An attempt at a paper. Here is the introduction, which discusses Franco Moretti and the merits of what he's up to. I'm concerned not with distant reading itself (which I think has amazing potential), but how we get to distant reading from close reading:Franco Moretti’s recent work is motivated by astonishment at the “minimal fraction of the literary field we work on” (Graphs, Maps, Trees, 3) He considers the field minimal because the actual amount of literary works produced in a span of time often dwarfs even the most expansive canon of that period that we indeed study (one of his favorite observations is that even a canon of two hundred nineteenth century novels would be still “less then one percent” of what was then produced ("Slaughterhouse of Literature")). Even more importantly, the literary field is minimal in that the distribution of these works as well as the forms that they use and modify continually overflows the national and linguistic borders within which our research moves. He therefore argues—most forcefully in Graphs, Maps, Trees—that literary critics should practice the study of these distributions of (world) literature as systems, as wholes, since “a field this large cannot be understood by stitching together separate bits of knowledge about individual cases” (GMT, 3) This means working off of models (like graphs or maps), produced by collaborative efforts at gathering and processing data, in dozens of languages, about when and where formal innovation occurs. In short, literary criticism should be brought closer to something like a sociology of literary forms.
Now, even if we do not agree with these conclusions, Moretti’s work perhaps has an effect over which we should linger. Flipping through journals, we begin to notice that we see only large blocks of text—no tables or charts, let alone graphs, maps, or trees. Opening up newly published studies, we find four or five chapters considering one or two literary figures, each investigated one by one—cases indeed stitched together. Walking through the literary criticism section in the library, we notice that few books have their spines lettered with more than one name—direct collaboration is relegated to the “acknowledgements.” In short, Moretti’s work starts to reveal that some of the least methodologically informed aspects of our criticism might indeed be methodologically determined. The infrequency with which we use quantitative data, the case by case basis of argument, and the lack of collaborative research are exposed as three very prevalent assumptions about how we should work—namely, that we should talk about the qualities internal to literature, do so by investigating singular cases of literary activity, and express our findings as a solitary critical consciousness—that we thought were just the form our critical work usually takes.
This is to say Moretti perhaps calls into question our way of working more than he gives us any new, feasible program for a sociologically based literary criticism (though he and other literary sociologists are making more and more visible the benefits and perhaps even the feasibility of adopting such a program). After reading him, certain practices or methods which give our critical work its distinctive form and character are seen afresh as merely one set chosen out of the many it is possible to adopt. This is not only because Moretti has such a different way of working, but because what his way of working seeks to challenge is indeed our method, and not any existing program for or theory of literature. In fact, it seems as if one of the most important arguments underlying Moretti’s work is that the proliferation of such programs or theories in order to challenge other existing theories of literature might have preserved the unreflective use of these methods. If Paul de Man can point out the similarities of deconstruction to practical criticism in “The Return to Philology,” does this not precisely announce that theoretical revolutions, despite what they claim to change and indeed do change, may change very little in the realm of methodology? Recent efforts to account for literary theory’s “failures” over the last few decades—even recent efforts to “historicize” it—might then be seen as expressing more or less confusedly, more or less belligerently, this frustrating point that Moretti makes clear: theory as it has been practiced might not be focused on altering some basic aspects of how we work.
But if what Moretti challenges is first and foremost our way of working, making visible our reliance on a distinct methodology, how are we to characterize that methodology? We hinted at some of its features above (it perhaps involves interrogating, individually and on a case by case basis, the qualities internal to literature, as opposed to working cooperatively on large fields of data with models). But can we say more definitively what that methodology is that we just assume to be the typical form statements about literature take? Moretti’s use of the term “distant reading” to characterize his own way of working with models and systems makes it clear: in his view our methodology is just the opposite, whatever theoretical approach we may adopt. In other words, close reading, for Moretti, is that way of working which most governs our practice of criticism.
