I know it isn't a popular opinion, but I think there is much to be said for Rorty's pragmatist interpretation of Heidegger. Why? Well, it makes the claims that Hubert Dreyfus' interpretation of Heidegger is pragmatist sound absolutely foolish. Dreyfus isn't a pragmatist. He is a phenomenologist. And if people are going to accuse his phenomenology of being too pragmatic, too unconcerned in the more "transcendental" issues Heidegger is bringing up, well, they should probably not call Heidegger a phenomenologist then. And if they do that, they miss precisely what Heidegger was doing with phenomenology even in the introduction to Being and Time. In other words, they should probably think of him as a Kantian, which is just as absurd as not calling him a phenomenologist.Rorty, then, shows what a real pragmatist interpretation of Heidegger would have to be. And he does so precisely by taking Heidegger's more "transcendental" remarks seriously. If he is errs in his interpretation, it is precisely in not considering Heidegger's phenomenology in the way Dreyfus does--in short, by considering only his more "Kantian" transcendental statements (for what it is worth, he errs in the opposite direction with Derrida and Nietzsche, by not considering these claims enough). In short, Dreyfus, far from being a pragmatist, actually combats the position of Rorty continuously, in my view.
And this already is how Rorty can be extremely useful, as I said. But he is most useful in this manner when he interprets (quite rigorously, I might add) the claims Heidegger makes regarding truth, particularly in "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" but also in Being and Time. While one may disagree with his conclusions about the correspondence theory of truth in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, in considering Heidegger he has to flesh out exactly what a sort of non-correspondence theory of truth would have to be. If one can get past his statements that sound like relativism--which they are not, because they are pragmatist (Rorty I think enjoys or finds useful--like Derrida--being scandalous [I later took this word back, cf. my comment below] and always makes his pragmatist claims sound as relativist as possible, while always opposing relativism--perhaps to show, quite nobly I think, that pragmatism can oppose relativism right at the limit where the two might come together)--Rorty is exactly right in saying that a non-correspondence theory of truth in Heidegger is an attempt to get outside the power struggles that correspondence theories of truth since Plato have made us enter into. On Rorty's reading, then, one can see in a different way why Heidegger would so vigorously oppose Nietzsche. It is not because of a sort of leveling-down of all things into expressions of
objectivity that Heidegger is opposing primarily but the fact that in Nietzsche truth is always a form of dominance. Eliminating or toning-down this dominance-structure in truth is Heidegger's objective--or is at least one of them. This is a hard thought for many Heideggerians to think, I think. But it is extremely rewarding, because one doesn't then have to disclaim that non-correspondence truth is just an other type of truth that, as it were, supervenes upon the truth that is correspondence, as Dreyfus tends to do in order to make Heidegger a bit more palatable there. Indeed, in the end, Dreyfus is right that Heidegger isn't calling for something totally different than the correspondence theory of truth to all of a sudden take over our dealings with truth. Correspondence has a particular role to play still. And so Rorty I think is ultimately wrong when it comes to what Heidegger is claiming, precisely because he does not see this role other than as a mere means that pragmatists' non-correspondence dealings with truth will employ. But he is extremely useful for going a little beyond Dreyfus to flesh out the possibilities that are there.Of course, someone who thinks Dreyfus is full of it to begin with for not dealing with Division II (an inane criticism, since he is always dealing with it) and more "transcendental" statements (again, which he always does) will not learn anything from Rorty in this respect. And thus one can see why their being closed-off to this interpretation, thinking that they are really "going beyond" the supposedly watered-down Anglo-American Heidegger, is mere self-righteousness. One should emphasize that Stiegler and Derrida (and, now that I think about it, John Sallis and Jean-Luc Nancy) are some examples of thinkers who did remain open to this Heidegger, and one can see by the amazing nature of their interpretation that it is quite profitable to do so. If they break with Heidegger on certain issues, one could make the case that they are precisely breaking with this effort of Heidegger to remove power from truth: they assert that power is still around even in Heidegger's truth, and this is why they keep calling themselves more Nietzschian than Heideggerian (Derrida goes so far as to call for the rescue of Nietzsche from a Heideggerian interpretation--cf. the opening pages of Of Grammatology).
3 comments:
This was interesting. I've been a long-time reader of Rorty, and a not-so-longtime reader of Heidegger, so this juxtaposition was nice.
I assume you've been reading volume 3 of the Philosophical Papers. After you finish the section on Derrida, you should read a short book called "Deconstruction and Pragmatism" which is the transcript between a debate of sorts between Simon Critchley, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Richard Rorty, and Derrida himself.
I disagree with your claim that correspondence is still an important aspect of any dealings with truth, though. In his works, besides Heidegger exegesis, he seems to do a nice job explaining that the whole notion is incoherent to begin with. Truth refers to sentences, not objects so it makes little sense to speak of "correspondence" since redescription is always possible. If you get a chance, you should read the two essays in Philosophy and Social Hope "Relativism: Finding and Making" as well as "Truth without Correspondence to Reality".
Thanks for a great and interesting post. I wish more people spent time talking about Rorty, frankly.
Wonderful post. I'm reading his essays on Heidegger now and its interesting to see how Anglo-American's 'see' Heidegger though I worry they see him in the sense of the appearance a la Heidegger's idea of appearance in b+t intro. We could do with more American eyes traversing across the Continental. As for Sallis I am convinced he is the most important reader of Heidegger alive. Perhaps only Gadamer understood it as well or as 'lightning'.
