the exposure of error but an investigation into truth"). But Spivak is getting at something which can easily be misread (especially and primarily in the case of Derrida, but also in the case of Heidegger).
Spivak is not emptying out the simple, classically philosophical term "truth" into the more relativistic formulation "how we produce truth," as if to remain undecided as of yet as to the existence of truth, or even to remain decided against this existence. No. Spivak rightly uses "how we produce truth" because the efforts of Derrida were directed towards showing that truth is already at play in how we produce it. Notice I did not say what is often popularly regarded as the insight of Derrida and other "postmodernists" (even by those postmodernists themselves, most significantly in Lyotard's famous summary of the condition): that truth is how it is produced, that how we produce truth is truth. If anything, this is a Marxist thesis, one that Derrida could be shown to be chiefly at work criticizing throughout Spectres of Marx. No, read correctly, and how I am sure Spivak would like it to be read, the displacement at work in her sentence consolidates a central thesis that lets the work of Derrida show itself as stronger than any relativist postmodernism and, for that matter, than any analytic effort that presumes truth is never found at play in its production. Indeed, this is why Derrida's concern was not the mere "exposure of error:" if this were true, the second, weak reading of this sentence would suffice.
But Derrida investigates the truth already in reserve within its production, in its presencing, and, like Heidegger, therefore attests unremittingly to its existence--indeed, to the point where saying truth "exists" or "has Being" cannot itself get at the real ability for truth to determine our lives and give us freedom (this is in fact the most basic premise of both Heidegger and Derrida). It is not that truth does not exist: it is that saying it exists does not encompass the phenomenon of its existence. The same goes with saying that it is the "highest:" the true is not the most real or actual in the sense of the most in-existence or in-Being, nor is it the existence that, as what is most in-existence or in-Being, determines all other existents or beings. Heidegger coined a term for investigations that hold these conceptions of truth early on, ontotheology, and called for the overcoming or the leap out of of it. And Derrida begins his work with this concept and this task at hand for him. Thus, we shouldn't expect him to be doubting the existence of truth by emptying it out into the process of its production. Rather, like Spivak is saying here, we should be looking at how from the beginning Derrida seeks like Heidegger to find a language other than that of Being and existence to bring the massive impact of truth upon us into our sights--or, put in a better and more expansive way, how he seeks to find a language that can answer to the truth already at work in existence.
All this makes it apparent that Spivak writes that Derrida investigates "how we produce truth" instead of just "truth" because "truth" is an inadequate term for truth after Derrida: the displacement of truth into the possibility of its being in reserve within its production is his legacy, a legacy Spivak understands and seeks to teach us. So, in the end, it is in this sense that we must speak of both Derrida and, in a different way, Heidegger as philosophers of truth. That is, like Spivak, we must speak of them equally (or, even better, evoking a displacement) as philosophers of how we produce of truth.