Hegel on Kant

All this is just crazy speculation--I'm trying to think through the links between Hegel and Kant--specifically how Hegel sees Kant's inadequacy in books like Faith and Knowledge:
Hegel is often seen as the person who recuperates negativity or negation from the realm of untruth and puts it in the service of truth. That is, he is seen as the person who makes the presence of negativity not the mere assertion that something is wrong or untrue, but that it is on the way to truth. Viewing events or things this way makes them not sites of pure positive identity in opposition to what they are not (to their negation), but permeates them with that precise not-ness, with their negation, such that what they are not is an integral element that makes them what they are. For instance, life is not just the opposition of something to death, but really is death insofar as it is life--it is death that is living, death that is not yet death, life that is still not yet what-it-already-is-not.
In doing so is seen mostly to react to Fichte and Schelling, for whom the transcendental unity of apperception, the "I" or self-consciousness that unified existence had to oppose itself to a not-I in order to be. That is, Hegel is saying that Fichte (primarily) and Schelling are wrong is merely opposing a self-consciousness to what it is not, but that self-consciousness must be conceived as already what it is not, in the way we just described--this is what Hegel means when he says substance must be considered as subject, i.e. must be considered as substance that is already not substance, is already changing (i.e. becoming what it is not, and therefore, as change, is subject).
But this reaction does not seem to most people to connect to Kant. That is, it is only seen as a reaction to those who react to Kant: Kant in a sense is seen as not able to be reacted to on this particular issue of negativity. Why?
I think the consensus is that Kant doesn't go as far as Fichte in asserting that the "I" of self-consciousness or apperception must be so very in opposition to the not-I, to the object. And to an extent this is true: Kant is only concerned with apperception's opposition to sensibility, as a pure act of understanding: the existence of the object does not mean anything to him in this case, but only how the object is represented (and thus this is why Fichte, to make Kant's idealism less indifferent to the object, must focus on the object).
But I think this is only part of the story--because it only takes account of Kant's words themselves, and does not really take into account what Hegel says about Kant. Rather, I'll suggest that Kant doesn't specifically come up while Hegel is discussing negativity because, for Hegel, as he writes in 1802 in Faith and Knowledge, Kant's whole philosophy is negative. That is, the consciousness Kant articulates in the Critique of Pure Reason and elsewhere is precisely a consciousness that is the negation of itself. How? It is the consciousness only of the inability of it to reach a priori knowledge--as Hegel puts it, "the Kantian philosophy remains entirely within the antihesis" of cognition or consciousness and its reality, and as such this consciousness is only a critique of the cognitive faculties" (Faith and Knowledge). In other words, the picture of cognition that we get from Kant in the Critique is merely in itself a critique of cognition.
This may be distorting a little what Hegel is saying, but I'm gambling that it might be right. At least its an interesting standpoint from which to see what Hegel is doing with Kant. Hegel's most extended criticisms of Kant himself tend to be regarding the "thing-in-itself" and its absurdity--never really touching specifically how the issue of how negation works in Kant with regard to apperception or self-consciousness (see the opening of the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit). One could indeed connect the necessity of the thing-in-itself with apperception and see how Hegel might think of it as negative. But if we consider Kant as he is seen by Hegel in this larger way--i.e. in such a way that we grasp the Kantian consciousness just as the pure function of negativity itself--we might see how for Hegel restoring the concept of negativity to the service of cognition is really a completion of the critique of Kant.
The question remains how precisely Hegel would see this consciousness as negative or as negation in Kant. If it in its structure is governed by the inability to penetrate into the content of the a priori or the real, transcendental apperception would be the purest form of this inability, and thus the purest form of this negativity-as-consciousness. But how? Well, Hegel says that apperception is the connection of two opposite faculties: the sensible and the understanding through the imagination. To say that this is the most negative act is to say that the conception of these faculties as opposed is the highest expression of the inability to comprehend the a priori. And in a sense this is true: it is the moment when the understanding is most governed by the a priori--not when it is most able to grasp it itself: this is still, and always, impossible for it.
The next step for Hegel, then, is to see that this connection of two faculties is the negative expression of the real case--which is the identity of the two faculties, out of which their difference follows (and not the other way around). Taking this view, then, Fichte and Schelling are two philosophers who are attempting to negate this negativity in the wrong way--not two people who originally bring philosophy to the point where it just inadequately thinks of self-conscousness. As Hegel says in the Phenomenology, with Kant philosophy is brought to its Concept--that is, it is brought to a level at which it can grasp consciousness in its act of self-consciousness. But it is not yet brought to that self-consciousness as self-consciousness: this is Hegel's task, and this is what Fichte and Schelling do wrong. Kant then actually succeeds in some way: he brings self-consciousness to philosophy successfully--i.e. really. He can only explicate this however as a negation, not in a negation that comprehends its full structure as negation (the negation of the negation).