Thank you all for your comments... I'm just starting out in encountering Rorty but I find him amazingly intriguing, and, indeed, like you said, I wish more people talked about him. I think this lack is due to what I pretty stupidly call his "being scandalous," (a characterization which is unjustified as it is) by which I really mean his style. He's brutally honest, always. But actually behind this honesty are extremely probing meditations that could be expressed perhaps less honestly but more subtly. So people read him and just pay attention to the surface. I'd like to think my juxtaposition here is trying to look a little deeper in Rorty, just like some of my comments on Derrida--who frankly is exactly the same way with respect to being brutal. It's not that good thoughts are subtle--its just that more interesting connections are being made in Rorty's head than on the page. All this is merely what Derrida calls this paying attention to textuality or the text.
I've actually read all those things you suggested, but thank you thank you for suggesting them: I love getting pointers. The volume on pragmatism is great if only because Rorty's essay is indeed absolutely brilliant. You can see Derrida being happy at this in his response. However, I think fundamentally Rorty misunderstands Derrida continuously throughout his career, mainly because he's so fascinated with this non-correspondence thing you bring up... and rightly so. Its a radical claim, one I think everyone except Dewey backs off from--and this is including Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and, as I said, Heidegger. Derrida too. The point about Derrida is that he constructs a practice that supposedly can accommodate this non-correspondence through that "optimism" Rorty is constantly talking about, and that is actually quite coherent if a bit hard to think. I don't think Rorty sees this, though he does see its possibility. However, Rorty nevertheless often equates Derrida with his position which critiques correspondence, which is to miss an entire other half of Derrida. And this is why Derrida is happy that Rorty calls him an optimist or a romantic, differentiating himself from Rorty. The point is that for Derrida, its just not that easy to junk correspondence. We are supposedly caught in a double bind between correspondence and non-correspondence: acting out of that position is the act of "deconstruction," not merely just showing how a correspondence position inevitably is based on a non-correspondence "reality." Thus textuality as I said above: the text for Derrida *isn't* the words on the page, the words merely considered as non-corresponding to the things they evoke but merely, as you say, just referring back to themselves or the sentences in which they are in. The text is only this *and* the further need to think of them as corresponding to objects. For all I know, this may in the end be precisely what Rorty calls relativism, but I don't know yet. I think though Rorty doesn't totally get what Derrida is up to. Few do--probably not even Derrida. Regardless, I think Rorty is great for striking up a dialogue between the two--its something the more myopic and polemical Derrida (that is, in terms of striking up academic conversations) probably wouldn't have done. The whole point though is that the correspondence theory of truth isn't going to be gotten "beyond" overnight so I find your thought that "it makes little sense" to speak about it perhaps just a little too hasty--or at least perhaps would be a little too hasty for Rorty.
I don't say that out of any personal belief or anything. Rather, I say it because this is perhaps the entire problem of the Continent right now: they feel they have taken up this non-correspondence theory of truth and ran with it (Derrida included) but are realizing that it is actually quite hard to do so. This leads to the strange fact that I think many Continental-leaning people would read my post and say "so what?" thinking correspondence is a thing of the past. Thankfully, Paul Ennis isn't that way, though he seems like he might find Rorty a bit of a slog though enlightening in some respects. I don't blame him--ultimately, I feel the same way. But patience is required, I think, because as you both say, the dialogue is ultimately worth it, and, perhaps more importantly, the problems it raises are absolutely intriguing. In fact, they are unbelievably rich--it isn't like the Continental people are "stooping" to the level of the Anglophones or the Anglophones are deigning to enter the jargon filled atmosphere of Continental thought. The thoughts are explosive, in fact--it's like reading Kant's third Critique trying to see it bridge the gap between the first two--and I think this is largely due to the wonderful effort of Rorty. What is *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* but an incredible reminder of how freaking hard it is to rigorously think about a non-correspondence theory of truth? That is, how quickly it can be covered up by something that looks like it is "beyond" the correspondence theory, and its revolutionary spirit completely forgotten for several decades if not more? The real fun I think is in the interplay between the two--that's why I'm partial to Derrida. But also moments like here, for example, in what Rorty thinks about power and Heidegger: this is a new term (that is, in how its operating) for both Rorty and for Heidegger here--how often do we get something so totally new and interesting being thought? This is why I like Dreyfus: he's constantly thinking right here between the correspondence and non-correspondence, trying to do neurobiology and Merleau-Ponty, for example.
So I think you may be right about Sallis, Paul, but perhaps look more at Dreyfus--especially his more recent articles. People are too quick to dismiss him rather than looking at him as a challenge to be more rigorous or to think in this wonderful, powerful "between." That said, I think you are *absolutely* right about Gadamer. Absolutely. There I will ultimately say that, perhaps with the exception of Derrida... actually, no, screw it, you're right... there just simply is no better interpreter than Gadamer. This is because he understands precisely that the problem in Heidegger is throwness, facticity, etc. and less projection, existentiality, etc. For me, the most unbelievable chapter in Being and Time is the one on historicity. *Truth and Method* is amazing, then, because it basically is a whole interpretation of that chapter (along with the one on being-in, truth and understanding). I wish Rorty would talk more about that, and temporality more generally--if anyone knows where I should look for that, tell me!
Sorry if I've been too general in characterizing your opinions: they are wonderful and I'm glad I could write something that would appeal to such amazing minds. In the end, like I said, I think it is rare to find a substantive discussion of Rorty out there, so I'm so glad people are willing to talk about him here.
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