Now, we are immediately tempted to challenge this. Surely there are other ways of working with literature: literary history, for example, might deploy different methods. But I would like to entertain Moretti’s notion that most forms of literary study in America (at least) do rely upon close reading as the way to work, for perhaps—despite the inaccuracies of his generalization—he is getting at something we critics are only beginning grapple with: namely, the tenaciousness of close reading, our dependence upon it and fondness for it despite significant changes in our notions of what literary study should be since it began to be practiced. To get a sense of this tenaciousness, we might merely observe how for so many years and even now, in our everyday speech and even in our critical discussions calling someone’s critical endeavor “a close reading” remains, without exception, a way to compliment or ratify that person’s work. Conversely, we might note that (especially for those still following Derrida) saying “you have not read this closely” remains a way for us to delegitimize what another is claiming about some literary activity. Reading Moretti, we might be surprised that these two little words could ever be used in a disparaging manner—to indicate a lack of rigor. This, however, is only one minor sign of the unremitting, unquestioning faith in close reading’s methodological efficacy which may pervasively govern widely differing critical practices—to which Moretti, I think, seems acutely attuned.
It remains all the more unfortunate, then, that he is not more specific about what, exactly, close reading itself involves. “At bottom,” he says in “Conjectures On World Literature,” “it’s a theological exercise—very solemn treatment of very few texts taken very seriously—whereas what we really need is a little pact with the devil: we know how to read texts, now let’s learn how not to read them.” This is about as specific as he gets: a potshot on the way to a call for something, indeed in some cases anything, different. But Moretti is not specific because he does not need to be specific: as far as he is concerned, close reading can remain a label for the effects of our current methodological dependencies, whatever they involve: the effects being the numerous ways we are denied access to the wide distribution of world literature that “distant reading” considers fundamental—that 99.5% of nineteenth century novels mentioned earlier, and the 99.5% of other fields. But insofar as the use of the term “close reading” carries for us the sense that it does accurately describe something more involved, and remains tenacious precisely because of what it involves—as I, and many of the people who have responded to Moretti’s work, think it does—Moretti fails to make available any more precise knowledge of how specific aspects of how we work lead to these effects or consequences. In doing so, he also fails to capitalize upon one of the most promising aspects of his project, which I have in the preceding tried to outline: for if Moretti can defamiliarize our ways of working, or can show us that our ways of working entail certain methodological decisions, he does not show us any way to alter these decisions. We may not work as collaboratively as we need to be working, for instance, but what in close reading specifically brings about the exclusion of cooperation? “It’s a theological exercise,” only hints at what we need to make explicit in order to responsibly bring about some real change...
Here is the point at which I would say that this is not entirely his fault: indeed, we all think we know generally what close reading entails. But it isn't clear that certain aspects might even be "distant" in the precise sense that Moretti uses that term. I found that many of I.A. Richards' practices in close reading function this way, at the same time as they consolidate a vision of what close reading is and should be that gets taken up by subsequent critics. However, even this vision is not merely homogeneous: significantly, it is internally torn between an analysis of communication and an analysis of the literary, which other critics will emphasize remains irreducible to the communicative.
5 comments:
What you say in the last paragraph about the communicative v. literary is kind of what I was thinking as I read through. I think Moretti has a very useful idea, but I don't know that it would change criticism as much as it would just open up a new field of study.
Although, your points and Moretti's points about close reading and the systems it operates within (the canon, prevailing styles of criticism, etc) excluding so much of the world's literature are good ones. Another good thing is your discussion of "close reading" having become valorized and then appropriated by everyday language. So many positive things are meant by "close," but it also contains what I'd call a myopic or a tunnel vision reading, in some cases. People using it for everything just confuses the situation even more. Like the yahoos on TV who ask interviewees to "deconstruct" someone's speech or something. Anyhow, I think close reading can also take on different meanings depending on what critical camp you're in. A deconstructionist would get close to a word or two and use them to rips things apart, a formalist would treat every word of a short piece with care, a feminist would tease out meaning from a few key scenes...so yeah, it's not even the same thing for everyone.
I think this distant reading is culturally important, but I'm not sure I'm ready to have my Norton Crit Editions invaded with pie charts. Criticism does come in the form of text blocks, but most of us in the "biz" (or in training for it) are quite comfy with reading text blocks and poising our pencils for underlining. The New Historicists and cultural critics are giving us things to think about along these lines for sure.
On another note, part of my love for decon comes from what I see as a two-sided view that's illuminated by it. There's always the inside and outside, the text speculating on the world and the text reflecting on itself. For those of us who are mostly concerned with texts, these kind of readings don't usually leave me feeling like the critic totally missed or chose to ignore something (like so many others do).
