A very nice recent lecture on G.E. Moore: G.E. Moore and Cambridge Philosophy. It's given by Thomas Baldwin, who edits Mind. Baldwin is very interested in something that has always fascinated me, and particularly fascinates me about Moore as I have been reading him occasionally over the past year: the effort of several thinkers at Cambridge after McTaggart to outline a version of experience that is roughly realist in a very--how to put it--odd manner. In other words, Moore in particular wants to show subjective idealism to be odd precisely by trying to show how it cannot account for the odd aspects of common perception--not by just asserting that it isn't dealing with normal or usual aspects of perception. This is what underlies Russell's thought too at a certain time, in his work on naming and knowledge by acquaintance versus knowledge by description. Thanks to Jethro for putting the link up.
Friday, April 3, 2009
G.E. Moore
A very nice recent lecture on G.E. Moore: G.E. Moore and Cambridge Philosophy. It's given by Thomas Baldwin, who edits Mind. Baldwin is very interested in something that has always fascinated me, and particularly fascinates me about Moore as I have been reading him occasionally over the past year: the effort of several thinkers at Cambridge after McTaggart to outline a version of experience that is roughly realist in a very--how to put it--odd manner. In other words, Moore in particular wants to show subjective idealism to be odd precisely by trying to show how it cannot account for the odd aspects of common perception--not by just asserting that it isn't dealing with normal or usual aspects of perception. This is what underlies Russell's thought too at a certain time, in his work on naming and knowledge by acquaintance versus knowledge by description. Thanks to Jethro for putting the link up.
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