Finally, there are plenty of things ignored by our canon, but I can't say I agree with including absolutely everything as game for distant reading, unless the point of it is (I think you said something like this) to just have us be more informed and take a different approach keeping the data in mind when we do sit down to do our "myopic" readings. And that would be its effect on criticism as a whole. How the canon gets figured is over my head, but I have an idea of what's literature and what's not so I guess I'm kind of a snob when it comes to what to include. Hopefully Moretti isn't suggesting that we include Harry Potter, Twilight, The Very Virile Viking, etc when we chart out the data. Maybe I misunderstood that part though.
Other than what is probably just my own confusion and non-grad-studentness getting in the way of understanding, this is and awesome start! I hope it's coming along!
Thanks so much Robyn--it is so valuable (and such a relief!) to hear such clear and insightful feedback!
I share each one of your concerns here, and so that is why, in fact, the paper is not coming along. I find it's a little too broad in certain areas (what is close reading? is a bad, overbroad question to ask since it is indeed now so differently--thank god--appropriated), and a little too specific in others (it places a lot of value in certain specific benefits of the Moretti-project) to really cohere. Oh well. But I think with different questions the essential points of this part might be able to be kept and elaborated upon.
Regardless, to your points. Putting it this way is really great: "A deconstructionist would get close to a word or two and use them to rips things apart, a formalist would treat every word of a short piece with care, a feminist would tease out meaning from a few key scenes...so yeah, it's not even the same thing for everyone." What Moretti is doing, and what is so tempting for people to do, and what I tried to do here, is lump these all together despite the differences--so that you can just talk about them all together as "close reading" as opposed to something new. And perhaps one can do this, but you actually have to have a really good way to bound these things off, and it doesn't seem like he actually has one (and neither do I really). And as you rightly emphasize, at the same time, this also has potential to become just another displacing of the old as unfashionable or uninteresting--in short, just lumping things together to create a new fields of study (instead of changing criticism).
As you saw, the thing I was fascinated with is that there is, somewhere in here, nevertheless, perhaps a potential to change criticism. I would say it comes in precisely doing what you yourself acknowledge would change criticism, but in putting the emphasis on something else:
"There are plenty of things ignored by our canon, but I can't say I agree with including absolutely everything as game for distant reading, unless the point of it is (I think you said something like this) to just have us be more informed and take a different approach keeping the data in mind when we do sit down to do our "myopic" readings. And that would be its effect on criticism as a whole. How the canon gets figured is over my head, but I have an idea of what's literature and what's not so I guess I'm kind of a snob when it comes to what to include."
The thing that would be changed--in my view, and not entirely Moretti's because he isn't as clear about this as he should be--the thing that would be changed is the very last bit: it is not that we would have a wide ranging and expansive canon, but that we wouldn't have to make personal decisions about what constitutes literature or not. In other words, the decision would just be less personal, more objective. It would reflect the movements of the system more than what we think about the system.
This doesn't mean that Harry Potter then will become all that we study, but that we might actually give serious thought as to why we are excluding it right now. Or to put it differently, we would have to give serious thought about the book *alongside* what we already study: the borders of the canon would become more flexible, and pull them in the direction of seeing how certain texts relate to a system of exchanges that are actually out there. If something changes in this system, we couldn't then just ignore it: we would have to react and assert, without any recourse to something abstract like taste, why it is trashy or not worth our time. And we could do so precisely with other data about the system.
But eh, who knows. I agree with you totally about decon--as you know I'm a decon dude at heart. But I'm trying to think of other ways to consider "the text" that we analyze... I'm trying to overcome precisely the "tunnel vision" that you talked about. I'd put it like so: I'm trying to find where exactly we can move from what's on the page to whats out there in the world, in the way that Derrida does when, say, he talks about the first world war when reading Freud in The Post Card. The question here becomes--how can we more accurately discern that move? That folding of what we thought was hors-texte back into textuality and dissolving the boundaries? Derrida sometimes does it so quickly since he's trying to show us what play can do, but it needs to be made more explicit how we are guiding these (always inadequate) moves away from the tunnel vision (while still preserving close attention to the new, generalized text).
One answer is precisely something like feminism: feminism is a project that directs that move (and critiques itself at each stage of this directive activity). And insofar as we take up the Moretti "system," it seems to overlook that there are valuable--and strategic, political, essential--ways already available to loosen up the textual borders in the ways that I'm talking about. When we make a decision about what is trash and what is not as a feminist, then, who is to say that we aren't precisely doing the very good thing that I'm talking about above? i.e. not basing our claims on something like abstract taste, but very extant set of practices and ways of speaking about practices that are out there--that is, with reference to what Moretti would call a system: we make our judgments precisely with reference to this system, using the materials of that system (its discursive elements) to justify our choices, and do not take it for granted (unless we are bad critics).
This is all confusing to me--as you can see, I am writing horribly here and I apologize, given that your response was so clear--but I'm now just articulating what is very suspect to me in not only Moretti's project but my own: we presuppose that all reading hitherto has been directed by something like "taste," when theory in general and certain discourses like feminism in particular have over the years already tried to take down this abstract, white male, old school thing. In other words, "close reading" then--particularly as theory and certain 80's disourses say practiced it--becomes a straw man, unless you recognize that it's already doing certain things that you're calling "distant" reading. This is one way of returning to what you were getting at: what decon achieves in its making you feel like it's gotten at what the text is doing, with its two-sided view. The two-sidedness is already a form of this "distance" in a way--that's I guess how I'd connect this to what I'm saying here--and this precisely means you don't have to get out there with a huge "distant reading" project... unless you want to forget precisely how decon and other things are already doing distance.
Wow, this is really sloppy and circular and poorly written (it's been a busy week) but I hope it's clear a bit what just happened: I've been distancing myself from decon and Derrida over the last few months--if only to get some perspective on how long I have spent studying him and how much he's influenced my view of literature--and so engaged in this project. But here I think I've just realized that not all this skepticism is really worth it. Which is great news for me, cause I love Derrida. But even better, I was concerned about the issues that Moretti was bringing up--regarding opposing abstract taste--and was worried that Derrida wasn't at all able to address them. I don't know how I got this in my head, but now I'm seeing that he does address them, and theory in general does, and so now can return back to decon and theory a bit more happily... Anyway, I don't know if this all made any sense--but I hope you'll take it all as a big thank you for the comments! I don't know if I got it right yet at all, but I feel like this has been super helpful.
Haha, don't worry about being unclear - it's near the end of the year and I have no idea what I'm writing anymore. I've been piling up a deskfull of A-minuses, you know, the minus that's kind of a nudge from those profs who know you were holding back (or in my case, and probably in your case too, the profs who know you're spending too much working time reading too many other things!).
Your comment-comment really illuminates even more of the things that I was thinking about your post. Especially the last bit about distancing yourself from Derrida -- your "anxiety of influence" in the lit-philo realm? Just a look at your categories and the huge pile of Derrida, etc. posts made me wonder "Where is this 'science' coming from!?"
I am having doubts too, but in a broader sense. I'm having "canon anxiety" and I'm trying to get started on writing about that today.
A little skepticism is healthy, as is an occasional reevaluation of your personal angle on literature -- but at some point you just know you like Derrida or de Man or whoever, and you know he's going to stick with you forever, and that's ok! I'm finding it is a good exercise to write things that make me uncomfortable, even if I am already charting a swift return to my theoretical safe-havens.
Excellent post. I especially appreciated the description of Moretti's "reversal" of the connotations of "close reading." I've seen the point summarized elsewhere, yet I found yours really poignant.
I'd be curious to see more of this. And perhaps I can suggest a link -- Jane Dark's review of Moretti: http://janedark.com/2009/03/poetics_world_clouds.html Some of the discussion of poetry might be helpful re: "close reading."
Only one point where I might offer a suggestion. You write that "Moretti perhaps calls into question our way of working more than he gives us any new, feasible program for a sociologically based literary criticism." I'm not sure if I agree. Graphs, Maps, Trees is loaded with proposed hypotheses and interesting avenues of investigation, as is Modern Epic and Atlas (to say nothing of more recent NLR articles). This seems like more in the way of a "program" than I feel like I get from many works in the humanities.
Thanks Allen--but I do have to take issue with "this seems like more in the way of a "program" than I feel like I get from many works in the humanities." You seem to be talking about two things, one of which I indeed praise about Moretti, the other of which is the point behind my skepticism in saying "Moretti perhaps calls into question our way of working more than he gives us any new, feasible program for a sociologically based literary criticism."The first thing is Moretti's clarity, roughly speaking: that is, his ability to provide us with a model of reading that does not base itself on obscuring things but calls for a definite outline of what will be undertaken. This is what makes him have a good "program" in your sense of the word. He gives us a program because he develops a model of reading that has clear goals and clear ways of getting there.
In this sense, I don't think we disagree at all. I like this about Moretti. But then you also seem to interpret "having a program" as just giving us certain research methods that are unproblematic--that are tried and true and clearly can be adopted, most notably because they are adopted in places like sociology already. Well, that's nice, but I don't know if it is a virtue in and of itself for something to just be very able to be picked up. The whole issue is not whether Moretti's mode of criticism *works*: it indeed provides us with something. It is whether we should bend what we already are doing towards how he works, and indeed how that will come about. In short, I don't think you can just have a bunch of people pick up the methods of sociology, say, and thereby change criticism. Moretti is indeed trying to find some nice middle ground, to indeed bend what we're doing closer to these already established methods. But it isn't clear that these things are just able to be picked up like that--and thereby solve the problems of criticism. Moretti still often acts as if this is the case: that the ways of working he offers are unproblematic in themselves. And if that is your notion of what "being programmatic" entails, well I have to disagree with you--precisely in saying that Moretti isn't as programmatic as he might seem, as I did above.
Let me be clearer--he offers a lot of things for you to try out, and that's great. But it isn't clear that just picking one of these methods up is virtue in itself--because frankly it isn't clear, for the humanities, that they aren't bound by certain (most notably historical, but also cultural) limits, and the real question is what value (what effects) their use will have. We want to know the effectivity of the thing a bit before we actually pick it up--if only to be better able to see what the general structure of the (absolutely true) results will be (that is, if only to make the use more effective). Moretti is making a case that outlines some possible modes of that effectivity, and insofar as he does that it is great. But when he then just says--as he does often--that we just need to begin to pick them up and see what happens, he's making the same mistake that you make in thinking that what is unproblematic is therefore what we should try out.
When I say he doesn't give us a feasible program, I mean then that many times he falls into this trap and just asks us to pick up the sociological mode just for the hell of it. This is not either feasible (in that it does not help us understand how exactly to integrate this study into what we do already, but presupposes its use is unproblematic) or programmatic (in that the programmatic is not the same as the unproblematic) in my book.
It also tends to discount--as you do--the programmatic status of many theories of literature that have proliferated over the years: this is what I was getting at in my comment above. Indeed, theory might not be as clear as one wants, but it definitely works programmatically, in my sense of the term: it does not consider any approach to the object of study as just unproblematic, however much it might advocate this. And the efforts to try and account for why often make up its halting nature, its lack of clarity. But in this case, the lack of clarity is a virtue--I'd say--because theory is working out what other fields would just take for granted and try out (notably because they can get vast reserves of funding for that purpose, and because their results are more easily convertible into products). It is being concerned with the limits of a particular approach's effectivity *before* adopting it and *while* adopting it.
So that's what I'm saying here: we should take Moretti as a theorist more than as a guy who is advocating unproblematic research modes. Only then do I try and look into what is new about Moretti: he might have in certain ways stumbled upon ways of working that would ask these theoretical questions without certain effects of this halting, unclear theory. And this is not something totally programmatic, but something that has to be worked out before being adopted--that is its virtue, I was saying.
This is part of a larger problem: this sort of reflection on the limits of a possible mode of working *before* or *as* one adopts it, rather than merely adopting it, is the current way that literature in particular, but the humanities more generally, still retain the evaluative function that everybody thinks they have gotten rid of. This is, in short, our way of weighing the value of the thing involved not unlike how old critics would say "this work is valuable literature, necessary for meaningful social life, for well educated gentlemen." Theory preserves what is essential about these sorts of statements--that they look at the limits of a discourse or a mode of operating--and discards their faith in certain abstractions ("meaningful social life etc."): discards this faith because it asks for more precision about what these things mean and how they function. The effect might even be the same: we might end up supporting what these abstractions signify--that is, we might theoretically defend the use of something in the name of its being part of a meaningful education--but we do so precisely, with a deeper look into what we mean by all this. We still evaluate, that is: we just try to make this evaluation precisely more determinate, more scientific, while preserving its essential function. And this I think is a good thing.
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